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ABSTRACT 
Estimating Fare and Expenditure Elasticities of Demand for Air Travel in the U.S. 
Domestic Market. (December 2005) 
Ahmad Abdelrahman Fahed Alwaked, B.A., Yarmouk University, Irbid, Jordan; 
M.A., Yarmouk University, Irbid, Jordan 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Steven N. Wiggins 
 
This study estimates the demand for domestic air travel services in the United 
States in order to calculate the fare and expenditure elasticities of demand. We 
segmented the market according to number of operating airlines, distances and traveler 
types. Using Seemingly Unrelated Regression to estimate the Almost Ideal Demand 
System (AIDS), we find that the expenditure and uncompensated own-fare elasticities 
are around unity and consistent with the previous literature. Results reveal a tendency of 
uncompensated own-fare elasticity to decrease as distance increases, and a tendency of 
uncompensated own-fare elasticity to increase as number of airlines increases. Due to 
few observations, business travelers’ results are not reliable to make any conclusion. 
Leisure travelers’ results are closer to all travelers’ results. 
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CHAPTER I 
                                                        INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation estimates the demand for domestic air travel services in the 
United States (U.S.) in order to calculate the fare and expenditure elasticities of demand. 
Travel demand studies have estimated the demand and fare elasticity by using varied 
approaches, but none of these studies used the Almost Ideal Demand System approach 
(hereafter, AIDS) in the estimation.  
The focus of this dissertation is to estimate the demand for air travel services 
facing airlines in different market structures. Also, this dissertation examines the factors 
that produce the differences in airfare responsiveness. The estimation of demand in 
airline industry, and calculation of fare elasticity is a very important exercise to examine 
the effect of airlines mergers, to enhance the airlines pricing strategy, or to quantify the 
welfare gain or loss of travelers. The precision of the estimated demand coefficients will 
help in testing the responsiveness of air travelers to changes in airfares more accurately, 
and consequently, to help establish the actions of airlines or public policy makers. 
The analysis in this dissertation encompasses major national and regional airlines 
(see Appendix F for a complete list). These airlines serve most of U.S. domestic airports 
and compete with each other in different airports combinations. 
 
 
________________________ 
This dissertation follows the style and formats of The Journal of Law, Economics & Organization.  
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Since deregulation in 1978, the airlines have the freedom to set airfares and 
routes served. During the pre-deregulation period 1938-78, the Civil Aeronautics Board 
(CAB) controlled both the routes airlines flew and the airfares they charged, with the 
goal of serving the public interest. Jung & Fujii (1976) reported an incident that 
happened between CAB and airlines regarding the difference in estimated fare elasticity 
of demand for air travel between San Francisco and Los Angeles. This study indicated 
the importance of estimating fare elasticity of air travel demand more precisely, and how 
different estimation models produced different fare elasticities.  The CAB and airlines 
estimated the fare elasticity of air travel demand, and tried to support their decisions or 
requests of fare changes. CAB estimated that the demand for air travel was elastic, 
which means a reduction in fare will increase the airlines’ total revenue. Airlines 
estimated the demand for air travel was inelastic, which means a reduction in fare would 
decrease the airlines’ total revenue. 
Air travel demand estimation, and subsequently fare elasticity calculations, has 
evolved through the years. The literature on air travel demand is wide and diverse. The 
first estimated model was the aggregate modal split.  This model was found to suffer 
from weak behavioral basis and a restrictive functional form. Consequently, the 
aggregate behavioral model of travel demand was then developed, which was based on 
the theory of consumer and producer behavior. The third type of model used is the 
disaggregated behavioral demand based on the theory of consumer behavior.  The latter 
model has richer empirical specifications and uses all of the information provided by the 
data on traveler choice and modes attributes. However, the disaggregate demand model 
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suffers from many problems such as the need to include considerable data to carry out 
the estimation, and the need to include information about the characteristics of all modes 
contains in the travelers’ choice. Also, in case of large-scale studies that include large 
number of city pairs, disaggregate behavior demand model is less practical than the 
aggregate demand model. 
In the last two decades, two new approaches for estimating demand have been 
developed and used widely. It is difficult to choose between these two approaches 
because each has advantages and shortcomings. The choice of any approach depends on 
the research question and framework. The first approach is the random coefficient 
discrete choice model. Although this model possesses many advantages, it needs prior 
parametric assumptions, and assumed functional forms. Further this model requires more 
computational intense than the other model. Also, if fares are extremely high, the 
quantity demanded still obtained. This shortcoming leads to the overestimation of the 
welfare effect.  
The second approach is the multistage budgeting demand model. It has a flexible 
functional form and requires less computational work. At the same time, it requires a 
priori segmentation of choices and goods, which impose some restrictions on the overall 
pattern of substitution across the goods.  This model permits an unconstrained pattern of 
conditional cross-fare (price) elasticities across products within a sub-segment. Also, this 
model aggregates perfectly over consumers without requiring a linear relationship 
between the quantity of a good consumed and consumer’s income (or Engel curve). This 
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model predicts that at some fare level, quantity demanded is zero. The bottom level of 
this model uses AIDS in the estimation. 
Previous studies have predicted different behaviors by different types of 
travelers, business and leisure travelers; by trip distance, long, medium and short trips 
distances; and by destination, domestic or international. Estimated demand model should 
generally distinguish between these distinct market’s segments, and estimate the fare 
elasticity separately for each segment. The estimated fare elasticity of each market 
segment will be more precise and reliable than the overall fare elasticity of the air travel 
market.  
In this study, data reveal that there are nine categories of city pairs based on the 
number of airlines serving these city pairs. Airlines act differently based on the number 
of competitor(s) on the city pair. Also, the fare elasticity of demand differs with number 
of competitors serving those city pairs. The city pairs are segmented into five 
distinguished markets starting from monopoly to five airlines. 
The literature on demand for air travel is broad and varied. The literature 
reported a wide range of value (-0.04 to –4.51) for estimated own-fare elasticity of air 
travel demand. Oum et al. (1992), Brons et al. (2001) and Gillen et al. (2004) attribute 
this wide range to many factors such as the availability of substitutes, income, motive for 
travel, and the time dimension of the study.  Accordingly, the estimation of demand 
needs to distinguish between leisure or business travelers’ markets, short-sun or long-run 
studies, and domestic or international markets.  
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Oum et al. (1992), Hosken et al. (2002) and Gillen et al. (2004) mention 
measurement drawbacks that related to the previous travel demand studies and the 
interpretations of the estimated elasticities. These drawbacks are the failure to include 
fares and attributes of substitutes, using functional forms without statistical testing, the 
failure to include the variables representing the time horizon of the study, and market 
aggregation or segmentation and the identification problem. 
This dissertation estimates the fare and expenditure elasticities for domestic air 
travel demand in the U.S. using the second quarter data of year 2002. The dissertation 
differentiates between air travelers based on fare classes, and also differentiates among 
trip distances.  This dissertation determines that the estimated conditional 
uncompensated own-fare elasticities are all negative, and within a range of (-0.61 to -
1.29), but inelastic and around unity for most of the airlines. The conditional 
compensated own-fare elasticities are negative and within a range of (-0.19 to -0.97). 
The cross-fare elasticities are positive for the conditional compensated demand and 
mostly negative and small for the uncompensated demand. The explanation for the latter 
is that the income effect outweighs the substitution effect. The expenditure elasticity is 
also around unity and positive for all airlines. The largest airline always has the highest 
conditional uncompensated own-fare and expenditure elasticities. At the same time, it 
has the smallest conditional compensated own-fare elasticity. This means the largest 
airline can increase its fare with less effect on the number of its travelers than the other 
airlines in the market.  
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As predicted by theory, this dissertation finds that own-fare elasticities, in 
general, increase as we move from markets with three airlines to more airline markets, 
and markets with two airlines was an exception. The availability of substitutes may 
explain this trend in estimated own-fare. Also, estimated expenditure elasticity has two 
trends; expenditure elasticity increases with distance for markets with two and three 
airlines, and decreases with distance for markets with four and five-and-more airlines. 
The first trend may be explained by the quality of services provided by largest airline 
that results in more travelers choosing to travel with this airline for longer distances. The 
second trend may be explained by more competition among airlines, in particular the 
competition between largest airline and others. Leisure travelers show evidence of more 
fare elasticity than business travelers; this result is in agreement with theory predictions 
and empirical works. 
The rest of the dissertation is organized as following: Chapter II presents the 
definitions of elasticity and its determinants, the available literature on travel demand 
models, measurements issues and estimated elasticities. Chapter III discusses the choice 
decision framework of air-travelers and presents the demand model. Chapter IV presents 
and discusses the data and estimation results. Chapter V presents the conclusions.  
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CHAPTER II 
THE LITERATURE OF DEMAND FOR AIR TRAVEL ELASTICITIES 
 
This dissertation estimates the fare and expenditure elasticities of demand for 
domestic air travel in the U.S. A key question regards the best estimation technique. The 
literature on the fare elasticity of domestic air travel is broad and varied. The demand 
models used in these studies were either models using aggregate data or discrete choice 
models using aggregate and micro data. This chapter discusses the definitions of 
elasticity and its determinants, the previous literature on travel demand models, 
measurements issues, and estimated elasticities.  
 
Elasticity and Its Determinants 
The fare elasticity of air travel demand measures the sensitivity of air travelers to 
changes in the fare of a trip, holding other factors affecting demand for air travel 
constant. Fare elasticity is classified into compensated and uncompensated fare 
elasticities. The latter is the fare elasticity derived from the ordinary or Marshallian 
demand, which is derived from the consumer maximization problem. The compensated 
fare elasticity is derived from compensated or Hicksian demand, which is derived from 
the consumer minimization problem (minimizes expenditure subject to a given level of 
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utility). The compensated fare elasticity shows the substitution effect1 of a trip fare 
change whereas uncompensated fare elasticity separates the income and substitution 
effects of a fare change. The expenditure elasticity of demand measures the sensitivity of 
air travelers to a change in travel expenditures, holding other factors affecting demand 
for air travel constant.  
The fare elasticity of travel demand is affected by numerous factors. The most 
important factor is the availability of substitutes. Income and expenditures for travel and 
time are also important.   
The number and closeness of substitutes to the product affect the fare elasticity of 
demand. For instance, the expected fare elasticity of demand for air travel will be higher 
for short distances because alternatives such as train, bus, ship or private owned vehicles 
are better substitutes for short trips. While for long distances, there are no close 
substitutes for air travel in terms of speed and time. 
 Another issue of substitutability of demand for travel is related to the level of 
estimated demand; if overall demand for travel is estimated, then the substitute is not to 
travel. Or, if the demand for each mode of transportation (called modal demand) is 
estimated, then the substitutes are other modes of travel. Also, if demand facing each 
provider of certain mode of travel (called intra-modal demand) is estimated, then the 
substitutes are other providers.  The expected fare elasticity will be lower for overall 
demand and the highest for intra-modal demand because of closeness of substitutes. 
                                                 
1 When the fare of an air trip by specific airline changed, there will be two effects; the first is fare 
change will induce traveler to choose another airline, this is the substitution effect. The other effect is a 
trip fare change will change traveler’s real income and subsequently his choices, this is the income effect. 
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Travelers’ expenditures are a key factor that affects the demand for travel. The 
consumer considers traveling by different modes of travel as intermediate good for 
his/her final consumption or production. Air travel is considered as luxury good. The 
demand for air travel will be more sensitive to a fare change when the allocated income 
for air travel of total traveler income is higher. For air travel, Mutti & Murai (1977) 
show that income level relates positively to the demand.  Brons et al. (2001) present the 
relationship between travel expenditure and fare elasticity of air travel. They write 
 if indeed the share of air travel demand is higher for 
consumers with higher income levels, this would suggest 
that, despite a decreasing marginal utility of income and 
the utility losses associated with a fare increase are higher 
for this group of consumers, which would imply they may 
be more fare sensitive than consumers with lower incomes. 
 
The literature cites other factors that affect the substitutability of travel modes 
such as trip distance and the reasons for travel.  Distance, in transportation economics, is 
considered “bad” in utility terms. As distance increases, utility decreases and the demand 
for travel decreases. As distance increases, substitutes for air travel become fewer, while 
for short distance, there are more substitutes with qualities levels more comparable to air 
travel. This implies a negative relationship between fare elasticity of air travel demand 
and distance. 
The cost of the trip affects the decision travel. The cost of long distance trips will 
be higher than the cost of short distance trip; which implies a positive relationship 
between fare elasticity of air travel demand and distance. This suggests that there are two 
counteracting forces in the case of distance and fare sensitivity of air travel. The first is a 
 10
negative relationship between distance and fare sensitivity based on the availability of 
substitutes, and the second is a positive relationship between both distance and fare 
sensitivity based on travel cost.   
The reason for travel is another factor that affects the fare sensitivity of air travel. 
The distinction between travelers based on their reasons for travel is theoretically simple.  
However, it is hard to apply this distinction to empirical work unless the data contains 
explicit information regarding the reason for travel and other information about 
travelers.  The empirical work uses fare classes to distinguish between business travelers 
and leisure travelers, which is a reasonable proxy for defining the reason for travel. The 
main difference between the two types of travelers is better explained by the final goal of 
each: a leisure traveler maximizes his utility from travel and the associated activities 
related to the trip, in order to enjoy the vacation given his budget constraint. Leisure 
expenditures are discretionary, which means travel will compete with other discretionary 
items in a consumer’s budget. The business traveler maximizes his profit from travel and 
the production associated with the trip such as signing contracts and so on. Also, time is 
more important for business travelers than for leisure travelers. The fare elasticity for 
business travelers is expected to be lower than that of leisure travelers due to the cost of 
time and final product of traveling. In other words, business travelers will be willing to 
pay more to reduce the cost of time and to maximize their productivity during travel. 
The latter refers to qualities of the service provided, such as last moment booking, 
flexible travel plans and changes, and better conveniences. 
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Another issue that affects the fare elasticity of travel demand is time. In the long-
run, travelers are more able to adjust for fare change. In theory, travelers are able to 
change the location choice and asset holdings in the long-run, but not in the short-run.  
Oum et al. (1992) emphasize that long-run demand studies for travel should include 
location factors and assets in the estimated model. The short-run fare elasticity of 
demand is expected to be less elastic than the long-run fare elasticity of demand. Cross-
sectional studies are considered to be short-run studies and generate short-run fare 
elasticity of demand. Times series studies, on the other hand, generate long-run fare 
elasticity of demand, because data show the changes in income, competitive 
environment and changes in the markets. 
The literature differentiates among the estimated elasticities. There are different 
types of estimated elasticities; the elasticity of market demand for travel which is derived 
from the estimation of demand for travel relative to non-travel goods. The mode-specific 
demand elasticities are the estimated elasticities of individual mode of transportation, 
and it is higher than the market demand elasticity.2 The mode-choice elasticities are the 
estimated elasticities of different modes of transportation. Mostly, mode-choice studies 
are conducted using the discrete choice model, and the estimation is carried out for a 
given volume of trips or traffic among modes. Also, the mode-choice elasticity does not 
consider the effect of fare changes on overall passengers or trips.  
                                                 
2 Taplin (1980, 1982) discussed the relationship between market demand fare elasticities ( E ) for 
travel and mode-specific fare elasticities ( ijE ). The relationship is ∑ ∑ 

=
i j
iji EsE  where “s” is the share 
of mode “i” of total trips. 
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In addition to the scope of estimated demand, the literature has discussed the 
estimation of the demand facing individual service providers. There are few studies that 
have tried to estimate the effect of market structure on inter-firm competition. These 
studies estimate the conduct parameters (also called conjectural variations) and estimate 
or calculate the firm specific fare elasticity of demand. 
Winston (1985) surveyed the literature on transportation demand carried out in 
economics, engineering and management. The survey aimed to study the conceptual 
development in the analysis of demand and supply of transportation, and then to use this 
development to evaluate the efficiency of different aspects of transportation policies and 
strategies such as pricing, investment regulations.  
Winston (1985) discusses the evolution of demand models for transportation. The 
survey reports three types of demand models developed over time up to 1985. The first 
estimated model for travel demand was the aggregate modal split model. This model 
aims to explain the trips’ share of each mode of transportation between city pairs; hence 
the name of is derived from this model goal. This model attempted to determine the 
number of trips among modes on the basis of relative travel times and costs. The 
variables and data used in this model are modes’ characteristics, cost of each mode, time 
and other variables. Also, the model may include information about passengers’ 
characteristics such as average income and population of each of city. The model 
specification is ad hoc and based on the general law of demand.  
Due to the weak behavioral and theoretical basis, and the restrictive functional 
form of the aggregate modal split model, the aggregate behavioral model of travel 
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demand was developed. The latter model is based on consumer or producer 
maximization behavioral assumptions. It assumes that consumer utility maximization is 
presented by 
max ( )ot XXU ,  subject to YXPXP oott ≤+              (1) 
where YPPXX otot ,,,, are travel modes, other goods, cost of transportation modes, fares 
of other goods and disposable income, respectively. The estimated demand function is 
derived from indirect utility function that results from the maximization problem. The 
data used is aggregate data on mode shares and fare indices and other variables.  
The third model type is the disaggregate behavioral demand.3  This demand 
model is known also as the disaggregate discrete choice model, which has many 
advantages over the aggregate demand model. For example, this model is more based on 
the theory of consumer behavior, has richer empirical specifications and uses all the 
information provided by the data on traveler choice and modes attributes. This model 
assumes that the traveler maximizes his utility by choosing mode “j” 
    ( ) jjj SXUU εβ += ;,                                   (2)                             
where jX  is a set of mode characteristics, S is a set of traveler’s characteristics, β is a set 
of unknown parameters to be estimated, and jε  is unobserved random utility component 
that influences the decision of traveler, including the idiosyncratic preferences for the “j” 
mode. Because part of utility is random, the model predicts choices as probabilities. 
Although the disaggregate demand model has advantages over other models, it suffers 
                                                 
3 This term is used in transportation economics, but the common name for these models is 
disaggregate discrete choice models. Also, it is called individual choice models.  
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from many problems, such as the need to include a considerable data to carry out the 
estimation, and the need to include information about all modes characteristics contains 
in the choice set of traveler, whether it is chosen by the traveler or not. Also, in case of 
large scale studies that include large number of city pairs, disaggregate behavior demand 
model is less practical than the aggregate demand model. 
In the last two decades, two new approaches for estimating demand have 
developed and spread. They are used to estimate the demand for differentiated products 
(such as air travel).4 The pros and cons of each approach make it hard for a researcher to 
choose between them. The first approach is the random coefficient discrete choice 
model,5 which is used by many studies such as those by Berry et al. (1996), Petrin 
(2002), Berry et al. (1996) and Nevo (1999). This model needs prior parametric 
assumptions, assumed functional forms, and imposes intensive computational work than 
multistage budgeting model. Also, if fares are extremely high, the quantity demanded 
still obtained or people still buy this product even if the fare is extremely high, i.e. 
approaches infinity. This shortcoming leads to the overestimation of the welfare effect. 
On the pros side, this model explicitly models and estimates heterogeneity, and estimates 
fewer parameters. The last advantage comes from modeling products as bundles of 
characteristics, and defining preferences over the characteristics space. 
                                                 
4  Nevo (1999) discusses these methods in some detail. Also, Hausman et al. (1994) and 
Chaudhuri et al. (2003) discuss and compare the discrete choice model and the multistage budgeting 
model. Both try to show the advantage of the used model over other models.  
5 Most of disaggregate discrete choice studies prior to this approach were not consider large scale 
data estimation, and not specify the random utility part of the model which include the idiosyncratic 
preferences toward the chosen mode and unobserved traveler and mode characteristics. The advance in 
computer programming and the introduction of BLP, open the way for estimation using this approach. 
Random coefficient approach is an extension to the discrete choice models. 
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The second approach is the multistage budgeting demand model. It has a flexible 
functional form and requires less computational work. At the same time, it requires a 
priori segmentation of choices and goods, which impose some restrictions on the overall 
pattern of substitution across the goods.  This model permits an unconstrained pattern of 
conditional cross-fare (price) elasticities across products within a sub-segment. Also, this 
model aggregates perfectly over consumers without requiring linear income-
consumption relationship (Engel curve). This model predicts that at some fare level, 
quantity demanded is zero, or in other words, at quantity equals zero the fare is not 
infinity. The bottom level of this model uses AIDS in the estimation. 
 
Measurement Issues 
There are different drawbacks (or pitfalls) that relate to the previous studies of 
demand models, and therefore, affect the interpretation of the estimated elasticities. 
These drawbacks were first mentioned by Oum et al. (1992), and later by Gillen et al. 
(2004). Also, Hosken et al. (2002) addresses some of these drawbacks that relate to 
horizontal merger analysis. The following are the most common drawbacks cited by the 
literature: 
1. Fare and Service Attributes of Substitutes: modeling intermodal competition requires 
the inclusion of the fares and attributes of competing modes in the estimation of the 
demand for air travel. Air travel demand can be affected by changes in the fares and 
service quality of other modes, especially for short distance routes (markets). For 
example, if there is a contemporary increase in air travel fare, and in train travel fare 
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(a competing mode for air travel), the estimated model will result in underestimated 
own-fare elasticity, if the fare of traveling by train is not included in the estimation.  
2. Functional Forms: the estimation of different functional forms of demand results in 
different estimated elasticities of demand even when the same data set used. 
Typically, studies of air travel demand use ad hoc demand specifications and have 
not based their choice on statistical test of alternative specification. The majority of 
these studies employed linear or log-linear functional specification. The linear model 
may yield negative cross-fare elasticity for substitutes, which are predicted to be 
positive. There is no guarantee a linear model will yield positive cross-fare elasticity 
for substitutes goods. At the same time, the log-linear model will assume constant 
elasticity and will not meet the adding-up requirement by microeconomic theory. In 
other words, the sum of expenditures shares should equal one. The discrete choice 
model suffers from the independence of irrelevant alternatives (hereafter, IIA) 
property; the exclusion of any product from the consumer choice set will result in 
distributing the consumers of that product to the other products according to the 
overall market shares of these products. The independence of irrelevant alternatives 
results in identical cross-fare elasticities, or in other words, restricts the substitution 
patterns of demand. 
3. Time horizon: as discussed earlier in this chapter, the distinction between short run 
and long run studies is important and will imply different specifications and 
interpretations of the estimated models. The fare elasticity of demand becomes more 
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elastic in long run than in short run, because, in long run, travelers can adjust to the 
fare and quality changes of the air travel services.  
4. Market Aggregation/Segmentation: the level of aggregation will affect the range of 
the elasticity estimates. Moving from aggregate markets to disaggregate markets will 
increase the variability in the elasticity estimates, because aggregation averages out 
some of the underlying variation. The context of analyses will determine the right 
level of aggregation. Large-scale analysis, such as estimating demand for domestic 
air travel demand, are better carried out using the aggregate model, because the 
disaggregate model is more practical and efficient in smaller samples. Another issue 
relating to aggregation is whether the model used in estimation is theoretically and 
empirically consistent with aggregation. As discussed above, air travel market 
segments (i.e. leisure or business trips segments) may differ significantly in its 
characteristics, competition and estimated elasticities. At the end of this chapter, a 
summary of elasticity estimates from different sources and for different countries is 
presented. These results will better demonstrate this point. 
5. Identification Problem: data observed by researchers is data reflecting market 
equilibrium and the interaction of supply and demand. The purported estimation of 
only “demand” or “supply” will result in biased and inconsistent estimates. The 
identification problem is one of the most noticed problems in studies of transport 
demand, because most of these studies estimate demand only. This problem occurs 
when estimating either demand or supply by regressing the equilibrium quantity on 
equilibrium fares, without taking into consideration the interaction between both of 
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them. Subsequently the estimated relation cannot generally be identified as 
specifically the demand function or the supply function. Gillen et al. (2004) write 
The identification problem in air travel can be illustrated 
by describing the process by which fares and travel, for 
example, are determined in the origin-destination market 
simultaneously. To model this process in its entirety, we 
must develop a quantitative estimate of both the demand 
and supply functions in a system. If, in the past, the supply 
curve has been shifting due to changes in production and 
cost conditions for example, while the demand curve has 
remained fixed, the resultant intersection points will trace 
out the demand function. On the contrary, if the demand 
curve has shifted due to changes in personal income, while 
the supply curve has remained the same, the intersection 
points will trace out the supply curve. The most likely 
outcome, however, is movement of both curves yielding a 
pattern of fare, quantity intersection points from which it 
will be difficult, without further information, to distinguish 
the demand curve from the supply curve or estimate the 
parameters of either. 
 
To sum, changes in supply conditions, holding demand conditions fixed, will result in 
demand estimation and vice versa. If both demand and supply conditions change 
simultaneously, then we cannot identify the relation we estimate unless there is 
additional information. 
 
Previous Studies Results 
I now turn attention to specific estimation results from the literature. I focus on 
the literature after the deregulation of the aviation sector on 1978.  
Oum et al.  (1990, 1992) surveyed more than seventy studies published in 
academic journals, books and reports. The latter study focused only on studies published 
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in academic journals that reported the own-fare elasticity of air travel for two types of 
estimates; mode-specific and mode-choice elasticities. Oum’s first study examines 
market demand elasticities of air travel, the mode-choice elasticities and some cross-fare 
elasticities. 
Own-fare demand elasticity for air passenger travel estimates range between -0.4 
to -4.51 for all of the thirty one studies that conducted between years 1978-89, while 
most estimates fall in the range of -0.8 to -2.0. For studies that differentiate between 
types of travelers, own-fare elasticity for business travelers was -0.65 for times series, -
1.15 for cross section studies and -0.90 for others. Own-fare elasticity for leisure 
travelers was within the range of -0.40 to -1.98 for times series, -1.52 for cross section 
studies and -1.40 to –4.60 for others.  For studies that do not differentiate between types 
of travelers, the range was -0.36 to -1.81 for times series, -0.76 to –4.51 for cross section 
studies and -0.53 to -1.90 for others.  These results are consistent with theoretical 
predictions except for cross-section and time series estimates. For disaggregate discrete 
choice models, estimated own-fare elasticities were lower than for the aggregate demand 
model estimates with a range of -0.18 to -0.62.   
Oum et al. (1990) also reports the estimates of mode-choice own-fare elasticity 
and cross-fare elasticities of few studies. Estimates of mode-choice own-fare elasticity, 
with respect to vacation and non-vacation air travelers, are -0.38 and -0.18, respectively. 
The range of own-fare elasticity was -0.26 to -5.26 for the studies that did not distinguish 
among the purposes of air travel. The reported estimates of the cross-fare elasticity were 
in the range of -0.01 to -0.12 for bus-air and air-bus modes and in range of 0.01 to 0.51 
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for rail-air and air-rail modes. The cross-fare elasticities estimates indicate that bus and 
air traveling are complements and rail and air travel are substitutes. 
Brons et al. (2001) surveyed thirty seven studies for the purpose of testing 
whether the estimated fare elasticities are statistically equal, and if not, explaining the 
variation in these elasticities. The average of own-fare elasticity, for the surveyed 
studies, is -1.146 with standard deviation of 0.619, and with a range of 0.21 to -3.20. 
Business travelers were found to be less fare sensitive than leisure travelers, and their 
own-fare elasticity is less than one. Using the estimates of fare elasticity from the 
surveyed studies, Brons et al. (2001) conducted a meta-regression and showed that 
business travelers are less fare sensitive, and air travelers are becoming more fare 
sensitive with time (more fare elastic in the long run). 
Gillen et al. (2004) surveyed twenty one studies in developed countries including 
the U.S. The goal was to report all or almost all of the empirically estimated demand for 
air travel, to collect a range of fare elasticities measures and to provide some judgment 
regarding the elasticities value that are more representative of the true value. They 
developed a meta-analysis that provides measures of dispersion while, at the same time, 
recognizes the quality of demand estimates based on a number of the selected study’s 
characteristics. 
Gillen et al. (2004) report that the range of the own-fare elasticity for all 
surveyed studies is between 0.04 to -3.2 with a median of -1.122.  For studies that 
distinguished between trips distances, long distance (1500 miles or more) own-fare 
elasticity median is -0.857 and a range of -0.010 to -2.234, and medium and short 
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distance own-fare elasticity median is -1.15 with a range of 0.04 to -3.2.  For studies that 
distinguish between time horizons, cross section own-fare elasticity median is -1.33 with 
a range of -0.181 to -2.01, and time series own-fare elasticity median is -0.847 with a 
range of 0.04 to -2.54.  These estimates are in agreement with the theory predictions 
except for time series, which is predicted to be more than cross-section studies. The 
short distances own-fare elasticity is more elastic than long distance elasticity, and the 
own-fare elasticity of overall distances is in between.  
The survey shows that studies distinguish between air travelers’ types reveal that 
business travelers are less fare sensitive than leisure travelers. The distribution of the 
studies’ results of own-fare elasticities is highly skewed with high variances, which 
explains the authors’ focus on the median.  They also showed that for recent studies, 
conducted for the two periods (1997-02) and (1992-1997), the median own-fare 
elasticity of demand tends to be higher for recent years than before (-0.847 and -0.56, 
respectively). The latter interpretation should be taken with caution since the date of 
study completion does not mean that the data used are more recent. It is noteworthy to 
mention here that Brons et al. (2001) and Gillen et al. (2004) reach the same conclusion 
that own-fare elasticity of demand tends to be more elastic with time. 
Bhadra (2003) estimate the demand for air travel using local area economics and 
demographic activities. The study examines the relationship between air travel and local 
area characteristics. The empirical model used in this study is semi-log linear demand 
relationship, categorizing the model as aggregate demand models. The data used is for 
the years 1999-2000. The study combines demographical data and airline data; part of 
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the airline data extracted from DB1A but not all DB1A data. He defines the distance 
between the city pair as the non-stop trip distance. He specifies all distance groups 
starting from 250 miles with an addition of 250 up to the 2500 miles distance, and then 
adds 500 after that.  
Bhadra’s study found that the elasticity for short distance (0-1249 miles) is less 
elastic than for other distances groups. Also, medium (1250-1999 miles) and long 
distance (2000-3000 miles) have similar elasticities, and the range was -0.557 to -1.815.  
These results contradicted with theory predictions and with previous empirical studies’ 
results. Income elasticity is the highest for short distance; about 3.0 for distance (0-250) 
miles, and it is mostly statistically significant for both origin and destination.6 Other 
results of this study are the positive effects of income and demographic characteristics 
on travel. The increase of economic activities leads at some point to decrease in travel. 
Also, large hubs, existence of Southwest airline and higher share of established airlines 
are important for travelers.  
There are only a few studies that estimate demand for air travel facing air service 
providers. Brander and Zhang (1990, 1993) studies examined the inter-firm competition 
within duopoly market and used estimated elasticities from other study. The range of 
these elasticities was -1.2 to -2.0 as taken from Oum, Gillan and Noble (1986) and from 
Mutti and Murai (1977). Brander and Zhang’s main conclusion was that the Cournot 
model is more consistent of the data than the Bertrand or Cartel models. 
                                                 
6 The paper does not show any table of estimation for income coefficients. The results indicated 
are from the text of the paper. 
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Oum, Zhang and Zhang (1993) estimate the market demand and the demand 
facing air service providers in the context of monopoly and duopoly city pairs served by 
American and United airlines. The average own-fare elasticity for market demand is -
1.58 with a range of -1.24 to -2.34. Own-fare elasticities of demand facing airlines were 
estimated to be similar for duopoly markets, and range between -1.85 to infinity. Also, 
doupolists own-fare elasticity increases with distance. The main findings of this paper 
are that airliners’ pricing methods are not identical and each airliner uses different 
pricing strategies for different route based on the competitive conditions on a given 
route.  Also, the doupolists’ behavior is between Cournot and Bertrand model, and much 
closer to Cournot behavior. 
To summarize, the literature reports a wide range of estimated own-fare 
elasticities. Many factors may cause this wide range of elasticity estimates: failure to 
consider some specification problems, neglecting intermodal competition, data used, 
variables definitions, sample period and the variety of models used in estimation and 
their shortcomings.   
The literature reveals different behavior by different types of travelers (business 
and leisure travelers), by trip distance (short, medium and long trips) and by destination 
whether domestic or international trips. The estimated demand model should distinguish 
between these distinct market’s segments, and estimate the fare elasticity separately for 
each segment. The estimated fare elasticity of each market segment will be more precise 
and reliable than the overall fare elasticity of the air travel market. Also, the model used 
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should be built on solid theoretical basis, and yield consistent model estimation when 
using aggregate data or household data. 
This dissertation addresses the issues of market segmentations, data aggregation 
and the drawbacks of previous studies. More specifically, the dissertation uses a flexible 
demand system that overcomes some of the pitfalls of previous studies, at the same time, 
matching the travelers’ choice decisions. The model used generates different types of 
fare elasticities; intramodal, mode-choice and aggregate travel demand elasticities.   
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CHAPTER III 
THE MODEL 
 
The model to be used in this dissertation will be a version of the AIDS demand 
system. Air travel takes place in differentiated product markets. Air travel is a service of 
moving passengers or products from one place to another by using airplanes. Each 
airline differentiates its products by offering a package of related services to these 
products such as frequent flights, frequent flyer mileage and other unobserved qualities 
characteristics.  
The AIDS model has many advantages over other demand approaches. 
Advantages include a flexible functional form based on microeconomic theory, 
computational ease, restrictions based on the theory with unconstrained cross-fare 
elasticity, and the model aggregates perfectly over households. Also, because air travel is 
a differentiated products market, there are a large number of parameters to be estimated. 
The problem of the large number of parameters will be avoided by using multistage 
approach. This chapter discusses the choice context of the air-traveler and the existing 
approaches to estimate the demand for air travel. This will be followed by description of 
the demand model specification. 
 
Air-Travelers’ Decision Tree 
The AIDS model will be implemented using a multistage budgeting approach. 
More specifically, consider the travel decision process, which is depicted in Figure 1. 
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The figure shows different levels of decisions that are made by a traveler who tries to 
maximize his utility given his budget constraint. A traveler will decide whether to travel 
or not to maximize his utility given his budget constraint. For example, given that the 
traveler has sufficient income, he may consider traveling or staying home. This traveler 
may use his income to travel or to buy a new car, or for home maintenance. At the same 
time, if the traveler is a businessman or is working for a firm, the decision to travel for a 
business meeting or to have a video or a tele-conference will be considered upon the 
profit generated by that decision.  
 Figure 1. The Consumer Decision Tree Regarding Travel7 
 
If the traveler decides to travel, the traveler must decide where to go and the 
mode of transportation to use (vehicle, train, bus or airplane). In this stage, traveler is 
maximizing his utility given his travel budget constraint. This stage will be determined 
by the budget for travel and accommodation if he can afford to go for longer time or to a 
                                                 
7 This figure is taken from Brons et al. (2001) with some modification. 
Consumer Expenditure
Travel  Non-Travel 
Destination X Destination Y 
By Car By Airplane 
By Airline W By Airline Z 
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far away place instead of a near place, or to use his own vehicle or cheaper 
transportation means to reach his chosen destination. For business trips, it will be based 
on the cost of trip and the time spent on traveling; the cost of time will be involved in the 
decision. Also, this stage may be thought of as traveler choosing to go to a destination 
that yields the maximum utility given his budget constraint. The change in fare will 
induce the traveler to choose another destination that will maximize his utility given his 
budget constraint. The alternative destination characteristics are important in the travel 
decision. In this argument, the decision is merely a leisure traveler decision, and not a 
business traveler decision.8  
Once the traveler selects the mode of transportation and destination, the next 
decision is the airline choice. The leisure traveler will decide upon the fare of the trip 
offered by the different airlines serving that route, while the business traveler will focus 
on quality including time, frequency of trips and other air travel qualities.  
 
The Model 
The multistage budgeting demand model has been used by Hausman (1996), 
Ellison et al. (1997) and Hausman et al. (1994). The model has a flexible functional form 
and computationally less demanding. At the same time, it requires prior segmentation of 
goods that imposes restrictions on the overall pattern of substitution across the goods. 
The substitution patterns implied by the lower level demand specification (mostly used 
the AIDS demand system) permits an unconstrained pattern of conditional cross-fare 
                                                 
8 See Brons et al. (2001), pp3. 
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elasticities across products within a sub-segment. Given that competition among 
differentiated products tends to be highest within sub-segments, this lack of restrictions 
at the lower stage is a considerable advantage of AIDS over alternative approaches. An 
additional advantage is that the AIDS model, though developed with micro data in mind, 
aggregates perfectly over consumers without requiring linear Engel curves. Finally, the 
implied demand curves intersect the fare axis, so that the virtual fare is not infinity. 
Given traveler decision tree, multistage budgeting is the proper model for the 
estimation of the demand for the air travel. Nevo (1999) writes: 
Multistage budgeting occurs when the consumer can 
allocate total expenditure in stages; at the highest stage 
expenditure is allocated to broad groups, while at lower 
stages group expenditure is allocated to sub-groups, until 
expenditures are allocated to individual products. At each 
stage the allocation decision is a function of only that 
group total expenditure and fares of commodities in that 
group (or fare indexes for the sub-groupings). All these 
allocations must equal those that would occur if the 
maximization was done in one complete information step. 
 
This describes the model well. This model has many great characteristics such as 
reducing the number of parameters estimated by segmenting the products into groups, 
easy to estimate, and it is matching the decision process of the rational traveler. At the 
same time, I can test the specification of the segments of the model. 
I used a multistage demand model developed by Gorman (1971).  Following 
Hausman (1994), Hausman, Leonard and Zona (1994), Ellison et al. (1997) and 
Chaudhuri et al. (2003), I modeled my empirical demand in a three-stage demand 
system. I followed closely Hausman (1994) and Hausman, Leonard and Zona (1994). 
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The top-level demand will correspond to the overall demand for travel. The middle level 
will correspond to the demand for each mode of transportation (i.e. own vehicles, bus, 
train, vessel and air). And the bottom level will produce the demand for different airlines 
services. 
Multistage budgeting demand estimation begins with the bottom level stage, 
which permits consistent estimation for higher demand levels. The typical empirical 
works, that apply multistage budgeting demand estimation, have used AIDS for the 
bottom level of demand. Deaton and Muellbuer (1980) sum up the pros of AIDS as  
Our model,…, gives an arbitrary first-order approximation 
to any demand system; it satisfies the axioms of choice 
exactly; it aggregates perfectly over consumers without 
invoking parallel linear Engel curves; it has a functional 
form which is consistent with known household-budget 
data; it is simple to estimate, largely avoiding the need for 
non-linear estimation; and it can be used to test the 
restrictions of homogeneity and symmetry through linear 
restrictions on fixed parameters.  
 
The aggregation problem is the problem of whether market demand derived from 
macro or aggregate data is consistent with microeconomic theory under which demand 
estimations are based on individual consumer behavior. To overcome this problem, there 
are certain necessary conditions under which market demand estimation is viewed as a 
result of the behavior of a single utility maximizing consumer. Exact aggregation 
combined with a specific expenditure function leads to a demand function derived from 
the maximization of representative consumer. Exact aggregation assumes that consumers 
are different in expenditures on the product, and facing the same vector of prices. 
 30
The AIDS model is derived by specifying an expenditure function exhibits fare-
independent generalized logarithmic preferences (hereafter, PIGLOG). This 
specification permits for exact aggregation over budget shares of different consumers. 
The representative consumer share function is not affected by the change in the 
distribution of expenditures among consumers. This share function leads to market 
demand based on a rational representative consumer. The PIGLOG class of preference 
leads to the following expenditure function: 
{ } { })(log)(log)1(),(log pbupaupue +−=                      (3)  
where e (u,p) is the expenditure function, u is utility, and p is a fare vector. The functions 
a (p) and b(p) are positive linearly homogeneous functions, and u lies between zero 
(subsistence) and one (bliss).  The formulas for functions a(p) and b(b) are: 
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The functional forms for a (p) and b (p) are chosen such that the second derivatives of 
the expenditure function can be set equal to those of an arbitrary expenditure function, 
thus satisfying the necessary condition for flexibility of functional form. 
The demand function is derived from the expenditure function using Shepherd’s 
lemma because of the fundamental property of the expenditure function that its fare 
derivatives are the quantity demanded. Multiplying both sides of the first derivatives of 
the cost function by ( )puepi , , the left-hand side may be expressed as a budget share 
and the right-hand side may be expressed as a function of fares and utility. The 
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expenditure function is then solved for u and the resulting term is substituted for u in the 
budget share equation. Thus, budget shares are represented by the following:  
  ∑
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where ints  is the revenue share of total air travel expenditure on the ith airline service in 
city pair “n” in quarter “t”; ntE is the overall city pairs air travel expenditure; jntP  is the 
fare of jth airline service in city pair “n”; inα is the intercept or constant coefficient of the 
share equation “i”; ijγ is the slope coefficient associated with the fare “j”; iβ is the 
coefficient associated with real expenditure variable and ntP is a fare index. The latter is 
defined by 
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The preferences specification will lead to restrictions on the parameters of the 
derived AIDS model to be consistent with the theory. These restrictions are divided into 
three sets of restrictions; Homogeneity restrictions or∑
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restriction implies that irrespective to the units in which fares and expenditure are 
expressed, the quantities purchased are not affected because the consumer’s perception 
of opportunities is not influenced or, in other words, of absence of money illusion. This 
implies that fares and outlay have no influence on the consumer’s choice except for 
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determining the budget constraint. Hence, demand is homogenous of degree zero in fares 
and total expenditures since it is derived from a function of degree one in fares. The 
second restrictions satisfy the Slutsky symmetry conditions, which ensures the 
substitution matrix is symmetric, and the adding up restrictions reflect the constraint 
which the budget limitation places on the consumer, implying that budget shares sum to 
unity. These restrictions are satisfied automatically.  
The fare aggregator (equation 7) makes the AIDS a nonlinear demand system. 
This nonlinearity will complicate the estimation. Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) suggest 
approximating this fare index by using the Stone Fare Index9.  The Stone Fare Index is 
defined by )log()log(
1
int∑
=
=
I
i
innt psP . They showed that the usage of the Stone Fare Index 
does not change the results in the case of aggregate data.10  
The fare and expenditure elasticities can be calculated from the estimated 
coefficients of the model. These elasticities are partial elasticities because the multistage 
budgeting approach implies that goods can be partitioned into separate groups. In other 
words, these elasticities are calculated conditional on the expenditure on each goods 
group or market, and do not take the effect on the other goods of different groups. 
The usage of Stone Fare Index creates the problem of which elasticity formulas 
to be used. Capps Jr. et al. (2003) show three alternatives for uncompensated own and 
cross-fare elasticity. The first alternative is to use the AIDS formula:  
                                                 
9 The usage of Stone Fare Index will linearize the AIDS and subsequently it called “Linear 
Approximate AIDS” or LA\AIDS (some called it LAIDS).  
10 There are many studies that showed the bias in the estimation caused by the usage of Stone fare 
index. The micro data studies results will be severely affected by this bias, while the aggregate data studies 
will not. 
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 where ijδ  is the Kronecker delta and equal one if ji =  and zero otherwise. All other 
symbols are as before. The second alternative is to use a commonly used formula: 
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The third alternative is to use the LA/AIDS fare elasticity formulas. Capps Jr. et al. 
(2003) provide the following formulas for own and cross-fare elasticity:  
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Given these uncompensated fare elasticity formulas, the next decision is which 
one of these formulas is the most suitable. Capps Jr. et al. (2003) argue that the decision 
should be based on the accuracy of elasticity estimates, while Buse (1994) argues it 
should based on the correct demand specification. This dissertation will employ the 
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formulas that lead to the most accurate elasticity estimates. At the same time, the 
employed formulas are easy to calculate. 
Following Green and Alston (1990, 1991), Buse (1994), and Thompson (2004), 
the AIDS’s income (or expenditure) elasticity formula is 
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The compensated or Hicksian cross and own-fare elasticities are 
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The symbols are the same as described above. 
The middle level demand corresponds to different mode of transportation. The 
demand for each mode of transportation is given by the following form  
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where mntq is the quantity of the mth transportation mode in city pair “n” in quarter “t”; 
Bnty is the total expenditure on the travel in city pair “n” in quarter “t”; kntπ  is the mode 
fare indices for city pair “n”.  For each transportation mode, I calculate the mode fare 
index from the previous estimate (bottom level estimation). 
The top level stage, that will be used to estimate the demand for transportation, is 
specified as 
  ttttt zyu εδπβββ ++++= logloglog 210         (15) 
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where u is the overall consumption of travel; y is the deflated disposable income; π is 
the deflated fare index for travel and z is a set of variables account for changes in 
demographics and other related factor to travel. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 36
CHAPTER IV 
DATA AND ESTIMATION RESULTS 
 
 
This chapter describes the data handling, market and product definitions. Then, 
the chapter describes the variables extracted from the data set, and discusses the 
summary statistics of the relevant variables for each market. This dissertation 
distinguishes among different market segments; leisure and business travelers markets; 
short, medium and long distances markets. Accordingly, this chapter discusses the 
estimation results for each of these markets, and the implied fare and expenditure 
elasticities are discussed.  
 
Data 
The data used in this dissertation is the Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) 
issued by Bureau of Transportation Statistics (hereafter, BTS) for the second quarter of 
year 2002. This database is a ten percent random sample of airline tickets from reporting 
airlines. This database has three components of which are DB1B-coupon and DB1B-
ticket. The coupon component table provides coupon-specific information for each 
domestic itinerary of the Origin and Destination Survey, such as the operating airline, 
origin and destination airports, number of passengers, fare class, coupon type, trip break 
indicator, and distance. The ticket component table contains summary characteristics of 
each domestic itinerary on the Origin and Destination Survey, including the reporting 
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airline, itinerary fare, number of passengers traveling, originating airport, roundtrip 
indicator, and miles flown. 
I extracted the information necessary to carry out this study from the coupon and 
the ticket components of the DB1B. Each observation on the data file contains the 
information of the reporting and operating airline, origin and destination airports, 
number of passengers traveling, itinerary fare and miles flown. 
A market is defined as a directional pair of airports (hereafter city pairs), such as 
Dallas (DFW)-Chicago (OHR) market is different from Chicago (OHR) - Dallas (DFW) 
market. A roundtrip ticket is defined as two equally fared tickets. Within each market, 
there are different products. I define a product as a unique combination of airline and 
city pair, i.e. traveling via American Airline in DFW-OHR market is a different product 
than traveling via United Airline in the same city pair.  
One-way tickets are included in the data. These tickets are considered as products 
without changing their fare, while for roundtrip tickets, fares and distances are divided 
by two. Airlines that have less than 5 percent of total city pair expenditure or have less 
than one hundred passengers per quarter are excluded from data. Also, all tickets with 
fares below $40.0 or above $25,000 are excluded. The purpose of that is to exclude 
frequent flyer trip, airline employees and data entry errors. Tickets with more than four 
coupons are excluded. Any ticket with a foreign portion or coupon is also excluded. 
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Data exclusion rules are used to ensure minimal errors in the data. I included 
only observations where the reporting and operating airline are the same11. Also, I 
excluded airlines if the ticketing (or marketing) airline is not the same as operating 
airline. In other words, I kept the data for affiliated airlines when there is code sharing. 
In this dissertation, there are twenty one airlines, eleven of which are major 
airlines and the rest are national and regional airlines.12  The inclusion of only these 
airlines will enable reliable estimation of demand for air travel. The excluded airlines are 
sufficiently different such that they would add a noise to the estimation.  
The data are classified according to the number of airlines serving each city pair. 
The data reveal that there are nine categories of city pairs based on the number of 
airlines serving those city pairs. Airlines will act differently based on the number of 
competitor(s) on the city pair. As the number of airlines in a city pair increases, the 
competition among airlines will increases and fares decrease. Also, the fare elasticity of 
demand will be different as the number of airlines serving these city pairs changed. 
The number of city pairs served by two or more airlines is 3,554. Markets served 
by one airline are excluded, because this dissertation interested in calculating own- and 
cross-fare elasticities.  I ranked the airlines in each market based on their relative shares; 
one represents the airline with the largest share, two represents the second largest share 
                                                 
11 The Reporting airline is the airline that submitted data to the Office of Airline Information for 
a given passenger segment. The operating airline is an air airline engaged directly in the operation of 
aircraft in passenger air transportation. The Ticketing airline is an air airline that issued a flight reservation 
or ticket under a code sharing agreement. 
12 See appendix F for the list of airlines. 
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airline, and so on.13 Markets served by five-and-more airlines have few observations, 
and they are assumed to have similar demand conditions. Accordingly, for markets 
served by six airlines or more, the airlines ranked from one to five are kept for each of 
these markets, and the rest are excluded and their shares set to zero. After that, I added 
these observations to markets with five airlines, and redo the calculation for a new data 
set called markets with five-and-more airlines.  
Trip distances are classified into three categories: short, medium and long trip 
distances. Short distance trip is a directional trip of 700 miles or less length. Medium 
distance trip is a directional trip of 701-1500 miles length. And the long distance trip is a 
directional trip of more than 1500 miles length.  This dissertation followed Gillen et al. 
(2004) classification of distances traveled. The literature used different classifications for 
distance categories.  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Each observation indicates the airline engages directly in offering air travel 
service for a given city pair, and submits the travelers’ data to the Office of Airline 
Transportation.  Each observation in the data set includes (i) the directional city pair that 
shows which airport a traveler starts the trip from (origin), and the destination airport; 
(ii) the total number of travelers reported by each airline serving that city pair; (iii) 
airline revenue that is the sum of one-way paid fares of travelers flying by a specific 
                                                 
13 This ranking will lead to estimate different demands for each market structure in data. The data 
shows the number of airlines serving city pairs range from 1-9 for the whole markets. At the same time, I 
am not going to estimate the demand for specific airline i.e. American Airline or Southwest. 
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airline between a given city pair; (iv) the average one-way paid fare for each airline 
serving a given city pairs, which is equal to airline revenue divided by number of  
passengers of that airline for a given city pair; (v) directional city pair total revenue 
which is the sum of airlines revenues in that city pair; (vi) airline’s share which is the 
percentage of airline revenue of directional city pair total revenue; (vii) Stone Fare Index 
for that city pair, which is a fare index weighted by each airline’s share for a given city 
pair; (viii) airline rank is a rank given to each airline based on size of its share relative to 
other airlines shares.  For example if airline has the largest share among airlines on that 
city pair, then its rank is one, rank two for the second largest share airline, and so on; (ix) 
relative average fare that is the logarithm of average one-way paid fare of some airline 
divided by the smallest (share) airline average one-way paid fare; and (x) average miles 
flown which is the average distance flown by all passengers on that directional city pair. 
Descriptive statistics for all markets are shown in Tables 1-4.  As mentioned 
earlier, markets are divided according to the number of airlines serving the city pairs. 
Each table will be discussed separately.  Then, overall comments on the statistics will be 
offered.    
Table 1 shows summary statistics of markets with two airlines. There are 1827 
city pairs served by two airlines. On average, the largest (share) airline acquires about 70 
percent of total city pair air travel expenditure, with a standard deviation of 0.12. The 
standard deviation of total city pair air travel expenditure is high; the average is $86.69 
thousands with a standard deviation of $164.32 thousands, and the majority of 
observations are below $100 thousands.  
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Also, Table 1 shows that the average fares for both airlines are generally 
monotonic in shares, or largest airline charge higher average fare than the smallest 
airline, and so on. For each airline, range of average fare is high and skewed to the right. 
The largest airline charges about 18.7 cents per mile (or its itinerary yield) on average 
while the smallest airline charges about 17.3 cents. 
 
Table1. Descriptive Statistics for Markets with Two Airlines  
Variable Variable mean Std. dev. Range 
Share of largest airline      0.70     0.12 0.50-0.94 
Share of smallest airline      0.29     0.12 0.05-0.49 
Average fare of largest airline ($)  209.55   82.98 62.19-689.35 
Average fare of smallest airline ($)  195.40   77.77 55.03-540.37 
Log (Relative average fare)      0.06     0.26  -1.02-1.25 
Stone Fare Index      5.25     0.37   4.18-6.29 
Total city pair expenditure ($000)    86.69 164.32 3.64-1,575.94 
Log (Real city pair expenditure)      5.11     1.39 3.26-9.17 
Average miles flown  1124 716 114-4902 
Number of observation 1827 
Source: Author’s calculation from Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) second quarter, 2002. 
 
 
 
The average number of travelers for markets with two airlines is 4226 passengers 
for the quarter or 47 passengers per day. Also, the Stone Fare Index averages at 5.25 
with a standard deviation of 0.37. Total city pair expenditure exhibits a large standard 
deviation, which causes the log of real city pair expenditure to exhibits the same and 
skews to the right. The average distance flown by travelers in these markets is 1124 
miles with a standard deviation of 716 miles.  
Table 2 shows summary statistics of markets with three airlines. There are 883 
city pairs served by three airlines. On average, the share is 57, 27 and 16 percent for 
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largest, second largest and smallest airlines, respectively. Some observations show that 
the largest airline captures more than 80 percent of total city pair expenditure. The share 
of largest airline has the highest standard deviation, 14 percent. The largest airline 
itinerary yield is about 16.4 cents per mile on average, and 15.5 and 14.5 cents for 
second largest and smallest airlines, respectively.  Also, total city pair air travel 
expenditure exhibits a large standard deviation; the average is $87.95 thousands with a 
standard deviation of $197.48 thousands. The majority of observations are below $100 
thousands. 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Markets with Three Airlines  
Variable Variable mean Std. dev. Range 
Share of largest airline 0.57 0.14 0.33-0.89 
Share of second Largest airline 0.27 0.09 0.05-0.45 
Share of smallest airline 0.16 0.07 0.05-0.32 
Average fare of largest airline ($)  228.02     88.34 74.11-728.34 
Average fare of second largest airline ($)  215.94     81.22 67.24-775.03 
Average fare of smallest airline ($)  202.94     74.83 69.34-545.68 
Log (Relative average fare of largest airline)  0.11 0.28 -0.85-1.12 
Log (Relative average fare of second largest 
airline) 0.06 0.28 -0.80-1.113 
Stone Fare Index 5.33 0.33 4.29-6.44 
Total city pair expenditure ($000)    87.95   197.48 6.76-2,931.42
Log (Real city pair expenditure)      5.21 1.14 3.52-8.70 
Average miles flown  1392   715 145-5058 
Number of observations   883 
Source: Author’s calculation from Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) second quarter, 2002. 
 
 
 
The average fares for airlines are generally monotonic in share. But for some city 
pairs, the average fare of the smallest airline is higher than the fare of the largest and 
second largest airlines. At the same time, the range of average fare for each airline is 
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high and skewed to the right. The average number of travelers is 3992 passengers for the 
quarter or 44 passengers per day. Also, the Stone Fare Index averages at 5.33 with a 
standard deviation of 0.33. Because of the high standard deviation of total city pair 
expenditure, log of real city pair expenditure exhibits a high deviation and skews to the 
right. The average distance flown by travelers in these markets is 1392 miles with 
standard deviation of 715 miles. 
Table 3 shows summary statistics for markets with four airlines. There are 462 
city pairs served by three airlines. On average, about 47, 25, 17 and 11 percent of total 
city pair air travel expenditure is for the largest, the second largest, the third largest and 
the smallest airlines, respectively. Some observations show that the largest airline 
captures more than 70 percent of total city pair expenditure. Largest airline exhibits the 
highest standard deviation with 12 percent. There is a high deviation on total city pair air 
travel expenditure; the average is $57.81 thousands with a standard deviation of $85.75 
thousands. The high standard deviation of total city pair air travel expenditure causes the 
log of city pair real expenditure to exhibits high standard deviation and skews to the 
right. The largest airline itinerary yield is 13.7 cents per mile on average while second 
largest, third larges and smallest airlines charge about 13.2, 12.9 and 12.2 cents, 
respectively.  
Table 3 also shows that average fares for airlines are, once again, generally 
monotonic in shares. But, for some city pairs, the average fare of the smallest airline is 
higher than average fare of largest, second largest and third largest airlines. The highest 
standard deviation of average fare is for the smallest airline and then for the second 
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largest airline. The average number of travelers is 2602 passengers for the quarter or 29 
passengers per day. Also, the Stone Fare Index averages 5.36 with a standard deviation 
of 0.26. Because the total city pair expenditure exhibits a large standard deviation, log of 
real city pair expenditure, also, exhibits high deviation and skews to the right. The 
average distance flown by travelers in this market is 1671 miles with a standard 
deviation of 644 miles. 
 
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Markets with Four Airlines  
Variable Variable mean Std. dev. Range 
Share of largest airline 0.47 0.12 0.27-0.82 
Share of second largest airline 0.25 0.06 0.06-0.42 
Share of third largest airline 0.17 0.05 0.05-0.29 
Share of smallest airline 0.11 0.04 0.05-0.23 
Average fare of largest share airline ($)   229.92    72.03 86.89-499.55
Average fare of second largest airline ($)   222.35    73.82 90.94-619.66
Average fare of third Largest airline ($)   215.67    70.14 80.16-530.10
Average fare of Smallest airline ($)   204.68    74.56 72.15-562.54
Log (Relative average fare of largest airline)  0.12 0.27 -0.62-1.22 
Log (Relative average fare of second largest 
airline) 
0.09 0.29 -0.87-1.02 
Log (Relative average fare of third largest 
airline) 
0.06 0.28 -0.82-0.95 
Stone Fare Index 5.36 0.26 4.59-6.13 
Total city pair expenditure ($000)     57.81    85.75 10.80-839.87
Log (Real city pair expenditure) 5.19 0.72 3.98-8.26 
Average miles flown   1671   644 509-4591 
 Number of observations   462 
Source: Author’s calculation from Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) second quarter, 2002. 
 
 
 
Table 4 shows summary statistics for markets with five-and-more airlines. There 
are 382 city pairs served by five-and-more airlines. On average, about 36, 23, 17, 13 and 
9 percent of total city pair air travel expenditure is for the largest, the second largest, the 
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third largest, the fourth largest and the smallest airlines, respectively. The largest airline 
has the highest standard deviation that equals to 9 percent. There is a high deviation on 
total city pair air travel expenditure; the average is $59.27 thousands with a standard 
deviation of $69.76 thousands. 
 
 
Table (4). Descriptive Statistics for Markets with Five-and-More Airlines  
Variable Variable mean Std. dev. Range 
Share of largest airline 0.36 0.09 0.22-0.72 
Share of second largest airline 0.23 0.04 0.08-0.35 
Share of third largest airline 0.17 0.03 0.06-0.26 
Share of fourth largest airline 0.13 0.03 0.05-0.20 
Share of smallest airline 0.09 0.02 0.05-0.16 
Average fare of largest share airline ($) 231.87 76.95 108.78-787.79 
Average fare of second largest airline ($) 224.75 76.55 109.94-748.04 
Average fare of third Largest airline ($) 218.18 68.85 112.50-638.33 
Average fare of fourth largest airline ($) 216.65 75.77 103.60-772.77 
Average fare of Smallest airline ($) 208.54 78.13 101.60-841.47 
Log (Relative average fare of largest airline)  0.11 0.29 -1.06-1.13 
Log (Relative average fare of second largest 
airline) 0.07 0.30 -1.19-1.05 
Log (Relative average fare of third largest 
airline) 0.05 0.32 -1.19-1.12 
Log (Relative average fare of fourth largest 
airline) 0.04 0.29 -0.94-0.99 
Stone Fare Index 5.36 0.23 4.87-6.40 
Total city pair expenditure ($000) 59.27 69.76 13.48-1,133.35
Log (real city pair expenditure) 5.39 0.60 4.34-8.58 
Average Miles flown  1888 516 587-4905 
Number of observations             382 
Source: Author’s calculation from Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) second quarter, 2002. 
 
 
 
The average fares for airlines are generally monotonic in shares as shown in 
Table 4. But, for some city pairs, the average fare of the smallest airline is higher than 
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average fare of largest, second largest, third largest and fourth largest airlines.  At the 
same time, the range of average fare is high for all airlines and skews to the right. 
Standard deviation of average fare is the highest for smallest airline, and the lowest for 
third largest airline. The average number of travelers is 2663 passengers for the quarter 
or 30 passengers per day. Itinerary yield is 12.1, 11.8, 11.6 and 11.3 cents for largest, 
second largest, third larges, fourth largest and smallest airlines, respectively.  Also, 
Stone Fare Index is averaged at 5.36 with standard deviation of 0.23. Because total city 
pair expenditure has high standard deviation, log of real city pair expenditure exhibits a 
high deviation and skews to the right. The average distance flown by travelers in these 
markets is 1888 miles with standard deviation of 516 miles. 
From the above discussion of descriptive statistics, there are some remarks 
applied to all markets. The average miles flown are positively related to the number of 
airlines serving the city pair. The average fares are proportional to airline share. But 
some observations show that the average fare of smallest airline is higher than any of 
other airlines average fare in the markets. The average fare in general shows a slight 
increase moving from markets with two airlines up to markets with five-and-more 
airlines. At the same time, its standard deviation has no clear trend across all of these 
markets. 
The largest airline dominates the markets with average share 70.5, 57.2, 47.0 and 
36.7 percent for markets with two, three, four and five-and-more airlines, respectively.  
While the average share of the second largest airline is between 29.4-23.1 percent. The 
third largest and the fourth largest airlines have average shares range between 16.0-17.2 
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percent and 11.0-13.1 percent, respectively. However, as the number of airlines 
increases, the share of the largest airline decreases the most for all markets. Also, the 
share of the largest airline has the highest standard deviation across all airline markets. 
Average city pairs total air travel expenditure exhibits a large standard deviation 
and skews toward the right or to higher values. This average is higher for markets with 
two and three airline than other airline markets. 
The number of city pairs is negatively related to the number of airlines. In other 
words, markets with two airlines have more city pairs than markets with three airlines 
markets, and the latter has more city pairs than markets with four airlines and so on. 
 
Estimation Results 
The multistage budgeting approach requires specification of product segments. 
Accordingly, this dissertation defines product segment or group as a market served by a 
specific number of airlines within the domestic air travel market in the U.S. There are 
four different product segments: two airlines, three airlines, four airlines and five-and-
more airlines. The bottom level demand in this approach is AIDS. As discussed in 
Chapter II, the literature revealed different estimation results for each type of travelers, 
and also for the different trip distances. The estimated demand model distinguishes 
between these distinct market’s segments, and calculate the fare and expenditure 
elasticities separately for each segment.  
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The estimated system of equations overcomes the drawbacks of previous models used in 
estimation. This model assumes exogenous fares,14 has a flexible functional form, is 
based on solid theoretical background, and is consistent with observational units and 
with aggregation over households.   
The system of the shares equations of LA\AIDS is used in the estimation. This 
system is represented by the following equation:  
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where ints  is the revenue share of total air travel expenditure on the ith airline service in 
city pair “n” in quarter “t”; ntE is the overall city pairs air travel expenditure; jntP  is the 
fare of jth airline service in city pair “n”; inα is the intercept or constant coefficient of the 
share equation “i”; ijγ is the slope coefficient associated with the fare “j”; iβ is the 
coefficient associated with real expenditure variable; nP is Stone Fare Index and inε is a 
random error with mean zero and constant variance.  
The adding-up property of the demand system causes the error covariance matrix 
to be singular. The symmetry restrictions are the only restrictions imposed in the 
estimation, because using the smallest airline as a numeraire good satisfies homogeneity 
restrictions. At the same time, adding-up restrictions are satisfied by construction. The 
                                                 
14 Most of literatures on AIDS and LA/AIDS did not use instrumental variables in estimation, but 
literature used Multistage Budgeting Demand approach used instrumental variables. A caveat should be 
taken in this regard; a relation may exist between fares and the error terms in each equation.  
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parameters of the equation dropped in the estimation are recovered by using the adding-
up restrictions.   
Seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) of Zellner is used to estimate the demand 
system presented by the share equations. This estimation method increases the efficiency 
of the estimated parameters if the errors in the single equations are contemporaneously 
correlated. 
The imposition of homogeneity and/or symmetry restrictions into the model are 
tested by likelihood ratio test for the demand systems of each market. Also, a Chi-square 
test for single equation homogeneity restriction is carried out. Symmetry restrictions 
cannot be tested for a single equation. The results, as reported in Appendix G, show that 
imposing both homogeneity and symmetry restrictions are rejected for three of the four 
markets based on likelihood ratio test, while imposing either homogeneity or symmetry 
restrictions are accepted for one and two of the four markets, respectively. The single 
equation test of homogeneity shows that six out of ten restrictions are accepted. The 
results of these tests show no definite rejection of each restrictions set for all markets. 
The rejection of homogeneity may due to the data used in estimation; cross-section data 
shows relatively inflexible expenditure pattern, and the usage of aggregate data to 
estimate individual behavior. Also, measurement error and model misspecification (i.e. 
omitting dynamic effect) may cause the rejection of homogeneity restrictions. Given the 
restrictions tests results, the theoretical restrictions will be imposed on the estimated 
model; the results of these tests were not conclusive, and these restrictions are based on 
the theory. 
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Tables 5-8 show the estimated parameters of the demand systems for the four 
different markets for all distances or observations. The estimation results for the 
different distances are reported in Appendix A.  
Table 5 reports the estimation results for largest and smallest airline equations in 
markets with two airlines for all observations. Also, estimation results for the three 
categories of trip distances of these markets are reported in Appendix A.  Because of the 
adding up restriction, the estimated parameters are the same except in signs.  As for the 
constant term, its interpretation as an intercept is not applicable to this model. It may say 
that as the other variables are zeros (relative fares are equal to one and the real 
expenditure equals $1), the share of the airline is equal to the estimated parameter. The 
estimated constant parameters are of values 0.55 and 0.45 for largest and smallest 
airlines, respectively. Also, both are significantly different from zero at the one percent 
level. The constant terms for short, medium and long trips distances are all significantly 
different from zero. But it is different for each distance; largest airline constant term is 
0.67, 0.50 and 0.47 for short, medium and long trip distances, respectively. 
The estimated fare parameters are the slopes of the shares equations. It shows 
that if the fare of the airline increases by 1 percent, the share of that airline will increase 
by the estimated parameter multiplied by 100. All estimated parameters are statistically 
significant at the one percent level, which means they are significantly different from 
zero, and both airlines fares have a measurable effect on the share of each. The estimated 
own-fare parameter of each airline shows that the increase of its fare by one percent will 
increase its share by 6.9 percent. The distance categories estimation results reveal no 
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measurable effect of fares on shares of airlines for short distance estimation, since both 
parameters are insignificant. For medium and long distances, estimated own-fare 
parameters are significantly different from zero and it shows if fare increases by one 
percent, the share of  the largest airline will increase by 9.1 and 10.3 percent for medium 
and long distance trips, respectively. These results indicate that the change in fares has 
more impact on share for longer trip distances. 
 
 
Table5. Estimation Results of All Distances: Markets with Two Airlines  
 Largest airline Smallest airline 
 0.069*** -0.069*** Log (Largest airline average fare) 
(0.011) (0.011) 
-0.069***  0.069*** Log (Smallest airline average fare) 
(0.011) (0.011) 
 0.028*** -0.028*** Log (Real city pair expenditure) 
(0.002) (0.002) 
 0.558***  0.442*** Constant 
(0.011) (0.011) 
R-square   0.10  
Chi-square 208.75  
P-value     0.00  
Number of observations 1827  
Share (mean %) 70.54 29.46 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
 
 
 
The cross-fare parameters are mostly negative. These parameters indicate that if 
fares of the other airlines increase by one percent, the share of the airline will decrease 
by the estimated parameter multiplies by 100. Cross-fare estimated parameter shows if 
the fare of each airline increases by one percent, the share of the other airline decreases 
by 6.9 percent. For estimation results of distance categories, the cross-fare parameter 
 52
estimates are statistically zero for short distance, and different from zero for medium and 
long trip distances. 
The estimated expenditure parameters show how the share will change when the 
real city pair expenditure increases by one percent. Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) state 
that a negative sign parameter means necessities and a positive coefficient corresponds 
to luxuries. The estimations show that the largest airline always has a positive signed 
estimated parameter, and other airlines have negative signed estimated parameters. This 
implies that as expenditures increase, travelers are shifting to the largest airline. A one 
percent change in total air travel expenditure in these markets, leads to an increase in the 
share of largest airline by 2.8 percent and a decrease in the share of smallest airline by 
2.8 percent. As for the distance categories, all estimated parameters are significantly 
different from zero. An increase of air travel expenditure by one percent will increase the 
share of largest airline by 0.8, 4.0 and 4.6 percent for short, medium and long distance 
trips, respectively.  At the same time, the increase in air travel expenditure will decrease 
the share of smallest airline by 0.8, 4.0 and 4.6 percent for short, medium and long 
distance trips, respectively. 
  The R-square is 0.10. The Chi-square and associated p-value of the estimated 
equations show that exogenous fares and expenditure reliably explain the changes in the 
share. 
Table 6 reports results of three estimated equations of all airlines in markets with 
three airlines for all observations. Also, estimation results for the three categories of trip 
distances of these markets are reported in Appendix A.  
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The estimated fares parameters are statistically significant at the one percent 
level, and fares have measurable effect on the share of each airline except for the fare of 
second largest airline.  
The estimated own-fare parameter of largest airline equation, as shown in 
column two of Table 6, indicates that a one percent increase in largest airline fare, 
holding other fares and real expenditure constant, increases largest airline share by nine 
percent. For medium and long trip distances, the own-fare parameters are different from 
zero, and a one percent increase in them will increase the share of largest airline by 6.8 
and 14.4 percent, respectively. The estimation for distances reveals that the fares have no 
effect on share of airlines at the short distance estimation. This indicates that the change 
in fares has more impact on share for longer trip distances. 
 
 
Table 6. Estimation Results of All Distances: Markets with Three Airlines 
 Largest airline 
Second largest 
airline 
Smallest 
airline 
    0.090***    -0.044***      -0.047*** Log(Largest airline average fare)     (0.019)    (0.013)      (0.009) 
  -0.044***     0.043***       0.001 Log(Second largest airline average 
fare)     (0.013)    (0.011)      (0.007) 
 -0.047***     0.001       0.045*** Log(Smallest airline average fare)     (0.009)    (0.007)      (0.012) 
    0.061***    -0.027***      -0.033*** Log (Real city pair expenditure)     (0.004)    (0.003)      (0.002) 
    0.249***     0.411***       0.340*** Constant     (0.020)     (0.014)      (0.010) 
R-square       0.23      0.12  
Chi-square  270.47  122.32  
P-value      0.00      0.00  
Number of Observations  883  883     883 
Share (mean %)    57.26    26.70       16.02 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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The cross-fare parameters in the largest airline estimated equation are negative. If 
fares of second largest and smallest airline increase by one percent, the share of the 
largest airline will decrease by 4.4 and 4.7 percent, respectively. For estimation results of 
medium distance, cross-fares are statistically zero for second largest airline, and 
significantly different than zero for smallest airline.  If the fare of the smallest airline 
increases by one percent the share of the largest airline increases by 3.8 percent. For 
estimation results of long distance, cross-fares are statistically significant for second 
largest and smallest airlines with effect on the share of the largest airline by 8.3 and 6.1 
percent, respectively. This means that the effect of smallest airline on share of largest 
airline is measurable.  
The estimated expenditure parameters show that there is a measurable effect of 
expenditures on the largest airline. For all observations, a one percent increase in total 
real expenditure leads to 6.1 percent increase on its share. For short, medium and long 
distances, one percent increases in total real expenditure increase share of largest airline 
by 1.4, 5.8 and 7.1 percent, respectively.  
R-square is 0.23 for all distances’ observations, and similar across distance 
categories.  The Chi-square and associated p-value of the estimated equation show that 
exogenous variables reliably explain the variations in the dependent variable, except for 
short distance trips where p-value is not significant. 
The estimated own-fare parameter of second largest airline equation, as shown in 
column three of Table 6, shows that if own-fare increases by one percent, holding other 
fares and real expenditure constant, will be associated with increase in its share by 4.3 
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percent. For medium and long trip distances, the own-fare parameters are significantly 
different from zero.  A one percent increase in own-fare will increase share of largest 
share airline by 4.0 and 8.4 percent, respectively. The estimation for distances reveals 
that the fares have no effect on share of airlines at the short distance estimation. This 
indicates that the change in fares has more impact on share for longer trip distances. 
The cross-fare parameters in the second largest airline estimated equation are 
mostly negative. Cross-fare estimated parameters for all observations show if fare of the 
largest airline increases by one percent, holding other variables constant, the share of the 
second largest airline decreases by 4.4 percent. For estimation results of long distance, 
cross-fares are statistically significant for the largest airline, with effect on share of 
second largest airline by 8.3 percent. Cross-fares estimated parameters for second largest 
airline are statistically insignificant for short and medium distances. Effect of other 
airline fare airline on the share of the second largest airline is not measurable. 
The estimated expenditure parameters show that there is a measurable effect of 
expenditure on the share of the second largest airline. For all observations, a one percent 
increase in total real expenditure leads to 2.7 percent decrease in its share. For short, 
medium and long distances, its share decreases by 0.6, 2.6 and 3.3 percent respectively.  
R-square is 0.12 percent for estimation of all observations.  The Chi-square and 
associated p-value of the estimated equation show that exogenous fares and expenditure 
reliably explain the change in the share, except for short distance where p-value is not 
significant. 
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The estimated own-fare parameter of smallest airline equation, as shown in 
column four of Table 6, shows if this fare increases by one percent, holding other fares 
and real expenditure constant, its share will increase by 4.5 percent.  For medium and 
long distances, the own-fare parameters are significantly different for zero, and show 
increase in share of largest airline by 4.8 and 6.2 percent, respectively. The estimation 
for different distances reveals that the fares have no effect on airlines share of the short 
distance estimation.  
The cross-fare parameters in the smallest airline estimated equation are mostly 
negative. Cross-fare estimated parameters value is 4.7 percent. For estimation results of 
medium and long distances, cross-fares are statistically significant for largest airline with 
value of 3.8 and 6.1 percent, respectively. Cross-fare estimated parameters for second 
largest airline are statistically insignificant. Effect of second largest airline fare on share 
of smallest airline is not measurable. 
The estimated expenditure parameters show that there is a measurable effect of 
expenditure on the share of the smallest airline. For all observations, a one percent 
increase in total real expenditure leads to 3.3 percent decrease in share of smallest 
airline. For short, medium and long distances, share of smallest airline decreases by 0.8, 
3.1and 3.7 percent respectively.  
In summary, estimation results for markets with three airlines show that the own-
fare effect of the largest airline on its share is the highest. Also, the effect of changes in 
real total travel expenditure is always positive on largest airline, and is negative on other 
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airlines. While for cross-fare effect, largest airline has effect on the other airlines, and 
the second largest and smallest airlines have no effect on each other. 
Table 7 reports the results of four estimated equations of markets with four 
airlines for all observations. Estimation results for trip distance categories of this market 
are reported in Appendix A. Eleven out of sixteen estimated parameters are statistically 
significant at the one and ten percent levels.  The second largest airline has three 
insignificant fare parameters.  
The estimated own-fare parameter of largest airline equation, as shown in 
column two of Table 7, shows that if this fare increases by one percent, holding other 
fares and real expenditure constant, its share will increase by 6.6 percent. For medium 
and long distances, the own-fare parameters are different from zero, and show an 
increase in its share by 8.6 and 7.2 percent, respectively. The short distance estimations 
of fares parameters are not significant.  
The cross-fare parameters in the largest airline estimated equation are negative, 
and show if the fare of each of the third largest, the fourth largest and the smallest airline 
increases by one percent, the share of largest airline will decrease by 1.4, 3.0 and 2.1 
percent, respectively. For estimation results of trips’ distances, four out of nine estimated 
cross-fare parameters are statistically different from zero. Estimated parameters show 
that the third largest share airline fare has clear effect on the share of largest airline for 
the different trip distances. 
The estimated expenditure parameters show that there is a measurable effect of 
expenditure on the largest airline. For all observations, a one percent increase in total 
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real expenditure leads to 10 percent increase on its share, and 16.3, 10.2 and 9.3 percent 
for short, medium and long distances, respectively. 
The R-square is 0.34 for all observations. The Chi-square and associated p-value 
of the estimated equation show that exogenous fares and expenditure reliably explain the 
variations in the share. 
 
Table 7. Estimation Results of All Distances: Markets with Four Airlines  
 Largest airline 
Second  
largest 
airline 
Third largest 
airline 
Smallest 
airline 
      0.066*** -0.014 -0.030*** -0.021*** Log(Largest airline 
average fare)      (0.022) (0.013)     (0.010)    (0.007) 
     -0.014 0.017      0.008    -0.010* Log(Second largest 
airline average fare)      (0.013) (0.012)     (0.007)    (0.006) 
    -0.030*** 0.008 0.021***     0.002 Log(Third largest 
airline average fare)      (0.010) (0.007)     (0.007)    (0.005) 
    -0.021*** -0.010*      0.002  0.029*** Log(Smallest airline 
average fare)     (0.007) (0.006)     (0.005)    (0.010) 
     0.100***     -0.033*** -0.036*** -0.031*** Log (Real city pair 
expenditure)     (0.006) (0.004)     (0.003)    (0.002) 
    -0.055*      0.421*** 0.359***  0.275*** Constant     (0.033) (0.021)    (0.016)    (0.011) 
R-square       0.36        0.15     0.25  
Chi-square  269.8      81.7 156.46  
P-value      0.00 0.00     0.00  
Number of 
observations  463     463  463  463 
Share (mean %)    46.85 25.02    17.06    11.08 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
 
 
 
The estimated fare parameters of second largest airline equation, as shown in 
column three of Table 7, are statistically insignificant except for one parameter. 
Estimated parameters show no effect of fares on the share of the second largest airline. 
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The estimated expenditure parameters show that there is a measurable effect of 
expenditure on the share of the second largest airline. For all observations, a one percent 
increase in total real expenditure leads to 3.3 percent decrease on its share. For short, 
medium and long distances, its share decreases by 7.1, 3.7 and 2.8 percent, respectively.  
The R-square is within a range of 0.13-0.58 for all estimated equation of second 
largest airline in markets with four airlines. The Chi-square and associated p-value of the 
estimated equation show that exogenous fares and expenditure reliably explain the 
variations in the share. 
The estimated fare parameters of third largest airline equation, as shown in 
column four of Table 7, are statistically significant for six out of sixteen parameters 
(includes estimated parameters of different distances). One percent increase in own-fare 
leads to increase on the share of the third largest airline by 2.1 and 3.1 percent for all 
observations and medium distance trips, respectively. For cross-fare effect, the only 
measurable effect on this airline is of largest airline fare change. 
The estimated expenditure parameters show that there is a measurable effect of 
expenditure on the share of the third largest airline. For all observations, a one percent 
increase in total real expenditure leads to 3.6 percent decrease in its share. For short, 
medium and long distances, share of third largest airline decreases by 4.5, 3.5 and 3.4 
percent, respectively.  
The R-square is within range of 0.25-0.41 percent for all estimated equation of 
the third largest airline in markets with four airlines. The Chi-square and associated p-
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value of the estimated equation show that exogenous fares and expenditure reliably 
explain the variations in the share. 
The estimated fare parameters of smallest airline equation, as shown in column 
five of Table 7, are statistically significant for six out of sixteen parameters (includes 
estimated parameters of different distances). A one percent increase in own-fare leads to 
an increase on the share of the smallest airline by 2.9, 3.2 and 2.7 percent for all 
observations, medium and long distances, respectively. For cross-fare effects, there are 
only two significant cross-fare parameters with largest airline. 
The estimated expenditure parameters show there is a measurable effect of 
expenditure on the share of the smallest airline. For all observations, a one percent 
increase in total real expenditure leads to 3.1 percent decrease in share of smallest 
airline. For short, medium and long distances, smallest airline’s share decreases by 4.7, 
3.0 and 3.0 percent respectively.  
Table 8 reports the results of the estimated shares equations of markets with five 
and-more airlines for all observations. Estimation results for medium and long distances 
of these markets are reported in Appendix A. Ten out of twenty-five estimated fare 
parameters (includes estimated parameters of different distances) are statistically 
significant at the one and ten percent levels. The second largest airline estimated fare 
parameters are statistically insignificant, and only one of third largest airline estimated 
equation is significant. 
The estimated own-fare parameter of largest airline equation, as shown in 
column two of Table 8, shows that if this fare increases by one percent, holding other 
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fares and real expenditures constant, its share will increase by 6.3 percent. For long 
distance, the own-fare parameter is different from zero. The estimation for short distance 
own-fare parameters is insignificant.  
The cross-fare parameters in the largest airline estimated equation are mostly 
negative. Cross-fare estimated parameters show that if fare of fourth largest and of 
smallest airlines increases by one percent, the share of the largest airline decreases by 
2.1 and 2.4 percent, respectively. For estimation results of distances, three out of eight 
estimated cross-fare parameters are statistically different from zero. The effect of 
smallest airline fare parameters on the share of the largest airline is measurable. 
The estimated expenditure parameters show that there is measurable effect of 
expenditure on the share of the largest airline.  For all observations, a one percent 
increase in total real expenditure leads to 6.5 percent increase in its share. For medium 
and long distances, it is 9.2 and 5.7 percent, respectively.  
The R-square is between 0.16-0.30 for all observations, medium and long 
distances. The Chi-square and associated p-value of the estimated equation show that 
exogenous fares and expenditure reliably explain the variations in share. 
The estimated fare parameters of second largest airline equation, as shown in 
column three of Table 8, are statistically insignificant except one parameter. Effect of 
fares on the share of the second largest airline is not measurable. 
The estimated expenditure parameters show there is a measurable effect of 
expenditure on the share of the second largest airline. For all observations, a one percent 
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increase in total real expenditure leads to 0.8 percent decrease in its share. For medium 
and long distances, her share decreases by 0.6 and 0.7 percent, respectively.  
The R-square is within range of 0.01-0.05 for all estimated equation of second 
largest airline on markets with five-and-more airlines. The Chi-square and associated p-
value of the estimated equation show that exogenous fares and expenditure do not 
reliably explain the variations in share. 
 
Table 8. Estimation Results of All Distances: Markets with Five-and-More Airlines  
 Largest airline 
Second 
largest 
airline 
Third 
largest 
airline 
Fourth 
largest 
airline 
Smallest 
airline 
 0.063*** -0.006 -0.013 -0.021*** -0.024*** Log(Largest 
airline average 
fare) (0.022) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) 
-0.006  0.009 -0.001  0.0001 -0.003 Log(Second 
largest airline 
average fare) (0.010) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
-0.013 -0.001  0.011*  0.004 -0.002 Log(Third largest 
airline average 
fare) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
-0.021***  0.0001  0.004  0.009*  0.007*** Log(Fourth 
largest airline 
average fare) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) 
-0.024*** -0.003 -0.002  0.007***  0.021*** Log(Smallest 
airline average 
fare) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.009) 
 0.065*** -0.008** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.020*** Log (Real city 
pair expenditure) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
 0.015  0.273***  0.270***  0.233***  0.203*** Constant (0.043) (0.022) (0.018) (0.015) (0.012) 
R-square  15.80 1.13 8.17 11.88  
Chi-square 78.65 5.3 34.55 52.54  
P-value   0.00 0.38   0.00   0.00  
Number of 
observations 383 383 383 383 383 
Share (mean %) 36.88 23.17 17.17 13.15 9.64 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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The estimated fare parameters of third largest airline equations, as shown in 
column four of Table 8, are statistically insignificant except for own-fare parameter in 
all observations and medium distance equations. One percent increases in own-fare leads 
to increase on the share of the third largest airline by 1.1 and 2.4 percent for all 
observations and medium distance trips. For cross-fare effect, there is no measurable 
effect. 
The estimated expenditure parameters show there is a measurable effect of 
expenditure on the share of the third largest airline. For all observations, a one percent 
increase in total real expenditure leads to 1.8 percent decrease in her share. For medium 
and long distances, a one percent increase in total real expenditures lead to a decrease in 
its share by 2.8 and 1.6 percent, respectively.  
The R-square is within a range of 0.06-0.23 for the estimated equation of second 
largest airline within markets with five-and-more airlines. The Chi-square and associated 
p-value of the estimated equation show that exogenous fares and expenditure reliably 
explain the variations in share. 
The estimated own-fare parameters of fourth largest airline equations, as shown 
in column five of Table 8, are statistically significant except for medium trip distance 
equation. One percent increases in own-fare leads to an increase in share of fourth 
largest airline by 0.9 and 1.5 percent for all observations and long distance. For cross-
fare effect, there are measurable effects from fares of largest and smallest airlines. 
The estimated expenditure parameters show that there is a measurable effect of 
expenditure on the share of the fourth largest airline. For all observations, a one percent 
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increase in total real expenditure leads to 1.9 percent decrease on her share. For medium 
and long distances, a one percent increase in total real expenditure will decrease her 
share by 3.0 and 1.6 percent, respectively.  
The R-square is within range of 0.11-0.26 for all estimated equation of second 
largest share airline at four airlines market. The Chi-square and associated p-value of the 
estimated equation show that exogenous fares and expenditure reliably explain the 
variations in share. 
The estimated own-fare parameters of smallest airline equation, as shown in 
column six of Table 8, are statistically significant for all observations and long distance 
trips. A one percent increases in own-fare leads to increase the share of smallest airline 
by 2.1 and 2.4 percent for all observations and long distance, respectively. For the cross-
fare effect, there are measurable effects from fares of the largest and the fourth largest 
airlines. 
The estimated expenditure parameters show that there is a measurable effect of 
expenditure on the share of the smallest airline. For all observations, a one percent 
increase in total real expenditure leads to 2.0 percent decrease in her share. For medium 
and long distances, a one percent increase in total real expenditure leads to decrease its 
share by 2.8 and 1.8 percent, respectively.  
There are general comments about the estimations results. The estimations show 
the budget shares are more responsive to the expenditure in almost all estimation, and 
less responsive to the fares. Also, the estimation results of fares for short distance are 
mostly not different from zero.  
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Turning next to discuss the calculations of fare and expenditure elasticities. But 
before that, I discuss the decision of choosing which fare and expenditure elasticities 
formulas to be used in this dissertation. In Chapter III, different elasticity formulas are 
presented and discussed. This dissertation will employ the formulas that produce the 
most accurate estimates, and the ease of calculating the formulas. 
 The fare and expenditure elasticities are calculated at the sample average shares 
holding total expenditure constant. Capps Jr. et al. (2003) formulas and commonly used 
(equation 9) formulas are examined separately to calculate the elasticities for markets 
with three airlines, to investigate the difference in calculations. Capps Jr. et al. (2003) 
stated that their formulas are derived from semi-reduced forms used by Buse (1994).  
Buse (1994) finds that researchers without fear of being gone astray may use the 
commonly used formula. The calculated own and cross-fare elasticity using Capps Jr. et 
al. (2003) formulas and the differences with commonly used formulas are reported in 
Appendix H. Capps Jr. et al. (2003) formulas show no difference compared with 
commonly used formulas in this application. Nevertheless, these formulas may make a 
larger difference when applied in other settings. 
Buse (1994) concludes that the commonly used formulas produce marginally the 
best estimates. Accordingly, the calculations of elasticities are based on the commonly 
used formulas represented by equations numbered 9, 12 and 13, in chapter III. 
Tables (9-12) report fare and expenditure elasticities. Table 9 reports own-fare 
and expenditure elasticities for markets with two airlines. All calculated elasticities are 
significant at the one percent level. Uncompensated own-fare elasticity shows a 
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decreasing trend with trip distance. Also, average uncompensated own-fare elasticity is 
higher than the medium and long trips own-fare elasticity.  The same trend applies to the 
compensated own-fare elasticities.  All expenditure elasticities are positive as predicted, 
and above one for the largest airline.  The largest airline expenditure elasticity tends to 
increase with distance.  On the other hand, the smallest airline expenditure elasticity 
tends to decrease with distance.  
Cross-fare elasticities for all observations and all distance segments are reported 
in Appendix A. Uncompensated cross-fare elasticities have a negative sign. While 
compensated cross-fare elasticities are all positive. The reason for negative sign of 
uncompensated cross-fare elasticity is that income effect outweighs substitution effect. 
 
Table 9. Compensated and Uncompensated Own-Fare and Expenditure Elasticities: 
Markets with Two Airlines 
Airline All 
distance 
700 miles or 
less 
700-1500 
miles 
More than 1500 
miles 
Uncompensated own-fare elasticity 
-0.930*** -1.000*** -0.911*** -0.896*** Largest airline (0.016) (0.032) (0.024) (0.025) 
-0.738*** -0.972*** -0.645*** -0.629*** Smallest airline (0.036) (0.076) (0.057) (0.052) 
Compensated own-fare elasticity 
-0.197*** -0.286*** -0.162*** -0.166*** Largest airline (0.015) (0.032) (0.023) (0.024) 
-0.471*** -0.685*** -0.395*** -0.359*** Smallest airline (0.036) (0.076) (0.057) (0.052) 
Expenditure elasticity 
 1.040***  1.011***  1.057***  1.068*** Largest airline (0.007) (0.013) (0.00001) (0.014) 
 0.905***  0.973***  0.861***  0.854*** Smallest airline (0.00001) (0.00002) (0.005) (0.014) 
Source: Author’s calculation using Table 5 and equations 9, 12 and 13 of chapter III 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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Table 10 reports own-fare and expenditure elasticities for markets with three 
airlines. All calculated elasticities are significant at the one percent level. 
Uncompensated own-fare elasticity shows a decreasing trend with trip distance. The 
same trend applies to the compensated own-fare elasticities.  Also, average 
uncompensated own-fare elasticity is higher than the medium and long trips own-fare 
elasticities.  
 
Table 10. Compensated and Uncompensated Own-Fare and Expenditure Elasticities: 
Markets with Three Airlines  
Airline All 
distance 
700 miles or 
less 
700-1500 
miles 
More than 1500 
miles 
Uncompensated own-fare elasticity 
-0.902*** -1.141*** -0.942*** -0.808*** Largest airline (0.048) (0.169) (0.083) (0.124) 
-0.813*** -1.166*** -0.821*** -0.667*** Second largest airline (0.072) (0.277) (0.125) (0.004) 
-0.684*** -1.091*** -0.654*** -0.607*** Smallest airline 
(0.034) (0.115) (0.054) (0.123) 
Compensated own-fare elasticity 
-0.269*** -0.540*** -0.298*** -0.190*** Largest airline (0.041) (0.142) (0.068) (0.100) 
-0.573*** -0.910*** -0.587*** -0.422*** Second largest airline (0.072) (0.277) (0.125) (0.00003) 
-0.557*** -0.948*** -0.533*** -0.471*** Smallest airline 
(0.041) (0.142) (0.068) (0.100) 
Expenditure elasticity 
1.106*** 1.024*** 1.098*** 1.130*** Largest airline (0.007) (0.017) (0.011) (0.028) 
0.898*** 0.977*** 0.899*** 0.882*** Second largest airline (0.010) (0.025) (0.018) (0.029) 
0.791*** 0.944*** 0.796*** 0.780*** Smallest airline 
(0.072) (0.277) (0.125) (0.00008) 
Source: Author’s calculation using Table 6 and equations 9, 12 and 13 of chapter III 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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All expenditure elasticities are positive, and above one for the largest airline. The 
largest airline expenditure elasticity tends to increase with distance.  However, the 
second largest and the smallest airlines’ expenditure elasticities tend to decrease with 
distance. 
Cross-fare elasticities are reported in Appendix A.  Uncompensated cross-fare 
elasticities are negative except for few estimates.  Positive uncompensated cross-fare 
elasticity estimates suggests that second largest and smallest airlines travel services are 
substitutes, but those elasticities are mostly statistically insignificant. In short distance 
trips, estimates indicate that second largest is a gross substitute for largest share airline 
travel service. The compensated cross-fare elasticities are all positive, which means that 
a change in fare of one airline will increase the travelers of the other airline, or travelers 
shift to other airlines when a fare increases. Because income effect outweighs 
substitution effect, most of uncompensated cross-fare elasticities are negative. 
 Own-fare and expenditure elasticities for markets with four airlines are reported 
in Table 11. The table shows that all calculated elasticities are statistically significant at 
the one percent level except one estimate. Uncompensated and compensated own-fare 
elasticities are negative and more elastic for short distance trips. The third largest airline 
shows the highest substitution effect among all airlines. 
All expenditure elasticities are positive as predicted, and they are above one for 
the largest airline. The largest airline expenditure elasticity tends to decrease with 
distance, while other airlines’ expenditure elasticity tends to increase with distance. 
Cross-fare elasticities are reported in Appendix A.  
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Table 11. Compensated and Uncompensated Own-Fare and Expenditure Elasticities: 
Markets with Four Airlines  
Airline All 
distance 
700 miles or 
less 
700-1500 
miles 
More than 1500 
miles 
Uncompensated own-fare elasticity 
-0.960*** -1.321*** -0.923*** -0.937*** Largest airline (0.047) (0.137) (0.070) (0.066) 
-0.899*** -0.716*** -0.870*** -0.914*** Second largest 
airline (0.052) (0.197) (0.081) (0.070) 
-0.842*** -1.075*** -0.777*** -0.882*** Third largest 
airline (0.059) (0.307) (0.092) (0.080) 
-0.705*** -0.715 -0.664*** -0.737*** Smallest airline 
(0.094) (0.548) (0.162) (0.117) 
Compensated own-fare elasticity 
-0.392*** -0.647*** -0.342*** -0.386*** Largest airline (0.046) (0.152) (0.069) (0.065) 
-0.682*** -0.565*** -0.656*** -0.691*** Second largest 
airline (0.052) (0.206) (0.081) (0.069) 
-0.707*** -0.960*** -0.647*** -0.742*** Third largest 
airline (0.059) (0.317) (0.092) (0.080) 
-0.625*** -0.654*** -0.590*** -0.651*** Smallest airline 
(0.094) (0.547) (0.161) (0.117) 
Expenditure elasticity 
 1.213***  1.318***  1.213***  1.202*** Largest airline (0.013) (0.058) (0.021) (0.017) 
 0.868***  0.680***  0.853***  0.886*** Second largest 
airline (0.016) (0.091) (0.027) (0.020) 
 0.787***  0.692***  0.786***  0.804*** Third largest 
airline (0.018) (0.137) (0.029) (0.022) 
 0.721***  0.562***  0.716***  0.742*** Smallest airline 
(0.022) (0.163) (0.033) (0.026) 
Source: Author’s calculation using Table 7 and equations 9, 12 and 13 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level 
 
 
 
Uncompensated cross-fare elasticities are mostly negative with few positives. 
Around half of the calculated elasticities are statistically significant including some 
positive signed ones. Positive cross-fare elasticity estimates for each estimated equation 
indicate that the travel services of those airlines are substitutes. The estimation results 
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show no consistent sign for any cross-fare elasticity over the different distance equations 
for each airline, but the third largest share and smallest share airlines are substitutes. 
Also, the second largest share and third largest share airlines are substitutes. The 
compensated elasticities are all positive except for short distance estimation. Because 
income effect outweighs substitution effect, most of uncompensated cross-fare 
elasticities are negative. 
Own-fare and expenditure elasticities for markets with five-and-more airlines are 
reported in Table 12. The table shows all calculated elasticities are statistically 
significant at the one and ten percent levels except few estimates. Uncompensated and 
compensated own-fare elasticities are negative and more elastic for medium distance 
trips. Compensated own-fare elasticity of fourth airline shows the highest substitution 
effects among all airlines. 
Cross-fare elasticities are reported in Appendix A. Uncompensated cross-fare 
elasticities are mostly negative, and less than half are statistically significant. Positive 
cross-fare elasticity estimates for each estimated equation indicates that travel services 
for the third and fourth largest airlines are substitutes, and the same for the fourth largest 
and smallest airlines. Compensated elasticities are all positive.  
All expenditure elasticities are positive as predicted, and above one for the 
largest airline. The largest and second largest airlines’ expenditure elasticities tend to 
decrease with distance.  However, other airlines’ expenditure elasticities tend to increase 
with distance.  
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Table 12. Compensated and Uncompensated Own-Fare and Expenditure Elasticities: 
Markets with Five- and-More Airlines  
Airline All distances 700-1500 miles More than 1500 miles 
Uncompensated own-fare elasticity 
-0.894*** -0.934* -0.889*** Largest airline (0.058) (0.534) (0.064) 
-0.952*** -1.022*** -0.912*** Second largest airline (0.039) (0.424) (0.042) 
-0.916*** -0.821*** -0.927*** Third largest airline 
(0.037) (0.375) (0.041) 
-0.910*** -0.999*** -0.873*** Fourth largest airline 
(0.039) (0.309) (0.045) 
-0.765*** -0.831 -0.736*** Smallest airline 
(0.095) (0.728) (0.1020 
Compensated own-fare elasticity 
-0.461*** -0.454 -0.470*** Largest airline (0.059) (0.535) (0.064) 
-0.728*** -0.799* -0.687*** Second largest airline (0.038) (0.424) (0.042) 
-0.768*** -0.695*** -0.773*** Third largest airline 
(0.031) (0.320) (0.034) 
-0.797*** -0.905*** -0.756*** Fourth largest airline 
(0.037) (0.299) (0.042) 
-0.689*** -0.764 -0.658*** Smallest airline 
(0.095) (0.728) (0.102) 
Expenditure elasticity 
 1.176***  1.237***  1.156*** Largest airline (0.021) (0.159) (0.024) 
 0.967***  0.973***  0.969*** Second largest airline (0.017) (0.187) (0.019) 
 0.862***  0.776***  0.883*** Third largest airline 
(0.018) (0.167) (0.021) 
 0.859***  0.761***  0.883*** Fourth largest airline 
(0.020) (0.164) (0.022) 
 0.789***  0.704***  0.812*** Smallest airline 
(0.023) (0.162) (0.023) 
Source: Author’s calculation using Table 8 and equations 9, 12 and 13  
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level 
 
Following this brief discussion of calculated elasticities for all markets, there is a 
summary of overall remarks and comments about these elasticities for all markets. 
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As discussed in Chapter II, the literature predicts own-fare elasticity of demand 
to increase as the number of substitutes increases. Comparison of average 
uncompensated own-fare elasticities of each market shows no clear trend when number 
of airlines increases. The exclusion of markets with two airlines from the comparison 
gives a general pattern of increasing uncompensated own-fare elasticity as the number of 
airlines increases. The largest airline’s uncompensated own-fare elasticity for five-and-
more airlines markets is the only exception to that trend.  
The conditional uncompensated own-fare elasticity, within each market, tends to 
be less with trip distance for two and three airlines markets, and with no clear trend for 
markets with four, and five-and-more airlines.  For instance, long distance trip is more 
fare elastic than medium distance trip for markets with four airlines.  Also, the general 
trend of short distance uncompensated own-fare elasticity is more elastic than medium 
and long distances trips elasticity for all markets. The same interpretation applies to 
comparison of medium and long trip uncompensated own-fare elasticity for markets with 
two and three airlines. These results may be attributed to availability of travel substitutes 
other than air travel such as train. Also, these findings are supported by the literature. 
The conditional uncompensated own-fare elasticity tends to be higher for the 
airline with higher share; the only exception is markets with five-or-more airlines. The 
overall conditional uncompensated own-fare elasticity is inelastic for all markets. This 
result implies that the decrease in fares will results in decrease in total revenue of air 
travel, because the percentage increase in number of air travelers will be less than the 
percentage decrease in fare. Also, the largest airline can increase its fare without fear of 
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decreasing its total revenue. Combining the last two remarks, all airlines, except the 
largest airline, will not decrease their fares to attract more travelers. 
As shown in Tables 9-12, the largest airline conditional compensated own-fare 
elasticity is the smallest among all airlines.  Also, the smallest airline has lower 
conditional own-fare elasticity than the other airlines (except the largest airline). This 
means that the largest airline may increase its fare with less effect on its number of 
travelers compared with other airlines. 
As discussed above, calculated elasticities show two distinct trends of 
expenditure elasticity for different trip distances. The first is for markets with two and 
three airlines, and the second is for the other two markets.  For the first trend, largest 
airline travelers’ number will increase relatively more, as distance and air travel 
expenditure increase. The second trend shows the reverse.  
The conditional uncompensated cross-fare elasticities are mostly negative, 
especially for markets with two and three airlines. On the other hand, the conditional 
compensated cross-fare elasticities are positive, and as stated by the theory. The main 
reason that the uncompensated cross-fare elasticities are negative is that income effect 
outweighs the substitution effect. 
 
Leisure and Business Travelers’ Estimation Results:  
In the previous section, all travelers’ data were used for estimation without 
distinction between travelers’ types. In this section, travelers are classified into leisure 
and business using fare classes. Travelers were classified based on fare classes. Business 
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travelers are assumed to comprise restricted and non-restricted business and first class 
tickets excluding Southwest travelers. Leisure travelers are assumed to comprise 
restricted and non-restricted coach tickets and Southwest travelers. Theory predicts 
leisure travelers are more fare sensitive than business travelers. Oum et al. (1992), Gillen 
et al. (2004) and Brons et al. (2001) show empirical evidences that leisure travelers will 
be more fare elastic than the business travelers. 
The variables are previously defined in this chapter, except that the observations 
are separated into two data subsets: leisure travelers’ data and business travelers’ data. 
Also, all data issues applied to the entire data set are applied here such as the definitions 
of products, markets, distances, and so on. Descriptive statistics for leisure and business 
travelers are presented in Tables 13-18. 
Table 13 shows the summary statistics of leisure travelers in Markets with two 
airlines. There are 1815 city pairs served by two airlines. On average, the largest share 
airline captures about 71 percent of total city pair air travel expenditures, with a standard 
deviation of thirteen percent.  
The average fares for both airlines are monotonic in share. At the same time, 
range of average fare is high for both airlines and skewed to the higher values. The 
itinerary yields for largest airline and for smallest airline are 17.9 and 16.8 cents, which 
are less than those of markets with two airlines for all travelers.  For some city pairs, the 
average fare of the smallest airline is higher than fare of largest airline.  
Total city pair air travel expenditure has a large standard deviation. The average 
total city pair air travel expenditure is $82.17 thousands with a standard deviation of 
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$151.55 thousands. The majority of observations are below $100 thousands. Also, the 
Stone Fare Index averages 5.11 with standard deviation of 0.35. Because the total city 
pair expenditure exhibits from standard deviation, log of real city pair expenditure shows 
high deviation and skews to the right. 
 
Table 13. Descriptive statistics for Leisure Travelers: Markets with Two Airlines  
Variable  Variable mean Std. dev. Range 
Share of largest airline     0.71     0.13 0.50-0.95 
Share of smallest airline     0.29      0.13 0.05-0.50 
Average fare of largest airline ($) 206.34    76.12 65.51-580.83 
Average fare of smallest airline ($) 192.32    71.72 55.64-538.05 
Log (Relative average fare)     0.07     0.27 -1.10-0.99 
Stone Fare Index     5.25     0.35 4.21-6.17 
Total city pair expenditure ($000)   82.17 151.55 3.50-1,434.19 
Log (Real city pair expenditure)      5.11     1.40 3.36-9.18 
Average miles flown  1123 714 114-4903 
Number of observations          1815 
    Source: Author’s calculation from Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) second quarter, 2002. 
 
The average number of travelers is 4152 passengers for the quarter or 46 
passengers per day. The average distance flown by travelers in these markets is 1123 
miles with standard deviation of 714 miles.  
Most of the statistics in Table 13 resembles statistics of Table 1, but most 
variables have lower standard deviation. Also, the fares and itinerary yields are lower in 
leisure travelers markets. 
Summary statistics for business travelers in markets with two airlines is reported 
in Table 14. There are 67 city pairs served by two airlines. On average, about 68 percent 
of total city pair air travel expenditure is of largest airline, with a standard deviation of 
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thirteen percent. Share of largest airline shows little difference when compared with 
statistics of leisure travelers and with the entire data set for two airlines markets. 
The average fares for both airlines are monotonic. The fare for business travelers 
is higher than of leisure travelers because of the higher qualities of service they offered. 
The itinerary yields for the largest share airline and for the smallest share airline are 84.5 
and 80.1 cents, which are much higher than of leisure travelers and entire two all 
observations average.  For some city pairs, the average fare of the smallest share airline 
is higher than fare of largest share airline. 
 
 
Table 14. Descriptive Statistics for Business Travelers: Markets with Two Airlines  
Variable  Mean Std. dev. Range 
Share of largest airline 0.68 0.13 0.50-0.94 
Share of smallest airline 0.32 0.13 0.06-0.50 
Average fare of largest airline ($) 793.93 424.45 126.81-1600.46 
Average fare of smallest airline ($) 751.79 502.79 77.49-1752.71 
Log (Relative average fare) 0.16 0.64 -0.85-2.63 
Stone Fare Index 6.46 0.70 4.92-7.39 
Total city pair expenditure ($000) 71.70 67.01 6.27-370.86 
Log (Real city pair expenditure) 4.31 0.60 3.28-5.60 
Average miles flown  939 535 231-2129 
Number of observations          67 
Source: Author’s calculation from Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) second quarter, 2002. 
 
 
Total city pair air travel expenditure exhibits a large standard deviation. The 
average of this expenditure is $71.7 thousands with a standard deviation of $67. Also, 
the Stone Fare Index averages 6.46 with a standard deviation of 0.7. This is higher than 
for leisure and entire data set for markets with two airlines. The average number of 
travelers is 919 passengers for the quarter or 11 passengers per day that is lower than the 
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average numbers of leisure travelers. The average distance flown by travelers on these 
markets is 939 miles with standard deviation of 535 miles.  
In comparison with leisure travelers and all travelers (entire data set) statistics 
reported in Tables 1 and 13, the business travelers’ statistics show distinct differences in 
terms of higher paid fares, lower deviation on most variables and shorter average miles 
flown. Also, it is worth mentioning the size of business travelers’ data is relatively small. 
This may explain the similarity in statistics between leisure and the entire data set. 
Table 15 shows summary statistics for leisure travelers in markets with three 
airlines. There are 881 city pairs served by three airlines. On average, about 57 percent 
of total city pair air travel expenditure is of largest airline, 27 percent of second largest 
airline and 16 percent is of smallest airline. Some observations show that the largest 
airline captured more than 80 percent of total city pair expenditure. The standard 
deviation of the largest airline is the highest with 14 percent.  
The average fares for airlines are less than the entire data set average with a 
smaller standard deviation. Average fare of the smallest airline is higher than fare of 
largest and second largest airlines for several city pairs. At the same time, average fare 
range is lower than the entire data range, and skewed to the right. Itinerary yields for the 
largest, the second largest and the smallest airlines are 15.6, 14.9 and 14.1, respectively.  
Total city pair air travel expenditure exhibits a large standard deviation. The 
average of this expenditure is $80.93 thousands with a standard deviation of $148.38 
thousands. Total city pair expenditure deviates lesser than the entire markets with three 
airlines.  The average number of travelers is 3833 passengers for the quarter or 34 
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passengers per day. Also, the Stone Fare Index averages 5.30 with a standard deviation 
of 0.31. Because the total city pair expenditure exhibits a large standard deviation, log of 
real city pair expenditure has high deviation and skews to the right. The average distance 
flown by travelers on these markets is 1397 miles with standard deviation of 718 miles. 
 
Table 15. Descriptive Statistics for Leisure Travelers: Markets with Three Airlines  
Variable  Variable mean Std. dev. Range 
Share of largest airline     0.57     0.14 0.29-0.89 
Share of second Largest airline     0.27     0.09 0.06-0.46 
Share of smallest airline     0.16     0.07 0.05-0.33 
Average fare of largest airline ($) 217.29    76.40 74.11-584.76 
Average fare of second largest airline ($) 207.57    73.17 66.56-651.25 
Average fare of smallest airline ($) 196.61    68.92 69.22-545.68 
Log (Relative average fare of largest 
airline)      0.10     0.26 -0.66-1.08 
Log (Relative average fare of second 
largest airline)     0.05     0.27 -0.80-1.14 
Stone Fare Index     5.30     0.31 4.29-6.21 
Total city pair expenditure ($000)    80.93 148.38 6.56-1,406.67
Log (Real city pair expenditure)      5.22 1.15 3.52-8.7 
Average miles flown  1397 718 144-5056 
Number of observations           881 
Source: Author’s calculation from Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) second quarter, 2002. 
 
Table 16 shows summary statistics of business travelers in markets with three 
airlines. There are twelve city pairs served by three airlines. On average, about 46 
percent of total city pair air travel expenditure is for the largest airline, 34 percent for the 
second largest airline and 19 percent for the smallest airline. Standard deviation of 
largest airline is the highest with 9 percent. Because of fewness of observations, 
comparison of these statistics with leisure and entire market data is taken with caveat. 
There are slight differences in shares of airlines in these markets. 
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Table 16. Descriptive Statistics for Business Travelers: Markets with Three Airlines  
Variable  Variable mean Std. dev. Range 
Share of largest airline 0.46 0.09 0.35-0.59 
Share of second Largest airline 0.34 0.05 0.22-0.41 
Share of smallest airline 0.19 0.09 0.06-0.32 
Average fare of largest airline ($) 1317.71 356.52 652.03-1780.79
Average fare of second largest airline ($) 1198.49 357.88 571.14-1696.27
Average fare of smallest airline ($) 986.51 186.24 759.15-1299.61
Log (Relative average fare of largest 
airline)  0.26 0.32 -0.20-0.80 
Log (Relative average fare of second 
largest airline) 0.16 0.33 -0.48-0.52 
Stone Fare Index 7.08 0.23 6.61-7.24 
Total city pair expenditure ($000) 384.51 518.37 32.64-1,493.04 
Log (Real city pair expenditure) 4.98 1.17 3.78-6.99 
Average miles flown  1493 586 440-2055 
Number of observations             12 
Source: Author’s calculation from Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) second quarter, 2002. 
 
 
The average fares for both airlines are monotonic in shares. The smallest airline 
has the smallest average fares’ standard deviation, which is almost half of other two 
airlines standard deviation. The itinerary yields for the largest airline, the second largest 
and for the smallest airline are 88.3, 80.3 and 66.1 cents, respectively. These are much 
higher than of leisure travelers and the averages of entire data set for markets with three 
airlines.  For some city pairs, the average fare of the smallest airline is higher than fare 
of largest airline.  
Total city pair air travel expenditure exhibits a large standard deviation. The 
average of this expenditure is $384.51 thousands with a standard deviation of $518.37 
thousands. Also, the Stone Price Index averages 7.08 with a standard deviation of 0.23, 
which is higher than for leisure and entire two airlines markets because of high business 
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fares. The average number of travelers is 3074 passengers for the quarter or 34 
passengers per day. This is lower than the average numbers of leisure travelers. The 
average distance flown by travelers on these markets is 1493 miles with standard 
deviation of 586 miles. 
In comparison with leisure travelers and all travelers statistics reported in Tables 
2 and 15, business travelers’ statistics show distinct differences in terms of higher paid 
fares, lower deviation on most variables and longer average miles flown.  
Summary statistics of leisure travelers in markets with four airlines are shown in 
Table 17. There are 458 city pairs served by three airlines. The statistics in this table 
resemble Table 3 statistics with few small differences in fares averages, total city pairs 
expenditure. Lower average fares are expected for leisure travelers by theory, and shown 
by the statistics. 
The average number of travelers is 2555 passengers for the quarter or 28 
passengers per day. Itinerary yields are 13.1, 12.7, 12.4 and 11.7 cents for largest, 
second largest, third larges and smallest airlines, respectively. Total city pair air travel 
expenditure exhibits a large standard deviation. The average of this expenditure is 
$54.43 thousands with a standard deviation of $76.66 thousands. 
Also, the Stone Fare Index averages 5.32 with a standard deviation of 0.25. 
Because the total city pair expenditure suffers from high standard deviation, the log of 
real city pair expenditure suffers from a high deviation and skewed to the right. The 
average distance flown by travelers on this market is 1669 miles with standard deviation 
of 639 miles. 
 81
Table 17. Descriptive Statistics for Leisure Travelers: Markets with Four Airlines  
Variable Variable 
mean 
Std. 
dev. Range 
Share of largest airline 0.47 0.12 0.27-0.81 
Share of second largest airline 0.25 0.07 0.07-0.43 
Share of third largest airline 0.17 0.05 0.05-0.30 
Share of smallest airline 0.11 0.04 0.05-0.23 
Average fare of largest share airline ($) 218.99 63.11 86.75-453.32 
Average fare of second largest airline ($) 212.97 65.19 90.94-534.33 
Average fare of third Largest airline ($) 207.69 64.54 80.16-547.07 
Average fare of Smallest airline ($) 198.34 70.59 72.16-519.81 
Log (Relative average fare of largest airline)  0.11 0.26 -0.66-1.02 
Log (Relative average fare of second largest 
airline) 0.08 0.28 -0.76-0.93 
Log (Relative average fare of third largest 
airline) 0.06 0.27 -0.82-0.81 
Stone Fare Index 5.32 0.25 4.58-6.11 
Total city pair expenditure ($000) 54.43 76.66 10.18-773.40 
Log (Real city pair expenditure) 5.19 0.72 3.98-8.24 
Average miles flown  1669 639 513-4592 
Number of observations         458 
Source: Author’s calculation from Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) second quarter, 2002. 
 
 
Summary statistics of leisure travelers in markets with five-and-more airlines are 
shown in Table 18. There are 384 city pairs served by three airlines. The statistics in this 
table are similar to Table 4 statistics with a few small differences in fares averages, and 
total city pairs expenditure. Theoretically the lower average fares are expected for leisure 
travelers proved by the statistics. 
The average number of travelers is 2618 passengers for the quarter or 29 
passengers per day. Itinerary yields are 11.5, 11.3, 11.2, 10.9 and 10.6 cents for largest, 
second largest, third larges, fourth largest and smallest airlines, respectively.  Total city 
pair air travel expenditure exhibits a large standard deviation. The average of this 
expenditure is $55.60 thousands with a standard deviation of $63.96 thousands. Also, the 
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Stone Fare Index averages 5.32 with a standard deviation of 0.21. The average distance 
flown by travelers on these markets is 1890 miles with standard deviation of 514 miles. 
 
 
Table 18. Descriptive Statistics for Leisure Travelers: Markets with Five-and-More 
Airlines  
Variable Variable mean Std. dev. Range 
Share of largest airline   0.37   0.10 0.22-0.73 
Share of second largest airline   0.23   0.05 0.08-0.34 
Share of third largest airline   0.17   0.04 0.07-0.26 
Share of fourth largest airline    0.13   0.03 0.060.20 
Share of smallest airline    0.10   0.03 0.05-0.18 
Average fare of largest share airline ($) 217.90 64.84 107.00-629.79
Average fare of second largest airline ($) 213.07 61.48 109.95-609.89
Average fare of third Largest airline ($) 211.52 72.85 97.59-749.38 
Average fare of fourth largest airline ($) 206.78 63.09 103.61-593.57
Average fare of Smallest airline ($) 200.56 66.51 101.61-654.53
Log (Relative average fare of largest 
airline)       0.09   0.28 -0.74-1.13 
Log (Relative average fare of second 
largest airline)      0.07   0.30 -1.03-1.29 
Log (Relative average fare of third largest 
airline)      0.05   0.31 -1.19-1.09 
Log (Relative average fare of fourth largest 
airline)     0.03   0.29 -0.94-1.26 
Stone Fare Index     5.32   0.21 4.78-6.18 
Total city pair expenditure ($000)    55.60 63.96 
12.93-
1,046.88 
Log (real city pair expenditure)      5.38   0.60 4.32-8.55 
Average Miles flown  1890 514 587-4910 
Number of observations       384 
Source: Author’s calculation from Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) second quarter, 2002. 
 
From the above discussion of leisure travelers’ descriptive statistics, there are a 
few important issues. The average miles flown are positively related to the number of 
airlines serving the city pair. Average fares are monotonic in share, and its standard 
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deviation slightly decreases with more airlines serving the markets. The first two 
comments are similar to all travelers’ statistics mentioned in the previous section. 
The largest airline dominates the markets with an average share within a range of 
70.3-36.7 percent. While the second airline gets average shares within a range of  29.4-
23.1 percent. The third and fourth have average shares within a range of 16.0-17.2 
percent and 11.0-13.1 percent, respectively. As the number of airlines increases, the 
share of the largest airline will decrease the most. 
Average fares are closer in all markets and ranges from $192.32-217.9; these are 
slightly lower than of all travelers’ average fares. But the itinerary yields are different 
and higher as the number of airlines decreases. Also, the total city pair expenditures 
decrease as the number of airlines increases.  
To conclude the discussion of descriptive statistics for both travelers’ types, there 
are some distinct features to mention. The differences in average fares and in their 
standard deviation are high between the two types. Also, Business travelers’ statistics 
show lower standard deviation of distance traveled than leisure travelers. 
The comparison of entire data set with leisure travelers’ data shows differences 
in average fares and total city pairs expenditures. These differences in statistics are 
expected to produce some differences in estimation results. 
Before turning to the estimation results, AIDS used to estimate, separately, the 
demand for each traveler’s type. The estimation is carried out using SUR to estimate the 
shares equations (equation 16). The parameters estimated are shown on Tables 19-25. 
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The interpretation of the parameters is the same as discussed before. The 
parameters signs are as the same for Tables 5-8, but their magnitudes are slightly 
different except for markets with four airlines. This may due to leisure travelers’ 
domination over business travelers in the data set. Business travelers comprise about five 
percent of total travelers in the entire data set.  
Table 19 reports the results of two estimated equations of leisure travelers in 
markets with two airlines. Also, estimation results for the three categories of trip 
distances of these markets are reported in Appendix B. All estimated parameters fares 
parameters are different from zero and both airlines fares have measurable effect on the 
share of each.  
The estimated own-fare parameter of each airline indicates that the increase of 
that fare by one percent, increase its share by 8.2 percent. Estimated fares parameters for 
short distance are insignificant for estimated equations, and it is significantly different 
from zero for medium and long distances. Cross-fare estimated parameter shows if fare 
of an airline increases by one percent, the share of the other airline decreases by 6.1 
percent, and it is different than zero for medium and long trips distances. 
The estimation results for the largest airline estimation results shown in column 
two of Table 19. The largest airline has always positive estimated parameter while the 
smallest airline has negative estimated parameter. A one percent change in total air 
travel expenditure in two airlines markets leads to an increase in the share of largest 
airline by 2.8 percent and a decrease in smallest airline by 2.8 percent. The interpretation 
is that air travelers will shift to the largest airline from other airline as air travel 
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expenditure increases. For the different distance categories, all estimated parameters are 
significantly different from zero. An increase of air travel expenditure by one percent 
will increase the share of largest airline by 0.8, 4.0 and 5.0 percent for short, medium 
and long distance trips, respectively. At the same time, this increase in air travel 
expenditure will decrease the share of smallest airline by 0.8, 4.0 and 5.0 percent for 
short, medium and long distance trips, respectively. 
 
Table 19. Estimation Results of Leisure Travelers: Markets with Two Airlines  
 Largest airline Smallest airline 
Log(Largest airline average fare)    0.061*** 
  (0.011) 
-0.061*** 
(0.011) 
Log(Smallest airline average fare)   -0.061*** 
  (0.011) 
 0.061*** 
(0.011) 
Log (Real city pair expenditure)    0.028*** 
  (0.002) 
-0.028*** 
(0.002) 
Constant    0.557*** 
  (0.011) 
 0.443*** 
(0.011) 
R-square     0.10  
Chi-square 200.99  
P-value     0.00  
Number of Observations 1815 1815 
Share (mean %) 70 30 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level 
 
 
 
The R-square is 0.1. The Chi-square and associated p-value of the estimated 
equation show that exogenous fares and expenditure reliably explain the change in the 
share. 
Table 20 reports estimation results of business travelers in two airlines markets. 
Also, estimation results for the three distance categories of these markets are reported in 
Appendix B. All estimated fares’ parameters are statistically significantly different from 
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zero. The two airlines fares have measurable effect on the share of each. The estimated 
own-fare parameter of each airline shows that the increase of the airline fare by one 
increases its share by 7.9 percent. Because of the fewness of observations, there is no 
distance segments estimation. Cross-fare estimated parameter shows that if relative fare 
of each increases by one, the share of the other airline decreases by 7.9 percent. 
The expenditure parameter is always positive for the largest share airline and 
negative for the smallest share airline. A one percent change in total air travel 
expenditure in these markets, leads to an increase in the share of the largest airline by 4.7 
percent and a decrease in the share of the smallest airline by 4.7 percent.  
The R-square is 0.15. The Chi-square and associated p-value of the estimated 
equation show that exogenous fares and expenditure reliably explain the change in the 
share. 
The comparison of estimated parameters for leisure, business and entire data set 
shows that business travelers’ parameters are higher in absolute value. This indicates that 
airlines’ shares values are more responsive to the changes in fares and expenditure of 
business travelers. In other words, an increase in business fare will result in share 
increase of largest airline by more than the increase from leisure fare increase.  
Table 21 reports the estimation results of three estimated equations leisure 
travelers in markets with three airlines. Also, estimation results for the trip distances of 
these markets are reported in Appendix B.  
Most of estimated fare parameters are statistically significant at the one percent 
level. Airlines fares have evident effect on the share of each other, except for the fare of 
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the second largest and the smallest airline, because their cross-fare parameters are not 
significant. This is similar in direction to the estimation results of entire data set for these 
markets. 
 
Table 20. Estimation Results of Business Travelers: Markets with Two Airlines 
 Largest airline Smallest airline 
 0.079*** -0.079*** Log(Largest airline average fare) 
(0.023) (0.023) 
-0.079***  0.079*** Log(Smallest airline average fare) 
(0.023) (0.023) 
 0.047** -0.047** Log (real city pair expenditure) 
 (0.025) (0.025) 
 0.468***  0.532*** Constant 
 (0.109) (0.109) 
R-square    0.15  
Chi-square 12.28  
P-value   0.00  
Number of Observations 67 67 
Share (mean %) 68.22 31.7 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
 
The estimated own-fare parameter of largest airline equation, as shown in 
column two of Table 21, indicates a one percent increase on own-fare, holding other 
fares and real expenditure constant, its share increase by 10.4 percent. For short, medium 
and long distances, the own-fare parameters are different from zero; a one percent 
increase in largest airline increases share of that airline by 13.4, 7.5 and 15.3 percent for 
these distances, respectively.  
The cross-fare parameters in the largest airline estimated equation are negative. 
Cross-fare estimated parameters for all observations show that if fare of second largest 
or of smallest airlines increases by one percent, the share of largest airline decreases by 
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5.5 or 4.9 percent, respectively. For estimation results of medium trips’ distance, cross-
fare parameters are statistically zero for second largest, and significant for smallest 
airline with effect on share of largest airline by 7.5 percent. For estimation results of 
long distance trips, cross-fare parameters are statistically significant for the second 
largest and the smallest airline with effect on the share of the largest airline by 4.3 and 
3.2 percent, respectively. This means that the effect of smallest airline on the share of the 
largest airline is measurable for all distances. 
 
Table 21.  Estimation Results of Leisure Travelers: Markets with Three Airlines  
 Largest airline Smallest airline Smallest airline 
 0.104*** -0.055*** -0.049*** Log(Largest airline average fare) (0.019) (0.013) (0.010) 
-0.055***  0.047***  0.008 Log(Second largest airline 
average fare) (0.013) (0.011) (0.007) 
-0.049***  0.008  0.042*** Log(Smallest airline average 
fare) (0.010) (0.007) (0.012) 
 0.061*** -0.027*** -0.034*** Log (Real city pair expenditure) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) 
 0.248***  0.408***  0.343*** Constant (0.020) (0.014) (0.010) 
R-square   0.24  0.12  
Chi-square 280.740 124.500  
P-value     0.00     0.00  
Number of Observations 883 883 883 
Share (mean %)   26.69   16.12   16.12 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
 
 
The estimated expenditure parameters indicate a measurable effect of 
expenditure on the largest airline. For all observation, a one percent increase in total real 
expenditure leads to 6.1 percent increase on its share. For short, medium and long trips 
distances, it is 1.4, 5.8 and 7.1 percent respectively.  
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The R-square for three airlines markets is within the range of 0.19-0.30 for all 
observation and distances. The Chi-square and associated p-value of the estimated 
equation show that exogenous fares and expenditure reliably explain the change in the 
share. 
The estimation results for the second largest airline, reported on column three of 
Table 21, show significant estimates for own-fare and largest airline fare for all 
estimates of leisure travelers data, except for short distance equation estimates. 
Expenditure parameters estimates are all significant with negative sign, and their effects 
on second largest airline are evident. For all observation, a one percent increase in total 
real expenditure leads to 2.7 percent decrease on her share. For short, medium and long 
distances, a one percent increase in total real expenditure leads to decrease its share by 
0.6, 2.6 and 3.1 percent respectively.  
The R-square is in the range of 0.10-0.18. The Chi-square and associated p-value 
of the estimated equation show that exogenous fares and expenditure reliably explaining 
the change in the share, except for short distance trips where p-value is not significant. 
The estimation results for the smallest airline equations are reported on column 
four of Table 21. Own-fare estimated parameter shows similar results of the largest 
airline in terms of significant and directions for all distances and all observations, but 
with lower parameters value. Also, it has a measurable effect from the largest airline 
fare.  
Table 22 reports results of the estimated equations of business travelers in the 
three airlines markets. Most of estimated fare parameters are statistically significant at 
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the one percent level. Airline fares have an effect on the share of each other, except for 
the fare of the second largest and the smallest airline, due to their insignificant cross-fare 
parameters. This is similar to the estimation results of leisure travelers and entire data set 
for these markets. 
The estimated own-fare parameter of largest airline equation shows that if this 
fare increases by one percent, holding other fares and real expenditure constant, its share 
increases by 16.8 percent. The cross-fare parameters in the largest airline estimated 
equation are negative. Cross-fare estimated parameters for all observations show if 
relative fare of the second largest and the smallest airline increases by one percent, the 
share of the largest airline decreases by 6.9 and 10 percent, respectively.  
The estimated expenditure parameters show there is an effect of expenditures on 
the share of the largest airline. For all observation, a one percent increase in total real 
expenditure leads to 3.0 percent increase on the share of the largest airline.  
The R-square for business travelers in markets with three airlines is high. The 
Chi-square and associated p-value of the estimated equation show that exogenous fares 
and expenditure reliably explain the change in the share. 
The estimation results for the second largest airline, shown on column three of 
Table 22, indicate significant estimates for own-fare and largest airline fare for all 
estimates of leisure travelers data. Expenditure parameters estimates are insignificant.  
The Chi-square and associated p-value of the estimated equation show that 
exogenous fares and expenditure reliably explain the change in the share. 
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Table 22.  Estimation Results of Business Travelers: Markets with Three Airlines  
 Largest airline Smallest airline Smallest airline 
 0.168*** -0.069** -0.100** Log(Largest airline average fare) (0.049) (0.032)  (0.049) 
-0.069**  0.083** -0.014 Log(Second largest airline 
average fare) (0.032) (0.040)  (0.042) 
-0.100** -0.014  0.114* Log(Smallest airline average 
fare) (0.049) (0.042)  (0.064) 
 0.030***  0.013 -0.044*** Log (Real city pair expenditure) (0.013) (0.011)  (0.015) 
 0.281***  0.280***  0.439*** Constant (0.066) (0.056)  (0.074) 
R-square   0.64  0.33  
Chi-square 21.110  8.270  
P-value   0.00  0.04  
Number of observations 12 12 12 
Share (mean %) 46.47 34.14 19.39 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
 
 
The last column of Table 22 reports the estimation results of the smallest airline 
equation. Estimated fare parameters are significant, except for the fare of the second 
largest airline. A one percent increases in own-fare parameter results in 11.4 percent 
increase in the share of the smallest airline. A one percent increases in largest airline fare 
decreases the smallest airline share by 10 percent. The share of the smallest airline will 
decrease by 4.4 percent if total city pairs expenditure increases by one percent. 
The comparison of estimated parameters for leisure, business and entire data set 
shows that business travelers’ parameters are higher in absolute value. Also, all 
estimated parameters enjoy the same characteristics with different absolute values. 
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Estimation results for leisure travelers in markets with four airlines are reported 
in Table 23. Also, estimation results for distance categories of these markets are reported 
in Appendix B.  
The estimated own-fare parameter of largest airline equation shows if this fare 
increase by one percent, holding other fares and real expenditure constant, share of this 
airline increases by 7.0 percent. For medium and long distances, the own-fare parameters 
are significantly different from zero. One percent increases in own-fare of this airline 
increases its share by 6.2 and 10.3 percent, respectively. The estimated fare parameters 
in short distance equations are insignificant. The cross-fare parameters in the largest 
airline estimated equation are negative, and are significant for third largest and smallest 
airlines.  
The estimated expenditure parameters show there is an evident effect of 
expenditure on the largest airline. For all observation, a one percent increase in total real 
expenditure leads to 10.1 percent increase in share of this airline. For short, medium and 
long trips distances, it is 16.1, 10.4 and 9.2 percent respectively. These results are similar 
to entire data set estimation. 
The R-square of the largest airline estimated equations are within the range of 
0.35-0.76. The Chi-square and associated p-value of the estimated equation show that 
exogenous fares and expenditure reliably explain the change in the share. 
The estimated fare parameters of second largest airline equation, as shown in 
column three of Table 23, are statistically insignificant except one parameter. Effect of 
fares on the share of second largest airline is not evident. 
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Table 23. Estimation Results of Leisure Travelers: Markets with Four Airlines 
 Largest airline 
Second largest 
airline 
Third largest 
airline 
Smallest 
airline 
 0.070*** -0.017 -0.032*** -0.021*** Log(Largest airline 
average fare) (0.023) (0.013) (0.011) (0.007) 
-0.017 0.012  0.013** -0.009 Log(Second largest 
airline average fare) (0.013) (0.011) (0.007) (0.006) 
-0.032*** 0.013**  0.015**  0.003 Log(Third largest 
airline average fare) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) 
-0.021*** -0.009  0.003  0.027*** Log(Smallest airline 
average fare) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.010) 
 0.101*** -0.034*** -0.036*** -0.031*** Log (Real city pair 
expenditure) (0.006 0.004 (0.003) (0.002) 
-0.062** 0.427***  0.361***  0.274*** Constant (0.033) 0.021 (0.016) (0.011) 
R-square   0.36 0.15  0.26  
Chi-square 156.460 87.730 159.720  
P-value     0.00   0.00     0.00  
Number of 
observations 458 458 458 458 
Share (mean %)   46.80   24.97   17.09   11.14 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
 
 
The estimated expenditure parameters show there is a measurable effect of 
expenditure on the share of the second largest airline. For all observation, a one percent 
increase in total real expenditure leads to 3.4 percent decrease share of this airline. For 
short, medium and long distances, share decreases by 7.2, 3.8 and 2.9 percent 
respectively.  
The R-square is within range of 13-54 percent for all estimated equation of the 
second largest airline in markets with four airlines. The Chi-square and associated p-
value of the estimated equation show that exogenous fares and expenditure reliably 
explain the change in the share. 
 94
The estimated fare parameters of third largest airline equation are shown in 
column four of Table 23. Fare parameters are statistically significant for six out of 
sixteen parameters, which consists of all parameters estimated using the distance 
categories and all observations of leisure travelers. One percent increases in own-fare 
leads to an increase in share of third largest airline by 1.5 and 2.2 percent for all 
observations and long distance trips. For cross-fare effect, the only airline effect that 
may be measurable is of the largest airline. 
The estimated expenditure parameters show there is an effect of expenditures on 
third largest airline. For all observation, a one percent increase in total real expenditure 
leads to a 3.6 percent decrease in this airline share. For short, medium and long trips 
distances, its share decreases by 4.8, 3.6 and 3.4 percent, respectively.  
The R-square is within the range of 0.24-0.53 for all estimated equation of 
second largest share airline at markets with four airlines. The Chi-square and associated 
p-value of the estimated equation show that exogenous fares and expenditure reliably 
explain the change in share. 
The estimated fare parameters of smallest airline equation are reported in column 
five of Table 23. Five out of the sixteen fare estimated parameters are statistically 
significant. One percent increases in own-fare leads to increase share of third largest 
airline by 2.7 and 3.3 percent for all observations and medium distance, respectively. For 
cross-fare effect, there is no measurable effect across different distances, except two 
significant cross-fare parameters with largest airline. 
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The estimated expenditure parameters show there is a measurable effect of 
expenditure on the share of the smallest airline. For all observation, a one percent 
increase in total real expenditure leads to 3.1 percent decrease in its share. For short, 
medium and long trips distances, its share decreases by 4.1, 3.0 and 3.0 percent 
respectively. These are close to entire data set estimation results. 
Table 24 reports results of estimated equations of markets with five-and-more 
airlines for leisure travelers. Also, estimation results for medium and long distance trips 
of this market are reported in Appendix B.  
The estimated fares parameters are the slopes of the share equations. Twelve out 
of twenty-five estimated parameters are statistically significant at one and ten percent. 
The second largest airline estimated fare parameters are statistically insignificant. 
The estimated own-fare parameter of largest airline equation shows that if this 
fare increases by one percent, holding other fares and real expenditure constant, its share 
will increase by 7.8 percent. For medium and long distances, the own-fare parameters 
are significant, and a one percent increases in this fare leads to an increase in its share by 
11.2 and 6.8 percent, respectively.  
The cross-fare parameters in the largest airline estimated equation are mostly 
negative. Cross-fare estimated parameters for all observations show if fare of third 
largest, of fourth largest and of smallest airlines increases by one percent, the share of 
the largest airline decreases by 1.8, 2.6 and 2.8 percent, respectively. For estimation 
results of distance categories, three out of eight estimated cross-fare parameters are 
statistically different from zero. 
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The estimated expenditure parameters show there is an effect of expenditure on 
the largest airline. For all observation, a one percent increase in total real expenditure 
leads to 6.8 percent increase on its share. For medium and long distances, the increase in 
its share will be 10.1 and 5.7 percent, respectively.  
 
Table 24. Estimation Results of Leisure Travelers: Markets with Five-and-More Airlines  
 Largest airline 
Second 
largest 
airline 
Third 
largest 
airline 
Fourth 
largest 
airline 
Smallest 
airline 
 0.078*** -0.006 -0.018** -0.026*** -0.028*** Log(Largest 
airline average 
fare) (0.022) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) 
-0.006  0.003  0.0003  0.004 -0.001 Log(Second 
largest airline 
average fare) (0.010) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
-0.018**  0.0003  0.018***  0.0001  0.0001 Log(Third largest 
airline average 
fare) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
-0.026***  0.004  0.0001  0.014***  0.008** Log(Fourth 
largest airline 
average fare) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
-0.028*** -0.001  0.0001  0.008**  0.021*** Log(Smallest 
airline average 
fare) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) 
 0.068*** -0.010*** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.021*** Log (real city pair 
expenditure) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
-0.002 0.288***  0.267*** 0.233***  0.203* Constant (0.042) (0.021) (0.017) (0.014) (0.012) 
R-square  18.34 1.84   8.97 12.96  
Chi-square 94.050 8.010 37.840 61.410  
P-value   0.00 0.15   0.00   0.00  
Number of 
Observations 384 384 384 384 384 
Share (mean %)   36.70   23.18   17.25   13.13     9.74 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level 
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The R-square of estimated equations ranges between 0.15-0.35 for all 
observation, medium and long distances. The Chi-square and associated p-value of the 
estimated equation show that exogenous fares and expenditure reliably explain the 
change in the share. 
The estimated fare parameters of second largest airline equation are reported on 
column three of Table 24. These parameters are statistically insignificant except for two 
parameters. Effect of cross-fares on share of second largest airline is not evident. 
The estimated expenditure parameters show there is a measurable effect of 
expenditure on the share of the second largest airline. For all observation, a one percent 
increase in total real expenditure leads to one percent decrease in its share. For medium 
and long distances, one percent increases in real travel expenditure decreases its share by 
1.1 and 0.9 percent, respectively.  
The Chi-square and associated p-value of the estimated equation show that 
exogenous fares and expenditure do not reliably explain the change in the share except 
medium distance equation. 
Third largest airline estimated fare parameters are reported in column four of 
Table 24, and they are statistically significant except for own-fare parameter for all 
observations and medium distance equations. A one percent increases in own-fare leads 
to an increase in the share of the third largest airline by 1.8 and 3.2 percent for all 
observations and medium distance.  
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All expenditure parameters are statistically significant. For all observation, a one 
percent increase in total real expenditure leads to 1.8 percent decrease on its share. For 
medium and long trips distances, its share decreases by 2.9 and 1.3 percent, respectively.  
The Chi-square and associated p-value of the estimated equation show that 
exogenous fares and expenditure reliably explain the change in share. 
The estimated own-fare parameters of fourth largest airline equations are 
statistically significant except for medium trip distance equation. As shown on Table 24, 
a one percent increases in own-fare increases the share of fourth largest airline by 1.4 
and 2.2 percent for all observations and long distance.  
The estimated expenditure parameters are significant. A one percent increase in 
total real expenditure leads to 1.9 percent decrease in the share of the fourth largest 
airline. For medium and long distance trips, the share of the fourth largest airline 
decreases by 3.1 and 1.5 percent, respectively. Chi-square and associated p-value of the 
estimated equation show that exogenous fares and expenditure reliably explain the 
change in the share. 
The estimated own-fare parameters of smallest airline equation are statistically 
significant for all observations and long distance trips. One percent increases in own-fare 
increases its share by 2.1 and 2.2 percent for all observations and long distance, 
respectively.  
The estimated expenditure parameters are statistically significant. A one percent 
increase in total real expenditure leads to 2.1 percent decrease in its share. For medium 
and long trips distances, its share decreases by 3.0 and 1.9 percent, respectively. 
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Next a turn to calculation of fare and expenditure elasticities, holding total air 
travel expenditure constant, at sample average shares. The calculations of the elasticities 
are based on the formulas represented by equations numbered 9, 12 and 13, which are 
discussed in Chapter III. 
Tables 25-30 report fare and expenditure elasticities for leisure and business 
travelers separately. Each table will be discussed separately and then compare to relevant 
tables. The comparison includes all travelers’ elasticities.  
Own-fare and expenditure elasticities for leisure travelers in markets with two 
airlines are reported in Table 25. All calculated elasticities are different from zero or 
statistically significant at the one percent level. Uncompensated own-fare elasticity 
shows an increasing trend with trip distance. Also, average uncompensated own-fare 
elasticity is higher than the medium and short trips own-fare elasticity. The same trend 
applies to the compensated own-fare elasticities. 
All expenditure elasticities are positive, and above one for the largest share 
airline. The largest airline expenditure elasticity slightly increases with distance. At the 
same time, the smallest airline expenditure elasticity tends to decrease with distance. 
Same result was shown in all observations results.  
Cross-fare elasticities are reported in Appendix B. Uncompensated cross-fare 
elasticities are mostly negative except for one, and are statistically significant. 
Compensated cross-fare elasticities are all positive and statistically different from zero. 
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Table 25. Compensated & Uncompensated Own-Fare and Expenditure Elasticities for 
Leisure Travelers: Markets with Two Airlines 
Airline All 
distance 
700 miles or 
less 
700-1500 
miles 
More than 1500 
miles 
Uncompensated own-fare elasticity 
-0.942*** -1.009*** -0.925*** -0.904*** Largest airline (0.016) (0.031) (0.020) (0.026) 
-0.766*** -0.994*** -0.681*** -0.639*** Smallest airline (0.037) (0.080) (0.056) (0.055) 
Compensated own-fare elasticity 
-0.209*** -0.282*** -0.176*** -0.173*** Largest airline (0.015) (0.031) (0.023) (0.026) 
-0.499*** -0.720*** -0.429*** -0.371*** Smallest airline (0.037) (0.079) (0.056) (0.055) 
Expenditure elasticity 
 1.040***  1.011***  1.056***  1.073*** Largest airline (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.00001) 
 0.904***  0.972***  0.864***  0.844*** Smallest airline (0.007) (0.012) (0.012) (0.00002) 
Source: Author calculations using Table 19 and equations 9, 12 and 13 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level 
 
The own-fare and expenditure elasticities for business travelers in markets with 
two airlines are reported in Table 26. Calculated elasticities have the expected signs and 
are statistically significant at the one percent level. The comparison of these elasticities 
with the ones reported in Table 25 shows slim differences between the two sets. The 
business price elasticities tend to be lower than the leisure travelers price elasticities. 
Expenditure elasticity of business travelers’ data shows that the largest airline will have 
higher share of travelers if travel expenditure increases. 
Fare and expenditure elasticities for leisure and business travelers for markets 
with three airlines are reported in Tables 27 & 28, respectively. Table 27 shows leisure 
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travelers’ elasticities for distance categories and all observations. All elasticities are 
significant at the one and five percent levels. 
 
Table 26. Compensated & Uncompensated Own-Fare and Expenditure Elasticities for 
Business Travelers: Markets with Two Airlines 
Airline Uncompensated  
own-price elasticity 
Compensated own-
price elasticity 
Expenditure 
elasticity 
-0.931*** -0.202***  1.069*** Largest airline (0.048) (0.034) (0.00003) 
-0.704*** -0.433***  0.853*** Smallest airline (0.078) (0.074) (0.00003) 
Source: Author calculations using Table 20 and equations 3-5. 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level 
 
Table 27 reveals no specific trend as the reported trend of Table 10, however it 
shows the medium distance is the most fare elastic among distance categories, then short 
distance. Expenditure elasticity for the second largest and the smallest airline shows a 
tendency to increase with distance. 
Cross-fare elasticities are reported in Appendix B. Uncompensated cross-price 
elasticities are mostly negative with some are positive. Almost half of these elasticities 
are significant across estimated equations. Compensated cross-fare elasticities are 
positive, and different from zero except one. 
As Table 28 shows, the business fare elasticity is lower than the average 
elasticity for markets with three airlines. This is consistent with the theoretical prediction 
and empirical works cited by Oum et al. (1992), Brons et al. (2001) and Gillen et al. 
(2004). But caution should be taken here because of the small number of observations 
used in the estimation. 
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Table 27. Compensated and Uncompensated Own-Fare Elasticities for Leisure 
Travelers: Markets with Three Airlines  
Airline All 
distance 
700 miles or 
less 
700-1500 
miles 
More than 1500 
miles 
Uncompensated own-fare elasticity 
-0.878*** -0.887*** -0.931*** -0.789*** Largest airline (0.034) (0.093) (0.058) (0.061) 
-0.795*** -0.721*** -0.825*** -0.678*** Second largest airline (0.048) (0.142) (0.087) (0.080) 
-0.707*** -0.474** -0.786*** -0.642*** Smallest airline 
(0.074) (0.211) (0.133) (0.108) 
Compensated own-fare elasticity 
-0.246*** -0.197** -0.285*** -0.176*** Largest airline (0.034) (0.099) (0.058) (0.061) 
-0.555*** -0.512*** -0.589*** -0.435*** Second largest airline (0.041) (0.130) (0.070) (0.066) 
-0.580*** -0.373*** -0.668*** -0.499*** Smallest airline 
(0.034) (0.099) (0.058) (0.061) 
Expenditure elasticity 
 1.106***  1.215***  1.099***  1.130*** Largest airline (0.074) (0.211) (0.133) (0.108) 
 0.900***  0.772***  0.897***  0.885*** Second largest airline (0.007) (0.042) (0.011) (0.014) 
 0.789***  0.623***  0.791***  0.785*** Smallest airline 
(0.010) (0.062) (0.017) (0.018) 
Source: Author calculations using Table 21 and equations 9, 12 and 13 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level 
 
 
Table 28. Compensated & Uncompensated Own-Fare and Expenditure Elasticities for 
Business Travelers: Markets with Three Airlines 
Airline Uncompensated  
own-price elasticity 
Compensated own-
price elasticity 
Expenditure 
elasticity 
-0.668*** -0.173  1.065*** Largest airline (0.109) (0.106) (0.331) 
-0.771*** -0.416***  1.039*** Second largest 
airline (0.096) (0.117) (0.028) 
-0.370 -0.220**  0.775*** Smallest airline 
(0.332) (0.106) (0.033) 
Source: Author calculations using Table 22 and equations 9, 12 and 13 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level 
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All the estimated elasticities are significant except one, which is close to ten 
percent significant level. Two of the airlines have expenditure elasticity higher than one. 
Own-fare and expenditure elasticities for leisure travelers in markets with four 
airlines are reported in Table 29. The table shows all the elasticities of different distance 
categories are different from zero. Uncompensated and compensated own-fare 
elasticities are negative and more elastic for short distance.  
All expenditure elasticities are positive, and above one for largest airline. This 
airline expenditure elasticity tends to decrease with distance. On the other hand, other 
airlines’ expenditure elasticity tends to increase with distance. 
 
 
Table 29. Compensated and Uncompensated Own-Fare and Expenditure Elasticities for 
Leisure Travelers: Markets with Four Airlines  
Airline All 
distance 
700 miles or 
less 
700-1500 
miles 
More than 1500 
miles 
Uncompensated  own-fare elasticity 
-0.952*** -1.324*** -0.975*** -0.866*** Largest airline (0.049) (0.165) (0.071) (0.071) 
-0.918*** -0.961*** -0.884*** -0.921*** Second largest airline (0.053) (0.239) (0.081) (0.074) 
-0.875*** -1.219*** -0.885*** -0.839*** Third largest airline 
(0.062) (0.308) (0.093) (0.085) 
-0.723*** -0.884 -0.654*** -0.764*** Smallest airline 
(0.094) (0.615 (0.004) (0.1230 
Compensated own-fare elasticity 
-0.383*** -0.647*** -0.392*** -0.317*** Largest airline (0.049) (0.183) (0.071) (0.070) 
-0.702*** -0.811*** -0.673*** -0.699*** Second largest airline (0.053) (0.250) (0.080) (0.073) 
-0.740*** -1.111*** -0.756*** -0.698*** Third largest airline 
(0.062) (0.318) (0.093) (0.085) 
-0.643*** -0.820 -0.578*** -0.678*** Smallest airline 
(0.094) (0.615 (0.157) (0.123) 
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Table 29. Continued. 
All distance 700 miles 
or less 
700-1500 
miles 
More than 
1500 miles 
All distance 
Expenditure elasticity 
 1.216***  1.313***  1.218***  1.202*** Largest airline (0.014) (0.065) (0.022) (0.018) 
 0.864***  0.675***  0.846***  0.885*** Second largest airline (0.016) (0.099) (0.027) (0.020) 
 0.864***  0.675***  0.780***  0.806*** Third largest airline 
(0.018) (0.130) (0.030) (0.022) 
 0.724***  0.613***  0.719***  0.746*** Smallest airline 
(0.017) (0.179) (0.035) (0.024) 
Source: Author calculations using Table 23 and equations 9, 12 and 13 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level 
 
 
Cross-fare elasticities are reported in Appendix B. Uncompensated elasticities 
are mostly negative. There are some positive cross-fare elasticity estimates for each 
estimated equation, but these estimates are not reproducing the same sign in different 
distances estimations. The second largest and the third largest airlines are substitutes. 
Compensated cross-fare elasticities are all positive except for short distance estimation. 
Comparison of Tables 29 and 11 shows a close similarity between the two tables 
in term of elasticities absolute value. This may due to the domination of leisure travelers’ 
observation on these markets. 
Fare and expenditure elasticities for markets with five-and-more are presented by 
Table 30. All calculated elasticities are significant at one percent except one. Fare 
elasticity for markets with five-and-more airlines is more elastic for medium distances 
than average or long distance. Also, expenditure elasticity tends to increase with distance 
for all airlines except the largest share airline, for which the tendency is reversed. 
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Table 30. Compensated and Uncompensated Own-Fare and Expenditure Elasticities for 
Leisure Travelers: Markets with Five-and-More Airlines  
Airline All distances 700-1500 miles More than 1500 miles 
Uncompensated own-fare elasticity 
-0.854*** -0.815*** -0.869*** Largest airline (0.060) (0.131) (0.066) 
-0.975*** -1.091*** -0.936*** Second largest airline (0.040) (0.096) (0.044) 
-0.881*** -0.776*** -0.905*** Third largest airline (0.036) (0.089) (0.040) 
-0.875*** -1.043*** -0.820*** Fourth largest airline 
(0.041) (0.091) (0.044) 
-0.762*** -0.754 -0.760*** Smallest airline 
(0.097) (0.916) (0.106) 
Compensated own-fare elasticity 
-0.420*** -0.321*** -0.453*** Largest airline (0.060) (0.129) (0.066) 
-0.754*** -0.876*** -0.712*** Second largest airline (0.040) (0.096) (0.043) 
-0.731*** -0.652*** -0.747*** Third largest airline (0.031) (0.090) (0.040) 
-0.762*** -0.951*** -0.702*** Fourth largest airline 
(0.038) (0.091) (0.044) 
-0.686*** -0.688 -0.681*** Smallest share airline 
(0.097) (0.916) (0.027) 
Expenditure elasticity 
1.185*** 1.257*** 1.157*** Largest airline (0.021) (0.042) (0.023) 
0.955*** 0.952*** 0.960*** Second largest airline (0.017) (0.040) (0.019) 
0.867*** 0.761*** 0.899*** Third largest airline (0.018) (0.042) (0.020) 
0.858*** 0.745*** 0.889*** Fourth largest airline 
(0.020) (0.045) (0.022) 
0.783*** 0.689 0.808*** Smallest airline 
(0.026) (0.916) (0.140) 
Source: Author calculations using Table 24 and equations 9, 12 and 13 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level 
 
 
 
 
 106
Cross-fare elasticity exhibits the same pattern as before: positive compensated 
cross-fare elasticity, and mostly negative uncompensated cross-fare elasticity. The fourth 
largest share and the smallest share airlines are substitutes. Comparison of Tables 30 and 
12 shows no trend at all. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This dissertation has estimated the fare and expenditure elasticities of demand for 
domestic air travel in U.S. The literature on demand for air travel generally finds that 
market can be segmented according to trip distance, reason of travel and trip destination. 
Also, empirical studies show that estimated fare elasticity will be different based on the 
time span of the study and the number of airlines serving that city pair.  
In spite of the numerous number of air travel demand studies, these studies suffer 
from many drawbacks such as the fares and attributes of substitutes, basis of functional 
forms used, time horizon of the study, market aggregation or segmentation, the 
identification problem and intermodal competition. Also, there have been a few studies 
that estimate the demand facing each airline. The estimation of fare and expenditure 
elasticities of air travel demand is an important issue for airlines, public policy and 
travelers’ welfare.  
This dissertation addresses the issues of estimating the fare and expenditure 
elasticities of demand for air travel, and analyzes the factors that produce the differences 
in estimated elasticity. The dissertation presents the first estimation of domestic air travel 
demand for U.S. using AIDS within the multistage budgeting approach. This approach 
requires priori segmentation of products. Besides segmenting the air travel markets 
according to the reason for travel and trip distance, this dissertation, also, divides the 
domestic air travel markets into segments according to the number of airlines serving 
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(competition structure) city pairs. The airlines behave differently according to number of 
competitors. Also, the estimated elasticities from these markets will be different.  We 
divide the air travel market into four different segments of according to number of 
airlines. This dissertation estimates the demand for air travel by considering the 
differences among travelers and distances. The model estimated for all distances and 
across distance categories, then estimated each type of travelers’ demand for all 
distances and across distance categories.  
The estimation results show that the compensated own and cross-fare elasticities 
are always as predicted by theory. The domination of expenditure elasticity in the 
estimation is the reason for negative uncompensated cross-fare elasticity. 
The estimation results show that expenditure has an important effect on the share 
for every airline, and this effect is measurable and always significant in all estimation. 
On the other hand, fares have moderate effect on the share of airlines, and it performs 
poorly in the short distance estimation. Mostly, short distance fare estimates were 
statistically insignificant.  
 Uncompensated cross-fare elasticity is mostly negative because expenditure 
effects outweigh substitution effects. The expenditure elasticity is high for the largest 
airline and mostly less than unity for other airlines in the markets. These estimates are 
close to the average or median of previous estimates reported by Gillen et al. (2004), 
Oum et al. (1992), and Brons et al. (2001). These results indicate that the largest airline 
will obtain the benefits of expenditure increase, because the travelers are going to shift to 
that airline. 
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The expenditure elasticity trends are very interesting; the largest airline 
expenditure elasticity increases with distance for markets with two and three airlines, 
and decreases with distance for markets with four and five-and-more airlines. The 
reverse happens to the other airlines expenditure elasticities. This may be explained by 
that longer distances, accompanied by higher number of airlines, lead to lessen the 
domination of largest airline in terms of the expenditure and travelers shares.  
Compensated own and cross-fare elasticities are consistent with the theoretical 
predictions. Own-fare is negative, and cross-fare is positive for almost all estimates. The 
largest airline has the lowest own-fare compensated elasticity. 
Comparing uncompensated own-fare elasticities of different markets with each 
another show no clear trend when the number of airlines increases. The exclusion of 
markets with two airlines from comparison gives a general pattern of increasing 
uncompensated own-fare elasticity as the number of airlines increases. The largest 
airline uncompensated own-fare elasticity for markets with five-and-more airlines is the 
only exception of that trend. The conditional uncompensated own-fare elasticity, within 
each market, tends to be less with trip distance for markets with two and with three 
airlines. The uncompensated elasticity for markets with four, and five-and-more airlines 
have similar trend like the other airline markets with some exceptions. The two trends 
are justified by substitutability factor. As mentioned in Chapter II, longer distances 
indicate fewer alternatives for air travel, and subsequently less elastic demand. Also, as 
number of airlines increases in the market, the travelers have more alternative to choose 
from.  
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Due to fewness of observations for business travelers, we cannot generalize the 
result of business fare elasticity. The calculated elasticities were lower than own-fare 
elasticity of leisure travelers. Observations fewness for business travelers restricts 
estimating the demand for business travelers properly, and makes it unreliable to 
generalize the results or to compare them to leisure travelers’ demand estimates. 
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APPENDIX A 
ESTIMATION AND ELASTICITIES: ALL TRAVELERS 
 
Table A1. Estimation Results of Short Trips Distance: Markets with Two Airlines  
 Largest airline Smallest airline 
 0.006 -0.006 Log(Largest airline average fare) 
(0.022) (0.022) 
-0.006  0.006 Log(Smallest airline average fare) 
(0.022) (0.022) 
 0.008** -0.008** Log (Real city pair expenditure) 
(0.004) (0.004) 
 0.671***  0.329*** Constant 
(0.023) (0.023) 
R-square   0.008  
Chi-square  4.62  
P-value  0.099  
Number of observations 566 566 
Share (mean %) 71.83 28.17 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level 
 
 
 
Table A2. Estimation Results of Medium Trips Distance: Markets with Two Airlines  
 Largest airline Smallest airline 
0.091*** -0.091*** Log(Largest airline average fare) (0.016) (0.016) 
-0.091*** 0.091*** Log(Smallest airline average fare) (0.016) (0.016) 
0.040*** -0.040*** Log (Real city pair expenditure) (0.003) (0.003) 
0.502*** 0.498*** Constant (0.018) (0.018) 
R-square  0.17  
Chi-square 157.96  
P-value  0.000  
Number of observations 795 795 
Share (mean %) 70.91  29.09 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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Table A3. Estimation Results of Long Trips Distance: Markets with Two Airlines  
 Largest share airline Smallest share airline
0.103*** -0.103*** Log(Largest share airline average fare) 
(0.017) (0.017) 
-0.103*** 0.103*** Log(Smallest share airline average fare)
(0.017) (0.017) 
0.046*** -0.046*** Log (Real city pair expenditure) 
(0.004) (0.004) 
0.466*** 0.534*** Constant 
(0.021) (0.021) 
R-square  0.23  
Chi-square 137.12  
P-value 0.000  
Number of observations 466 466 
Share (mean %) 68.34 31.66 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
TableA4. Estimation Results of Short Trips Distance: Markets with Three Airlines  
 Largest airline 
Second largest 
airline 
Smallest 
airline 
-0.075  0.052  0.022 Log(Largest airline average fare) (0.068) (0.044) (0.035) 
 0.052 -0.045 -0.007 Log(Second largest airline average 
fare) (0.044) (0.037) (0.023) 
 0.022 -0.007 -0.015 Log(Smallest airline average fare) (0.035) (0.023) (0.042) 
 0.014 -0.006 -0.008 Log (Real city pair expenditure) (0.010) (0.007) (0.005) 
 0.505***  0.295***  0.200*** Constant (0.060) (0.039) (0.032) 
R-square   0.07  0.02  
Chi-square  3.71  2.48  
P-value  0.294  0.478  
Number of observations 112 112 112 
Share (mean %) 58.74 26.14 15.12 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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TableA5.  Estimation Results of Medium Trips Distance: Markets with Three Airlines  
 Largest airline 
Second largest 
airline 
Smallest 
airline 
 0.068** -0.030 -0.038*** Log(Largest airline average fare) (0.032) (0.022) (0.015) 
-0.030 0.040** -0.010 Log(Second largest airline average 
fare) (0.022) (0.018) (0.010) 
-0.038*** -0.010  0.048*** Log(Smallest airline average fare) (0.015) (0.010) (0.018) 
 0.058*** -0.026*** -0.031*** Log (Real city pair expenditure) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) 
 0.277*** 0.405***  0.319*** Constant  0.035) (0.026) (0.017) 
R-square   0.19 0.09  
Chi-square 83.31 38.86  
P-value   0.000 0.000  
Number of observations 358 358 358 
Share (mean %) 58.63 26.07 15.30 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
TableA6.  Estimation Results of Long Trips Distance: Markets with Three Airlines  
 Largest airline 
Second largest 
airline 
Smallest 
airline 
 0.144*** -0.083*** -0.061*** Log(Largest airline average fare) (0.034) (0.022) (0.017) 
-0.083***  0.084*** -0.001 Log(Second largest airline average 
fare) (0.022) (0.018) (0.011) 
-0.061*** -0.001  0.062*** Log(Smallest airline average fare) (0.017) (0.011) (0.020) 
 0.071*** -0.033*** -0.038*** Log (Real city pair expenditure) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) 
 0.189***  0.439***  0.372*** Constant (0.037) (0.025) (0.019) 
R-square   0.29  0.18  
Chi-square 106.17 61.58  
P-value     0.00   0.00  
Number of observations 256 256 256 
Share (mean %)  54.66  27.83 17.43 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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Table A7. Estimation Results of Short Trips Distance: Markets with Four Airlines  
 Largest airline 
Second largest 
airline 
Third largest  
airline 
Smallest 
airline 
-0.081 -0.003  0.084*  0.0001 Log(Largest airline 
average fare) (0.078) (0.046) (0.051) (0.041) 
-0.003  0.047 -0.042 -0.002 Log(Second largest 
airline average fare) (0.046) (0.050) (0.041) (0.029) 
 0.084* -0.042 -0.019 -0.024 Log(Third largest airline 
average fare) (0.051) (0.041) (0.053) (0.032) 
 0.0001 -0.002 -0.024  0.026 Log(Smallest airline 
average fare) (0.041) (0.029) (0.032) (0.059) 
 0.163*** -0.071*** -0.045** -0.047*** Log (Real city pair 
expenditure) (0.030) (0.020) (0.022) (0.018) 
-0.363**  0.604***  0.394***  0.364*** Constant (0.160) (0.109) (0.118) (0.096) 
R-square   0.78   0.58   0.41  
Chi-square 57.42 17.99 14.95  
P-value    0.00    0.00   0.00  
Number of observations  14  14  14   14 
Share (mean %) 51.11 22.12 15.94 10.82 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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Table A8. Estimation Results of Medium Trips Distance: Markets with Four Airlines  
 Largest  airline 
Second largest  
airline 
Third largest   
airline 
Smallest  
airline 
 0.086*** -0.026 -0.046*** -0.014 Log(Largest  airline 
average fare) (0.033) (0.020) (0.015) (0.012) 
-0.026  0.023  0.017 -0.015 Log(Second largest  
airline average fare) (0.020) (0.019) (0.011) (0.009) 
-0.046***  0.017  0.031*** -0.002 Log(Third largest  airline 
average fare) (0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) 
-0.014 -0.015 -0.002  0.032* Log(Smallest  airline 
average fare) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.017) 
 0.102*** -0.037*** -0.035*** -0.030*** Log (Real city pair 
expenditure) (0.010) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003) 
-0.061  0.444***  0.353***  0.264*** Constant (0.053) (0.036) (0.026) (0.019) 
R-square    0.36  0.17   0.26  
Chi-square 112.88 40.96 68.91  
P-value     0.00   0.00   0.00  
Number of observations 194 194 194 194 
Share (mean %)   47.85  25.14  16.58  10.44 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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Table A9. Estimation Results of Long Trips Distance: Markets with Four Airlines  
 Largest  airline 
Second largest  
airline 
Third largest   
airline 
Smallest  
airline 
  0.072**  -0.012  -0.027*  -0.033*** Log(Largest  airline 
average fare)  (0.030)  (0.017)  (0.014)  (0.009) 
 -0.012   0.015   0.002  -0.004 Log(Second largest  
airline average fare)  (0.017)  (0.015)  (0.009)  (0.007) 
 -0.027*   0.002   0.015   0.010 Log(Third largest  airline 
average fare)  (0.014)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.006) 
 -0.033***  -0.004   0.010   0.027* Log(Smallest  airline 
average fare)  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.014) 
  0.093***  -0.028***  -0.034***  -0.030*** Log (Real city pair 
expenditure)  (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.003) 
 -0.026   0.398***   0.354***   0.274*** Constant  (0.042)  (0.026)  (0.020)  (0.014) 
R-square    0.36   0.13   0.25  
Chi-square 148.86 37.17 83.44  
P-value     0.00   0.00   0.00  
Number of observations 255 255 255 255 
Share (mean %)   45.85   25.09  17.49   11.58 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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Table A10. Estimation Results of Medium Distance Trips: Markets with Five-and-More 
Airlines 
 Largest  airline 
Second 
largest  
airline 
Third 
largest   
airline 
Fourth 
largest  
airline 
Smallest  
airline 
 0.061 -0.009 -0.010 -0.010 -0.032** Log(Largest  
airline average 
fare) (0.054) (0.026) (0.020) (0.018) (0.016) 
-0.009 -0.006 -0.013  0.012  0.017* Log(Second largest  
airline average 
fare) (0.026) (0.021) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) 
-0.010 -0.013  0.024*  0.0001 -0.001 Log(Third largest  
airline average 
fare) (0.020) (0.012) (0.014) (0.009) (0.008) 
-0.010  0.012  0.0001 -0.004  0.002 Log(Fourth largest  
airline average 
fare) (0.018) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) 
-0.032**  0.017* -0.001  0.002  0.013 Log(Smallest  
airline average 
fare) (0.016) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.022) 
 0.092*** -0.006 -0.028*** -0.030*** -0.028*** Log (Real city pair 
expenditure) (0.016) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
-0.108  0.263***  0.312***  0.285***  0.203*** Constant (0.086) (0.050) (0.033) (0.030) (0.027) 
R-square (%)  0.30  0.05  0.23   0.26  
Chi-square 36.93  6.34 23.72 31.34  
P-value   0.00  0.27   0.00   0.00  
Number of 
observations  79  79  79  79  79 
Share (mean %)  38.86  22.91  16.23  12.45    9.55 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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Table A11. Estimation Results of Long Distance Trips: Markets with Five-and-More 
Airlines  
 Largest  airline 
Second 
largest  
airline 
Third 
largest   
airline 
Fourth 
largest  
airline 
Smallest  
airline 
 0.061***  0.0001 -0.014 -0.023*** -0.023*** Log(Largest  
airline average 
fare) (0.023) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.006) 
 0.0001  0.019 -0.001 -0.008 -0.010** Log(Second largest  
airline average 
fare) (0.011) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
-0.014 -0.001  0.010  0.006 -0.001 Log(Third largest  
airline average 
fare) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) 
-0.023*** -0.008  0.006  0.015***  0.010*** Log(Fourth largest  
airline average 
fare) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) 
-0.023*** -0.010 -0.001  0.010***  0.024** Log(Smallest  
airline average 
fare) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) 
 0.057*** -0.007 -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.018*** Log (Real city pair 
expenditure) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) 
 0.051  0.270***  0.260***  0.221***  0.203*** Constant (0.048) (0.024) (0.020) (0.016) (0.013) 
R-square (%)  0.13  0.01   0.06  0.11  
Chi-square 52.26  8.83 20.5 36.11  
P-value   0.00  0.11   0.00   0.00  
Number of 
observations 301 301 301 301 301 
Share (mean %)   36.26   23.25   17.46   13.36     9.67 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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Table A12. Fare and Expenditure Elasticities: Markets with Two Airlines  
 Largest  airline Smallest  airline 
Uncompensated fare elasticity 
-0.930*** -0.168*** Largest  airline (0.016) (0.001) 
-0.331*** -0.738*** Smallest  airline (0.0001) (0.036) 
1.040*** 0.905*** Expenditure elasticity (0.007) (0.0001) 
Compensated fare elasticity 
-0.197*** 0.471*** Largest  airline (0.015) (0.001) 
-0.025*** -0.471*** Smallest  airline (0.0001) (0.036) 
Source: Author’s calculations using Table 5 and equations 9, 12 and 13 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
 
 
 
Table A13. Fare and Expenditure Elasticities for Short Distance Trips: Markets with 
Two Airlines 
 Largest  airline Smallest  airline 
Uncompensated fare elasticity 
-1.000*** -0.001 Largest  airline (0.032) (0.006) 
-0.289*** -0.972*** Smallest  airline (0.001) (0.076) 
1.011*** 0.973*** Expenditure elasticity (0.013) (0.00002) 
Compensated fare elasticity 
-0.286*** 0.685*** Largest  airline (0.032) (0.006) 
0.009*** -0.685*** Smallest  airline (0.001) (0.076) 
Source: Author’s calculations using Table A1 and equations 9, 12 and 13 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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Table A14. Fare and Expenditure Elasticities for Medium Distance Trips: Markets with 
Two Airlines 
 Largest  airline Smallest  airline 
Uncompensated fare elasticity 
-0.911*** -0.216*** Largest  airline (0.024) (0.003) 
-0.335*** -0.645*** Smallest  airline (0.003) (0.057) 
1.057*** 0.861*** Expenditure elasticity (0.00001) (0.005) 
Compensated fare elasticity 
-0.162*** 0.395*** Largest  airline (0.023) (0.003) 
-0.027*** -0.395*** Smallest  airline (0.001) (0.057) 
Source: Author’s calculations using Table A2 and equations 9, 12 and 13 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
 
 
 
Table A15. Fare and Expenditure Elasticities for Long Distance Trips: Markets with 
Two Airlines 
 Largest  airline Smallest  airline 
Uncompensated fare elasticity 
-0.896*** -0.225*** Largest  airline (0.025) (0.003) 
-0.366*** -0.629*** Smallest  airline (0.003) (0.052) 
1.068*** 0.854*** Expenditure elasticity (0.014) (0.014) 
Compensated fare elasticity 
-0.166*** 0.359*** Largest  airline (0.024) (0.003) 
-0.028*** -0.359*** Smallest  airline (0.001) (0.052) 
Source: Author’s calculations using Table A3 and equations 9, 12 and 13 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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Table A16. Fare and Expenditure Elasticities: Markets with Three Airlines 
Airline Largest  airline Second largest  airline Smallest  airline 
Uncompensated fare elasticity 
-0.902*** -0.107*** -0.172*** Largest  airline (0.048) (0.048) (0.051) 
-0.106*** -0.813*** 0.065 Second largest  airline (0.001) (0.072) (0.039) 
-0.099*** 0.022 -0.684*** Smallest  airline 
(0.016) (1.009) (0.034) 
1.106*** 0.898*** 0.791*** Expenditure elasticity (0.007) (0.010) (0.072) 
Compensated fare elasticity 
-0.269*** 0.407*** 0.281*** Largest  airline (0.041) (0.049) (0.059) 
0.190*** -0.573*** 0.276*** Second largest  airline (0.023) (0.072) (0.042) 
0.079*** 0.166*** -0.557*** Smallest  airline 
(0.016) (0.025) (0.041) 
Source: Author’s calculations using Table 6 and equations 9, 12 and 13 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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Table A17. Fare and Expenditure Elasticities for short Distance Trips: Markets with 
Three Airlines 
Airline Largest  airline Second largest  airline Smallest  airline 
Uncompensated fare elasticity 
-1.141*** 0.213 0.180 Largest  airline (0.169) (0.169) (0.233) 
0.083*** -1.166*** -0.034 Second largest  airline (0.006) (0.277) (0.156) 
0.034 -0.025 -1.091*** Smallest  airline 
(0.059) (1.032) (0.115) 
1.024*** 0.977*** 0.944*** Expenditure elasticity (0.017) (0.025) (0.277) 
Compensated fare elasticity 
-0.540*** 0.787*** 0.735*** Largest  airline (0.142) (0.169) (0.230) 
0.350*** -0.910*** 0.213 Second largest  airline (0.075) (0.277) (0.155) 
0.189*** 0.123 -0.948*** Smallest  airline 
(0.059) (0.090) (0.142) 
Source: Author’s calculations using Table A4 and equations 9, 12 and 13 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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Table A18. Fare and Expenditure Elasticities for Medium Distance Trips: Markets with 
Three Airlines 
Airline Largest  airline Second largest  airline Smallest  airline 
Uncompensated fare elasticity 
-0.942*** -0.054 -0.128*** Largest  airline (0.083) (0.148) (0.0001) 
-0.076*** -0.821*** -0.013*** Second largest  airline (0.007) (0.125) (0.0001) 
-0.080*** -0.024 -0.654*** Smallest  airline 
(0.026) (1.014) (0.054) 
1.098*** 0.899*** 0.796*** Expenditure elasticity (0.011) (0.018) (0.125) 
Compensated fare elasticity 
-0.298*** 0.473*** 0.338*** Largest  airline (0.068) (0.148) (0.0001) 
0.210*** -0.587*** 0.194*** Second largest  airline (0.083) (0.125) (0.0001) 
0.088 0.114 -0.533*** Smallest  airline 
(0.058) (0.071) (0.068) 
Source: Author’s calculations using Table A5 and equations 9, 12 and 13 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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Table A19. Fare and Expenditure Elasticities for Long Distance Trips: Markets with 
Three Airlines 
Airline Largest  airline Second largest  airline Smallest  airline 
Uncompensated fare elasticity 
-0.808*** -0.233* -0.230*** Largest  airline (0.124) (0.124) (0.0001) 
-0.187*** -0.667*** 0.056*** Second largest  airline (0.007) (0.004) (0.00004) 
-0.134*** 0.018 -0.607*** Smallest  airline 
(0.060)) (1.015) (0.123) 
1.130*** 0.882*** 0.780*** Expenditure elasticity (0.028) (0.029) (0.00008) 
Compensated fare elasticity 
-0.190 0.250*** 0.196*** Largest  airline (0.100) (0.124) (0.00006) 
0.127 -0.422*** 0.273*** Second largest  airline (0.081) (0.00008) (0.00004) 
0.063 0.171*** -0.471*** Smallest  airline 
(0.061) (0.064) (0.100) 
Source: Author’s calculations using Table A6 and equations 9, 12 and 13 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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Table A20. Fare and Expenditure Elasticities: Markets with Four Airlines 
Airline Largest  
airline 
Second largest  
airline 
Third largest  
airline 
Smallest  
airline 
Uncompensated fare elasticity 
-0.960***  0.005 -0.080 -0.059 Largest  airline (0.047) (0.028) (0.059) (0.060) 
-0.083*** -0.899***  0.097*** -0.023 Second largest  
airline (0.028) (0.052) (0.040) (0.049) 
-0.101***  0.052** -0.842*** 0.066 Third largest  
airline (0.022) (0.027) (0.059) (0.040) 
-0.068*** -0.027  0.042*** -0.705*** Smallest  airline 
(0.015) (0.023) (0.010) (0.094) 
 1.213*** 0.868***  0.868***  0.721*** Expenditure 
elasticity (0.013) (0.016) (0.018) (0.022) 
Compensated fare elasticity 
-0.392*** 0.412*** 0.290*** 0.279*** Largest  airline (0.046) (0.052) (0.059) (0.064) 
0.220*** -0.682*** 0.294*** 0.157*** Second largest  
airline (0.006) (0.052) (0.040) (0.053) 
0.106*** 0.201*** -0.707*** 0.189*** Third largest  
airline (0.022) (0.027) (0.059) (0.043) 
0.066*** 0.070*** 0.129*** -0.625*** Smallest  airline 
(0.015) (0.023) (0.028) (0.094) 
Source: Author’s calculations using Table 7 and equations 9, 12 and 13 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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Table A21. Fare and Expenditure Elasticities for Short Distance Trips: Markets with 
Four Airlines 
Airline Largest  
airline 
Second largest  
airline 
Third largest  
airline 
Smallest  
airline 
Uncompensated fare elasticity 
-1.321*** 0.148 0.672*** 0.224 Largest  airline (0.137) (0.188) (0.283) (0.384) 
-0.077 -0.716*** -0.200 0.078 Second largest  
airline (0.092) (0.197) (0.255) (0.202) 
0.114 -0.137 -1.075*** -0.149 Third largest  
airline (0.103) (0.186) (0.307) (0.247) 
-0.034 0.025 -0.189 -0.715 Smallest  airline 
(0.079) (0.131) (0.196) (0.548) 
1.318*** 0.680*** 0.680*** 0.562*** Expenditure 
elasticity (0.058) (0.091) (0.137) (0.163) 
Compensated fare elasticity 
-0.647*** 0.495*** 1.041*** 0.512 Largest  airline (0.152) (0.206) (0.317) (0.376) 
0.214*** -0.565*** -0.040 0.202 Second largest  
airline (0.023) (0.206) (0.255) (0.271) 
0.325*** -0.029 -0.960*** -0.060 Third largest  
airline (0.099) (0.184) (0.317) (0.292) 
0.108 0.099 -0.111 -0.654 Smallest  airline 
(0.080) (0.133) (0.198) (0.547) 
Source: Author’s calculations using Table A7 and equations 9, 12 and 13 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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Table A22. Fare and Expenditure Elasticities for Medium Distance Trips: Markets with 
Four Airlines 
Airline Largest  
airline 
Second largest  
airline 
Third largest  
airline 
Smallest  
airline 
Uncompensated fare elasticity 
-0.923*** -0.031*** -0.174** -0.001 Largest  airline (0.070) (0.002) (0.092) (0.069) 
-0.107*** -0.870*** 0.158*** -0.073 Second largest  
airline (0.043) (0.081) (0.065) (0.063) 
-0.131*** 0.093*** -0.777*** 0.023*** Third largest  
airline (0.032) (0.043) (0.092) (0.0001) 
-0.052*** -0.044 0.008 -0.664*** Smallest  airline 
(0.024) (0.037) (0.039) (0.162) 
1.213*** 0.853*** 0.786*** 0.716*** Expenditure 
elasticity (0.021) (0.027) (0.029) (0.033) 
Compensated fare elasticity 
-0.342*** 0.377*** 0.202*** 0.343*** Largest  airline (0.069) (0.081) (0.092) (0.111) 
0.198*** -0.656*** 0.356*** 0.105 Second largest  
airline (0.010) (0.081) (0.065) (0.090) 
0.070*** 0.235*** -0.647*** 0.141** Third largest  
airline (0.032) (0.043) (0.092) (0.075) 
0.074*** 0.045 0.090** -0.590*** Smallest  airline 
(0.024) (0.037) (0.047) (0.161) 
Source: Author’s calculations using Table A8 and equations 9, 12 and 13 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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Table A23. Fare and Expenditure Elasticities for Long Distance Trips: Markets with 
Four Airlines 
Airline Largest  
airline 
Second largest  
airline 
Third largest  
airline 
Smallest  
airline 
Uncompensated fare elasticity 
-0.937***  0.004 -0.063 -0.163*** Largest  airline (0.066) (0.038) (0.081) (0.078) 
-0.077*** -0.914***  0.061  0.026 Second largest  
airline (0.037) (0.070) (0.052) (0.062) 
-0.094***  0.028 -0.882***  0.132*** Third largest  
airline (0.030) (0.037) (0.080) (0.054) 
-0.094*** -0.005  0.110*** -0.737*** Smallest  airline 
(0.020) (0.029) (0.026) (0.117) 
1.202***  0.886***  0.804***  0.721*** Expenditure 
elasticity (0.017) (0.020) (0.022) (0.026) 
Compensated fare elasticity 
-0.386***  0.410***  0.305***  0.177*** Largest  airline (0.065) (0.069) (0.080) (0.081) 
 0.224*** -0.691***  0.263***  0.212*** Second largest  
airline (0.008) (0.069) (0.052) (0.064) 
 0.116***  0.183*** -0.742***  0.262*** Third largest  
airline (0.030) (0.037) (0.080) (0.056) 
 0.045***  0.098***  0.203*** -0.651*** Smallest  airline 
(0.020) (0.030) (0.037) (0.117) 
Source: Author’s calculations using Table A9 and equations 9, 12 and 13 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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Table A24. Fare and Expenditure Elasticities: Markets-with-Five-and-More Airlines 
Airline Largest  
airline 
Second 
largest  
airline 
Third largest  
airline 
Fourth 
largest  
airline 
Smallest  
airline 
Uncompensated fare elasticity 
-0.894*** -0.012 -0.037 -0.105* -0.167*** Largest  airline (0.058) (0.044) (0.051) (0.055) (0.057) 
-0.056*** -0.952***  0.021  0.032  0.018 Second largest  
airline (0.028) (0.039) (0.032) (0.037) (0.039) 
-0.065***  0.003 -0.916***  0.054  0.020 Third largest  
airline (0.025) (0.024) (0.037) (0.032) (0.039) 
-0.079***  0.004  0.037 -0.910***  0.104*** Fourth largest  
airline (0.020) (0.021) (0.024) (0.039) (0.034) 
-0.081*** -0.009  0.001  0.070*** -0.765*** Smallest  
airline (0.012) (0.018) (0.023) (0.025) (0.095) 
 1.176***  0.967***  0.862***  0.859***  0.789*** Expenditure 
elasticity (0.021) (0.017) (0.018) (0.020) (0.023) 
Compensated fare elasticity 
-0.461***  0.344***  0.281***  0.212***  0.124*** Largest  airline (0.059) (0.044) (0.051)*** (0.055) (0.062) 
 0.216*** -0.728***  0.220***  0.231***  0.201*** Second largest  
airline (0.028) (0.038) (0.031) (0.037) (0.045) 
 0.136***  0.169*** -0.768***  0.202***  0.155*** Third largest  
airline (0.024) (0.023) (0.031) (0.031) (0.043) 
 0.076***  0.131***  0.150*** -0.797***  0.208*** Fourth largest  
airline (0.020) (0.021) (0.024) (0.037) (0.037) 
 0.032***  0.084***  0.084***  0.152*** -0.689*** Smallest  
airline (0.016) (0.019) (0.024) (0.027) (0.095) 
Source: Author’s calculations using Table 8 and equations 9, 12 and 13 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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Table A25. Fare and Expenditure Elasticities for Medium Distance Trips: Markets with 
Five-and-More Airlines 
Airline Largest  
airline 
Second 
largest  
airline 
Third largest  
airline 
Fourth 
largest  
airline 
Smallest  
airline 
Uncompensated fare elasticity 
-0.934 -0.029 0.005 0.009 -0.218 Largest  airline (0.534) (0.112) (0.123) (0.147) (0.168) 
-0.078 -1.022*** -0.044 0.153* 0.243*** Second largest  
airline (0.066) (0.424) (0.071) (0.081) (0.100) 
-0.064 -0.054 -0.821*** 0.035 0.042 Third largest  
airline (0.052) (0.052) (0.375) (0.072) (0.084) 
-0.056 0.057 0.018 -0.999*** 0.060 Fourth largest  
airline (0.048) (0.045) (0.055) (0.309) (0.082) 
-0.104*** 0.076 0.013 0.040 -0.831 Smallest  
airline (0.040) (0.042) (0.050) (0.063) (0.728) 
1.237*** 0.973*** 0.776*** 0.761*** 0.704*** Expenditure 
elasticity (0.159) (0.187) (0.167) (0.164) (0.162) 
Compensated fare elasticity 
-0.454 0.349*** 0.307*** 0.305*** 0.056 Largest  airline (0.535) (0.111) (0.123) (0.148) (0.169) 
0.206*** -0.799* 0.134*** 0.328*** 0.404*** Second largest  
airline (0.066) (0.424 (0.072) (0.081) (0.102) 
0.137*** 0.104*** -0.695*** 0.158*** 0.156* Third largest  
airline (0.051) (0.051) (0.320) (0.071) (0.085) 
0.098 0.178*** 0.115*** -0.905*** 0.148 Fourth largest  
airline (0.047) (0.044) (0.054) (0.299) (0.083) 
0.014 0.168*** 0.087 0.113* -0.764 Smallest  
airline (0.042) (0.043) (0.050) (0.064) (0.728) 
Source: Author’s calculations using Table A10 and equations 9, 12 and 13 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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Table A26. Fare and Expenditure Elasticities for Long Distance Trips: Markets with 
Five-and-More Airlines 
Airline Largest  
airline 
Second 
largest  
airline 
Third largest  
airline 
Fourth 
largest  
airline 
Smallest  
airline 
Uncompensated fare elasticity 
-0.889***  0.010 -0.048 -0.133*** -0.170*** Largest  airline (0.064) (0.046) (0.055) (0.058) (0.061) 
-0.037 -0.912***  0.014 -0.029 -0.057 Second largest  
airline (0.031) (0.042) (0.035) (0.043) (0.047) 
-0.066***  0.0001 -0.927***  0.067*  0.022 Third largest  
airline (0.028) (0.026) (0.041) (0.036) (0.037) 
-0.086*** -0.028  0.048* -0.873***  0.128*** Fourth largest  
airline (0.022) (0.025) (0.027) (0.045) (0.037) 
-0.079*** -0.039*  0.003  0.086*** -0.736*** Smallest  
airline (0.013) (0.021) (0.022) (0.028) (0.102) 
 1.156***  0.969***  0.883***  0.883***  0.812*** Expenditure 
elasticity (0.024) (0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) 
Compensated fare elasticity 
-0.470***  0.361***  0.273***  0.187***  0.124* Largest  airline (0.064) (0.047) (0.056) (0.059) (0.066) 
 0.232*** -0.687***  0.219***  0.176***  0.132*** Second largest  
airline (0.030) (0.042) (0.034) (0.042) (0.052) 
 0.136***  0.169*** -0.773***  0.221***  0.164*** Third largest  
airline (0.027) (0.026) (0.034) (0.035) (0.041) 
 0.069***  0.101***  0.166*** -0.756***  0.237*** Fourth largest  
airline (0.022) (0.024) (0.027) (0.042) (0.041) 
 0.033*  0.055***  0.088***  0.171*** -0.658*** Smallest  
airline (0.018) (0.022) (0.023) (0.029) (0.102) 
Source: Author’s calculations using Table A11 and equations 9, 12 and 13 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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APPENDIX B 
ESTIMATION RESULTS AND ELASTICITIES: LIESURE TRAVELERS 
 
Table B1. Estimation Results of Short Distance Trips: Markets with Two Airlines  
 Largest  airline Smallest  airline 
-0.001  0.001 Log(Largest  airline average fare) 
(0.022) (0.022) 
 0.001 -0.001 Log(Smallest  airline average fare) 
(0.022) (0.022) 
 0.008** -0.008** Log (Real city pair expenditure) 
(0.004) (0.004) 
 0.672***  0.328*** Constant 
(0.023) (0.0001) 
R-square   0.01  
Chi-square  4.46  
P-value  0.10  
Number of observations 564 564 
Share (mean %)   71.84   28.16 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level 
 
 
 
 
Table B2. Estimation Results of Medium Distance Trips: Markets with Two Airlines  
 Largest  airline Smallest  airline 
 0.082*** -0.082*** Log(Largest  airline average fare) (0.016) (0.016) 
-0.082***  0.082*** Log(Smallest  airline average fare) (0.016) (0.016) 
 0.040*** -0.040*** Log (Real city pair expenditure) (0.003) (0.003) 
 0.506***  0.494*** Constant (0.018) (0.018) 
R-square   0.16  
Chi-square 145.52  
P-value     0.00  
Number of observations 787 787 
Share (mean %)   70.85   29.15 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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Table B3. Estimation Results of Long Distance Trips: Markets with Two Airlines  
 Largest  airline Smallest  airline 
  0.099***  -0.099*** Log(Largest  airline average fare) 
 (0.017)  (0.017) 
 -0.099***   0.099*** Log(Smallest  airline average fare) 
 (0.017)  (0.017) 
  0.050***  -0.050*** Log (Real city pair expenditure) 
 (0.005)  (0.005) 
  0.451***   0.549*** Constant 
 (0.021)  (0.021) 
R-square    0.24  
Chi-square 145.09  
P-value     0.00  
Number of observations 464 464 
Share (mean %)   68.19   31.81 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
 
 
 
Table B4.  Estimation Results of Short Distance Trips: Markets with Three Airlines  
 Largest  airline 
Second largest  
airline 
Smallest  
airline 
 0.134** -0.059 -0.075** Log(Largest  airline average fare) (0.056) (0.040) (0.028) 
-0.059  0.059  0.0001 Log(Secondlargest  airline average 
fare) (0.040) (0.035) (0.020) 
-0.075**  0.0001  0.075** Log(Smallest  airline average fare) (0.028) (0.020) (0.034) 
 0.122*** -0.062*** -0.061*** Log (Real city pair expenditure) (0.024) (0.017) (0.013) 
-0.020  0.564***  0.455*** Constant (0.115) (0.080) (0.062) 
R-square    0.01  0.01  
Chi-square 27.13 15.31  
P-value   0.00   0.00  
Number of observations  75  75  75 
Share (mean %)  56.82  27.07  16.11 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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Table B5.  Estimation Results of Medium Distance Trips: Markets with Three Airlines  
 Largest  airline 
Second largest  
airline 
Smallest  
airline 
 0.075** -0.043* -0.032* Log(Largest  airline average fare) (0.034) (0.023) (0.016) 
-0.043* 0.039* 0.004 Log(Second largest  airline 
average fare) (0.023) (0.019) (0.011) 
-0.032** 0.004 0.027 Log(Smallest  airline average 
fare) (0.016) (0.011) (0.020) 
 0.058*** -0.027*** -0.031*** Log (Real city pair expenditure) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) 
 0.273*** 0.410*** 0.317*** Constant (0.035) (0.025) (0.017) 
R-square    0.19 0.10  
Chi-square 85.85 40.20  
P-value   0.00   0.00  
Number of observations 356 356 356 
Share (mean %)   58.80   26.31   14.89 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
Table B6.  Estimation Results of Long Distance Trips: Markets with Three Airlines  
 Largest  airline 
Second largest  
airline 
Smallest  
airline 
 0.153*** -0.087*** -0.066*** Log(Largest  airline average fare) (0.033) (0.022) (0.016) 
-0.087***  0.080***  0.007 Log(Second largest  airline 
average fare) (0.022) (0.018) (0.012) 
-0.066***  0.007  0.058*** Log(Smallest  airline average 
fare) (0.016) (0.012) (0.020) 
 0.071*** -0.031*** -0.039*** Log (Real city pair expenditure) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) 
 0.189***  0.432***  0.379*** Constant (0.037) (0.025) (0.018) 
R-square   0.30   0.17  
Chi-square 109.81 56.07  
P-value     0.00   0.00  
Number of observations 255 255 255 
Share (mean %)   54.28   27.44   18.28 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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Table B7. Estimation Results of Short Distance Trips: Markets with Four Airlines  
 Largest  airline 
Second largest  
airline 
Third Largest   
airline 
Smallest  
airline 
-0.084  0.003  0.057  0.023 Log(Largest  airline 
average fare) (0.094) (0.056) (0.050) (0.047) 
 0.003 -0.007  0.010 -0.006 Log(Second largest  
airline average fare) (0.056) (0.059) (0.037) (0.034) 
 0.057  0.010 -0.042 -0.026 Log(Third largest  airline 
average fare) (0.050) (0.037) (0.040) (0.029) 
 0.023 -0.006 -0.026  0.008 Log(Smallest  airline 
average fare) (0.047) (0.034) (0.029) (0.065) 
 0.161*** -0.072*** -0.048** -0.041** Log (Real city pair 
expenditure) (0.034) (0.022) (0.020) (0.019) 
-0.342*  0.609***  0.410***  0.323*** Constant (0.183) (0.120) (0.110) (0.103) 
R-square   0.75  0.55  0.52  
Chi-square 47.68 16.30 15.21  
P-value   0.00   0.00   0.00  
Number of observations 14 14 14 14 
Share (mean %) 51.55 22.29 15.64 10.53 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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Table B8. Estimation Results of Medium Distance Trips: Markets with Four Airlines 
 Largest  airline 
Second largest  
airline 
Third largest   
airline 
Smallest  
airline 
  0.062* -0.020 -0.028* -0.014 Log(Largest  airline 
average fare)  (0.034) (0.020) (0.016) (0.011) 
 -0.020  0.019  0.017 -0.017* Log(Second largest  
airline average fare)  (0.020) (0.018) (0.010) (0.009) 
 -0.028*  0.017*  0.013 -0.002 Log(Third largest  airline 
average fare)  (0.016) (0.010) (0.012) (0.008) 
 -0.014 -0.017 -0.002  0.033** Log(Smallest  airline 
average fare)  (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.017) 
  0.104 -0.038*** -0.036*** -0.030*** Log (Real city pair 
expenditure)  (0.010) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) 
 -0.072  0.450***  0.357***  0.265*** Constant  (0.055) (0.035) (0.026) (0.019) 
R-square    0.35  0.17   0.24  
Chi-square 103.80 44.04 61.83  
P-value    0.00   0.00   0.00  
Number of Observations 191 191 191 191 
Share (mean %)   47.88   24.97   16.59   10.55 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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Table B9. Estimation Results of Long Distance Trips: Markets with Four Airlines  
 Largest  airline 
Second largest  
airline 
Third Largest   
airline 
Smallest  
airline 
 0.103*** -0.024 -0.045*** -0.034*** Log(Largest  airline 
average fare) (0.032) (0.018) (0.015) (0.010) 
-0.024  0.013  0.012  0.0004 Log(Second largest  
airline average fare) (0.018) (0.016) (0.009) (0.008) 
-0.045***  0.012  0.022**  0.011 Log(Third largest  airline 
average fare) (0.015) (0.009) (0.011) (0.007) 
-0.034***  0.0004  0.011  0.024 Log(Smallest  airline 
average fare) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.014) 
 0.092*** -0.029*** -0.034*** -0.030*** Log (Real city pair 
expenditure) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) 
-0.026  0.401***  0.354***  0.272*** Constant (0.042) (0.026) (0.020) (0.014) 
R-square     0.36  0.13  0.26  
Chi-square 149.22  38.62 90.81  
P-value     0.00    0.00   0.00  
Number of observations 253 253 253 253 
Share (mean %)   45.71   25.12   17.55   11.62 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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Table B10. Estimation Results of Medium Distance Trips: Markets with Five-and-More 
Airlines  
 Largest  airline 
Second 
largest  
airline 
Third 
Largest   
airline 
Fourth 
largest  
airline 
Smallest  
airline 
 0.112** -0.041* -0.022 -0.018 -0.031 Log(Largest  
airline average 
fare) (0.051) (0.024) (0.020) (0.017) (0.066) 
-0.041* -0.023  0.012  0.038***  0.015 Log(Second largest  
airline average 
fare) (0.024) (0.022) (0.013) (0.011) (0.039) 
-0.022  0.012  0.032** -0.014 -0.007 Log(Third largest  
airline average 
fare) (0.020) (0.013) (0.015) (0.009) (0.032) 
-0.018  0.038*** -0.014 -0.009  0.004 Log(Fourth largest  
airline average 
fare) (0.017) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.027) 
-0.031  0.015 -0.007  0.004  0.021 Log(Smallest  
airline average 
fare) (0.066) (0.039) (0.032) (0.027) (0.088) 
 0.101*** -0.011 -0.029*** -0.031*** -0.030*** Log (Real city pair 
expenditure) (0.017) (0.009) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) 
 0.151*  0.285***  0.320***  0.290***  0.203*** Constant (0.090) (0.049) (0.037) (0.030) (0.047) 
R-square    0.35    0.10   0.30   0.34  
Chi-square 46.54 13.78 32.56 50.83  
P-value   0.00   0.01   0.00   0.00  
Number of 
observations 76 76 76 76 76 
Share (mean %) 39.27 22.65 16.25 12.25   9.57 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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Table B11. Estimation Results of Long Distance Trips: Markets with Five-and-More 
Airlines  
 Largest  airline 
Second 
largest  
airline 
Third 
Largest   
airline 
Fourth 
largest  
airline 
Smallest  
airline 
 0.068***  0.004 -0.015 -0.028*** -0.028*** Log(Largest  
airline average 
fare) (0.024) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) 
 0.004  0.013 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 Log(Second largest  
airline average 
fare) (0.011) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
-0.015 -0.005  0.014**  0.003  0.002 Log(Third largest  
airline average 
fare) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) 
-0.028*** -0.006  0.003  0.022***  0.010*** Log(Fourth largest  
airline average 
fare) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) 
-0.028*** -0.005  0.002  0.010***  0.022*** Log(Smallest  
airline average 
fare) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) 
 0.057*** -0.009** -0.013*** -0.015*** -0.019*** Log (Real city pair 
expenditure) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
 0.050  0.283***  0.249***  0.216***  0.203*** Constant (0.045) (0.023) (0.019) (0.016) (0.014) 
R-square   0.15  0.01  0.06  0.12  
Chi-square 60.84  8.06 19.07 41.86  
P-value   0.00  0.15   0.00   0.00  
Number of 
observations 305 305 305 305 305 
Share (mean %)   36.20   23.32   17.55   13.37     9.80 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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Table B12. Leisure Travelers’ Fare and Expenditure Elasticities: Markets with Two 
Airlines 
Airline Largest  airline Smallest  airline 
Uncompensated fare elasticity 
-0.942*** -0.138*** Largest  airline (0.016) (0.0002) 
-0.319*** -0.766*** Smallest  airline (0.0002) (0.037) 
 1.040***  0.904*** Expenditure elasticity (0.003) (0.007) 
Compensated fare elasticity 
-0.209***  0.499*** Largest  airline (0.015) (0.001) 
-0.012*** -0.499*** Smallest  airline (0.0002) (0.037) 
Source: Author’s calculations using Table 17 and equations 9, 12 and 13 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
 
 
 
Table B13. Leisure Travelers’ Fare and Expenditure Elasticities for Short Distance 
Trips: Markets with Two Airlines 
Airline Largest  airline Smallest  airline 
Uncompensated fare elasticity 
-1.009***  0.022*** Largest  airline (0.031) (0.0001) 
-0.262*** -0.994*** Smallest  airline (0.001) (0.080) 
 1.011***  0.972*** Expenditure elasticity (0.005) (0.012) 
Compensated fare elasticity 
-0.282***  0.720*** Largest  airline (0.031) (0.006) 
 0.022*** -0.720*** Smallest  airline (0.001) (0.079) 
Source: Author’s calculations using Table B1 and equations 9, 12 and 13 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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Table B14. Leisure Travelers’ Fare and Expenditure Elasticities for Medium Distance 
Trips: Markets with Two Airlines 
Airline Largest  airline Smallest  airline 
Uncompensated fare elasticity 
-0.925*** -0.183*** Largest  airline (0.024) (0.003) 
-0.323*** -0.681*** Smallest  airline (0.001) (0.056) 
 1.056***  0.864*** Expenditure elasticity (0.005) (0.012) 
Compensated fare elasticity 
-0.176***  0.429*** Largest  airline (0.023) (0.003) 
-0.015*** -0.429*** Smallest  airline (0.001) (0.056) 
Source: Author’s calculations using Table B2 and equations 9, 12 and 13 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
 
 
 
Table B15. Leisure Travelers’ Fare and Expenditure Elasticities for Long Distance 
Trips: Markets with Two Airlines 
Airline Largest  airline Smallest  airline 
Uncompensated fare elasticity 
-0.904*** -0.205*** Largest  airline (0.026) (0.003) 
-0.356*** -0.639*** Smallest  airline (0.001) (0.055) 
 1.073***  0.844*** Expenditure elasticity (0.00002) (0.00002) 
Compensated fare elasticity 
-0.173***  0.371*** Largest  airline (0.026) (0.019) 
-0.014*** -0.371*** Smallest  airline (0.001) (0.055) 
Source: Author’s calculations using Table B3 and equations 9, 12 and 13 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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Table B16. Leisure Travelers’ Fare and Expenditure Elasticities: Markets with Three 
Airlines 
Airline Largest  airline Second largest  airline Smallest  airline 
Uncompensated fare elasticity 
-0.878*** -0.150*** -0.185*** Largest  airline (0.034) (0.048) (0.002) 
-0.125*** -0.795***  0.104*** Second largest  airline (0.001) (0.048) (0.040) 
-0.103***  0.045 -0.707*** Smallest  airline 
(0.014) (1.007) (0.074) 
 1.106***  0.900***  0.789*** Expenditure elasticity (0.074) (0.007) (0.010) 
Compensated fare elasticity 
-0.246***  0.365***  0.266*** Largest  airline (0.034) (0.049) (0.060) 
 0.171*** -0.555***  0.314*** Second largest  airline (0.023) (0.041) (0.043) 
 0.075***  0.190*** -0.580*** Smallest  airline 
(0.017) (0.026) (0.034) 
Source: Author’s calculations using Table 18 and equations 9, 12 and 13 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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Table B17. Leisure Travelers’ Fare and Expenditure Elasticities for short Distance Trips: 
Markets with Three Airlines 
Airline Largest  airline Second largest  airline Smallest  airline 
Uncompensated fare elasticity 
-0.887*** -0.088 -0.251*** Largest  airline (0.093) (0.139) (0.028) 
-0.162*** -0.721***  0.102 Second largest  airline (0.006) (0.142) (0.071) 
-0.167***  0.036 -0.474*** Smallest  airline 
(0.048) (1.024) (0.211) 
 1.215***  0.772***  0.623*** Expenditure elasticity (0.211) (0.042) (0.062) 
Compensated fare elasticity 
-0.197**  0.351***  0.103 Largest  airline (0.099) (0.147) (0.171) 
 0.167*** -0.512***  0.270*** Second largest  airline (0.070) (0.130) (0.123) 
 0.029  0.161*** -0.373*** Smallest  airline 
(0.049) (0.073) (0.099) 
Source: Author’s calculations using Table B4 and equations 9, 12 and 13 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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Table B18. Leisure Travelers’ Fare and Expenditure Elasticities for Medium Distance 
Trips: Markets with Three Airlines 
Airline Largest  airline Second largest  airline Smallest  airline 
Uncompensated fare elasticity 
-0.931*** -0.103 -0.089 Largest  airline (0.058) (0.088) (0.084) 
-0.099*** -0.825***  0.084 Second largest  airline (0.002) (0.087) (0.066) 
-0.068***  0.032 -0.786*** Smallest  airline 
(0.028) (1.015) (0.133) 
 1.099***  0.897***  0.791*** Expenditure elasticity (0.133) (0.011) (0.017) 
Compensated fare elasticity 
-0.285***  0.424***  0.376*** Largest  airline (0.058) (0.087) (0.111) 
 0.190*** -0.589***  0.292*** Second largest  airline (0.039) (0.070) (0.074) 
 0.095***  0.165*** -0.668*** Smallest  airline 
(0.028) (0.042) (0.058) 
Source: Author’s calculations using Table B5 and equations 9, 12 and 13 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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Table B19. Leisure Travelers’ Fare and Expenditure Elasticities for Long Distance 
Trips: Markets with Three Airlines 
Airline Largest  airline Second largest  airline Smallest  airline 
Uncompensated fare elasticity 
-0.789*** -0.256*** -0.243*** Largest  airline (0.061) (0.080) (0.036) 
-0.196*** -0.678***  0.100 Second largest  airline (0.002) (0.080) (0.062) 
-0.145***  0.048 -0.642*** Smallest  airline 
(0.029) (1.015) (0.108) 
 1.130***  0.885***  0.785*** Expenditure elasticity (0.108) (0.014) (0.018) 
Compensated fare elasticity 
-0.176***  0.225***  0.184*** Largest  airline (0.061) (0.079) (0.088) 
 0.114*** -0.435***  0.315*** Second largest  airline (0.040) (0.066) (0.063) 
 0.062***  0.210*** -0.499*** Smallest  airline 
(0.030) (0.042) (0.061) 
Source: Author’s calculations using Table B6 and equations 9, 12 and 13 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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Table B20. Leisure Travelers’ Fare and Expenditure Elasticities: Markets with Four 
Airlines 
Airline Largest  
airline 
Second largest  
airline 
Third largest  
airline 
Smallest  
airline 
Uncompensated fare elasticity 
-0.952*** -0.003 -0.086*** -0.064 Largest  airline (0.049) (0.054) (0.062) (0.061) 
-0.089*** -0.918***  0.132*** -0.012 Second largest  
airline (0.028) (0.053) (0.040) (0.047) 
-0.105***  0.077*** -0.875***  0.074 Third largest  
airline (0.015) (0.027) (0.062) (0.042) 
-0.070*** -0.021  0.051*** -0.723*** Smallest  airline 
(0.015) (0.022) (0.012) (0.094) 
 1.216***  0.864***  0.864***  0.724*** Expenditure 
elasticity (0.014) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) 
Compensated fare elasticity 
-0.383***  0.402***  0.282***  0.275*** Largest  airline (0.049) (0.053) (0.062) (0.066) 
 0.214*** -0.702***  0.329***  0.169*** Second largest  
airline (0.006) (0.053) (0.040) (0.050) 
 0.103***  0.225*** -0.740***  0.198*** Third largest  
airline (0.023) (0.027) (0.062) (0.044) 
 0.066***  0.075***  0.139*** -0.643*** Smallest  airline 
(0.016) (0.022) (0.029) (0.094) 
Source: Author’s calculations using Table 19 and equations 9, 12 and 13 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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Table B21. Leisure Travelers’ Fare and Expenditure Elasticities for Short Distance 
Trips: Markets with Four Airlines 
Airline Largest  
airline 
Second largest  
airline 
Third largest  
airline 
Smallest  
airline 
Uncompensated fare elasticity 
-1.324***  0.181  0.525*  0.421 Largest  airline (0.165) (0.229) (0.282) (0.448) 
-0.064 -0.961***  0.134  0.032 Second largest  
airline (0.111) (0.239) (0.236) (0.315) 
 0.062  0.096 -1.219*** -0.182 Third largest  
airline (0.101) (0.170) (0.308) (0.277) 
 0.012  0.009 -0.210 -0.884 Smallest  airline 
(0.092) (0.151) (0.184) (0.615) 
 1.313***  0.675***  0.675***  0.613*** Expenditure 
elasticity (0.065) (0.099) (0.130) (0.179) 
Compensated fare elasticity 
-0.647***  0.529***  0.881***  0.738 Largest  airline (0.183) (0.250) (0.318) (0.448) 
 0.229*** -0.811***  0.288  0.169 Second largest  
airline (0.029) (0.250) (0.236) (0.319) 
 0.267***  0.202 -1.111*** -0.086 Third largest  
airline (0.096) (0.165) (0.318) (0.276) 
 0.151  0.080 -0.137 -0.820 Smallest  airline 
(0.092) (0.150) (0.186) (0.615) 
Source: Author’s calculations using Table B7 and equations 9, 12 and 13 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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Table B22. Leisure Travelers’ Fare and Expenditure Elasticities for Medium Distance 
Trips: Markets with Four Airlines 
Airline Largest  
airline 
Second largest  
airline 
Third largest  
airline 
Smallest  
airline 
Uncompensated fare elasticity 
-0.975*** -0.005 -0.063 -0.001 Largest  airline (0.071) (0.081) (0.093) (0.065) 
-0.095*** -0.884***  0.158*** -0.090 Second largest  
airline (0.042) (0.081) (0.063) (0.058) 
-0.094***  0.094*** -0.885***  0.025 Third largest  
airline (0.033) (0.042) (0.093) (0.073) 
-0.053*** -0.051  0.010 -0.654*** Smallest  airline 
(0.024) (0.036) (0.040) (0.004) 
 1.218***  0.846***  0.780***  0.719*** Expenditure 
elasticity (0.022) (0.027) (0.030) (0.035) 
Compensated fare elasticity 
-0.392***  0.400***  0.311***  0.343*** Largest  airline (0.071) (0.080) (0.093) (0.108) 
 0.209*** -0.673***  0.353***  0.090 Second largest  
airline (0.010) (0.080) (0.063) (0.086) 
 0.108***  0.235*** -0.756***  0.145* Third largest  
airline (0.032) (0.042) (0.093) (0.075) 
 0.076***  0.038  0.092*** -0.578*** Smallest  airline 
(0.020) (0.030) (0.037) (0.117) 
Source: Author’s calculations using Table B8 and equations 9, 12 and 13 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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Table B23. Leisure Travelers’ Fare and Expenditure Elasticities for Long Distance 
Trips: Markets with Four Airlines 
Airline Largest  
airline 
Second largest  
airline 
Third largest  
airline 
Smallest  
airline 
Uncompensated fare elasticity 
-0.866*** -0.043 -0.168** -0.180*** Largest  airline (0.071) (0.075) (0.086) (0.041) 
-0.103*** -0.921***  0.116***  0.061** Second largest  
airline (0.040) (0.074) (0.053) (0.031) 
-0.134***  0.067* -0.839***  0.139*** Third largest  
airline (0.033) (0.037) (0.085) (0.055) 
-0.099***  0.012  0.116*** -0.764*** Smallest  airline 
(0.022) (0.030) (0.027) (0.123) 
 1.202***  0.885***  0.806***  0.746*** Expenditure 
elasticity (0.018) (0.020) (0.022) (0.024) 
Compensated fare elasticity 
-0.317***  0.361***  0.201***  0.161*** Largest  airline (0.070) (0.073) (0.085) (0.087) 
 0.199*** -0.699***  0.319***  0.248*** Second largest  
airline (0.008) (0.073) (0.053) (0.065) 
 0.077***  0.223*** -0.698***  0.269*** Third largest  
airline (0.033) (0.037) (0.085) (0.057) 
 0.041*  0.115***  0.210*** -0.678*** Smallest  airline 
(0.022) (0.030) (0.038) (0.123) 
Source: Author’s calculations using Table B9 and equations 9, 12 and 13 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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Table B24. Leisure Travelers’ Fare and Expenditure Elasticities: Markets with Five-and-
More Airlines 
Airline Largest  
airline 
Second 
largest  
airline 
Third largest  
airline 
Fourth 
largest  
airline 
Smallest  
airline 
Uncompensated fare elasticity 
-0.854*** -0.011 -0.065 -0.145*** -0.211*** Largest  airline (0.060) (0.045) (0.051) (0.057) (0.060) 
-0.060*** -0.975***  0.025  0.062  0.041 Second largest  
airline (0.029) (0.040) (0.031) (0.038) (0.042) 
-0.080***  0.009 -0.881***  0.023  0.036 Third largest  
airline (0.025) (0.024) (0.036) (0.033) (0.036) 
-0.095***  0.022  0.013 -0.875***  0.114*** Fourth largest  
airline (0.021) (0.022) (0.025) (0.041) (0.034) 
-0.095***  0.0002  0.009  0.077*** -0.762*** Smallest  
airline (0.013) (0.019) (0.022) (0.026) (0.097) 
 1.185***  0.955***  0.867***  0.858***  0.783*** Expenditure 
elasticity (0.021) (0.017) (0.018) (0.020) (0.026) 
Compensated fare elasticity 
-0.420***  0.339***  0.253***  0.170***  0.076 Largest  airline (0.060) (0.045) (0.052) (0.057) (0.065) 
 0.214*** -0.754***  0.226***  0.260***  0.222*** Second largest  
airline (0.028) (0.040) (0.031) (0.038) (0.047) 
 0.125***  0.174*** -0.731***  0.171***  0.171*** Third largest  
airline (0.024) (0.023) (0.031) (0.032) (0.040) 
 0.061***  0.148***  0.126*** -0.762***  0.216*** Fourth largest  
airline (0.020) (0.022) (0.025) (0.038) (0.037) 
 0.020  0.093***  0.094***  0.161*** -0.686*** Smallest  
airline (0.017) (0.020) (0.023) (0.028) (0.097) 
Source: Author’s calculations using Table 20 and equations 9, 12 and 13 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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Table B25. Leisure Travelers’ Fare and Expenditure Elasticities for Medium Distance 
Trips: Markets with Five-and-More Airlines 
Airline Largest  
airline 
Second 
largest  
airline 
Third largest  
airline 
Fourth 
largest  
airline 
Smallest  
airline 
Uncompensated fare elasticity 
-0.815*** -0.163 -0.062 -0.047 -0.206 Largest  airline (0.131) (0.110) (0.125) (0.141) (0.693) 
-0.163*** -1.091***  0.114  0.368***  0.223 Second largest  
airline (0.062) (0.096) (0.081) (0.088) (0.412) 
-0.097  0.060 -0.776*** -0.076 -0.027 Third largest  
airline (0.051) (0.058) (0.089) (0.075) (0.330) 
-0.077  0.173*** -0.067 -1.043***  0.075 Fourth largest  
airline (0.044) (0.048) (0.057) (0.091) (0.283) 
-0.105  0.069 -0.029  0.053 -0.754 Smallest  
airline (0.169) (0.174) (0.195) (0.221) (0.916) 
 1.257***  0.952***  0.761***  0.745***  0.689 Expenditure 
elasticity (0.042) (0.040) (0.042) (0.045) (0.916) 
Compensated fare elasticity 
-0.321***  0.211  0.237*  0.246  0.065 Largest  airline (0.129) (0.108) (0.123) (0.139) (0.693) 
 0.121** -0.876***  0.286***  0.536***  0.379 Second largest  
airline (0.062) (0.096) (0.081) (0.088) (0.412) 
 0.107**  0.215*** -0.652***  0.045  0.085 Third largest  
airline (0.051) (0.058) (0.090) (0.075) (0.330) 
 0.077  0.290***  0.026 -0.951***  0.160 Fourth largest  
airline (0.043) (0.048) (0.057) (0.091) (0.283) 
 0.016  0.160  0.044  0.125 -0.688 Smallest  
airline (0.169) (0.174) (0.195) (0.221) (0.916) 
Source: Author’s calculations using Table B10 and equations 9, 12 and 13 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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Table B26. Leisure Travelers’ Fare and Expenditure Elasticities for Long Distance 
Trips: Markets with Five-and-More Airlines 
Airline Largest  
airline 
Second 
largest  
airline 
Third largest  
airline 
Fourth 
largest  
airline 
Smallest  
airline 
Uncompensated fare elasticity 
-0.869***  0.031 -0.056 -0.173*** -0.219*** Largest  airline (0.066) (0.048) (0.055) (0.060) (0.065) 
-0.026 -0.936*** -0.011 -0.022 -0.010 Second largest  
airline (0.032) (0.044) (0.034) (0.042) (0.048) 
-0.069*** -0.014 -0.905***  0.043  0.057 Third largest  
airline (0.028) (0.026) (0.040) (0.036) (0.042) 
-0.100*** -0.022  0.028 -0.820***  0.124*** Fourth largest  
airline (0.023) (0.024) (0.028) (0.044) (0.038) 
-0.094*** -0.019  0.021  0.083*** -0.760*** Smallest  
airline (0.015) (0.021) (0.025) (0.028) (0.106) 
 1.157***  0.960***  0.899***  0.889***  0.808*** Expenditure 
elasticity (0.023) (0.019) (0.020) (0.022) (0.140) 
Compensated fare elasticity 
-0.453***  0.376***  0.267***  0.147***  0.071 Largest  airline (0.066) (0.048) (0.056) (0.060) (0.070) 
 0.244*** -0.712***  0.199***  0.185***  0.178*** Second largest  
airline (0.031) (0.043) (0.034) (0.042) (0.052) 
 0.135***  0.154*** -0.747***  0.199***  0.199*** Third largest  
airline (0.027) (0.025) (0.040) (0.036) (0.046) 
 0.055***  0.106***  0.148*** -0.702***  0.232*** Fourth largest  
airline (0.022) (0.024) (0.027) (0.044) (0.041) 
 0.019  0.075***  0.109***  0.170*** -0.681*** Smallest  
airline (0.019) (0.022) (0.025) (0.030) (0.027) 
Source: Author’s calculations using Table B11 and equations 9, 12 and 13 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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APPENDIX C 
EXPENDITURE AND FARE ELASTICITIES: BUSINESS TRAVELERS  
 
 
Table C1. Business Travelers’ Fare and Expenditure Elasticities for all Observation: 
Markets with Two Airlines 
Airline Largest  airline Smallest  airline 
Uncompensated fare elasticity 
-0.931*** -0.149*** Largest  airline (0.048) (0.007) 
-0.334*** -0.704*** Smallest  airline (0.001) (0.078) 
 1.069***  0.853*** Expenditure elasticity (0.00003) (0.00003) 
Compensated fare elasticity 
-0.202***  0.433*** Largest  airline (0.034) (0.005) 
 0.005*** -0.433*** Smallest  airline (0.001) (0.074) 
Source: Author’s calculations using Table 27 and equations 9, 12 and 13 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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Table C2. Business Travelers’ Fare and Expenditure Elasticities for all observation: 
Markets with Three Airlines 
Airline Largest  airline Second largest  airline Smallest  airline
Uncompensated fare elasticity 
-0.668*** -0.219*** -0.409*** Largest  airline (0.109) (0.097) (0.121) 
-0.170*** -0.771***  0.004 Second largest  airline (0.005) (0.096) (0.218) 
-0.227*** -0.049 -0.370 Smallest  airline 
(0.105) (1.046) (0.332) 
 1.065***  1.039***  0.775*** Expenditure elasticity (0.331) (0.028) (0.033) 
Compensated fare elasticity 
-0.173  0.264*** -0.049 Largest  airline (0.106) (0.094) (0.251) 
 0.194*** -0.416***  0.269 Second largest  airline (0.069) (0.117) (0.217) 
-0.020  0.153 -0.220** Smallest  airline 
(0.105) (0.123) (0.106) 
Source: Author’s calculations using Table 28 and equations 9, 12 and 13 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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APPENDIX D 
VARIABLES DESCRIPTION 
 
Average Fare ( inp ): The average one-way fare paid by every traveler with airline “i” at 
city pair “n”.  
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                           i : the airline, i=1,2,3,4,5 
                           k : number of passengers paying the same fare, k=1,…, K  
        m : number of observations for the “n” city pair served by airline “i”,       
m=1,…,M  
        n: city pair, n=1,…., N 
The Relative Fare (P )in :  The average fare paid to airline “i” divided by the average fare 
paid to the smallest airline in the same city pair and same market.  
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Airline Revenue at Specific City Pair: The total expenditure by travelers using the 
services of that specific airline at specific city pair. 
            ∑=
m
mmin farekE *                               
                           I : the airline, I==1,2,3,4,5 
 160
k : number of passengers paying the same fare, k=1,…, K  
m : number of observations for the “n” city pair served by airline “i”,          
m=1,…,M  
 n: city pair, n=1,…., N  
Total Expenditure on Air Travel at a City Cair: The sum of total expenditure on air 
travel on each airline at that specific city pair;  
           ∑
=
=
I
i
inn EE
1
 
                           i : the airline, i=1,2,3,4,5 
n: city pair, n=1,…., N 
The Airline Share: Airline revenue at a given city pair divided by the total expenditure 
on air travel at that city pair. 

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n
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E
s  , and the sum is equal to one for each city pair.  
i : the airline, i=1,2,3,4,5 
n: city pair, n=1,…., N 
Stone Fare index: The Fare index of air travel at a given city pair weighted by airline 
shares. 
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i : the airline, i=1,2,3,4,5 
n: city pair, n=1,…., N 
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APPENDIX E 
ESTIMATION OF THE DELETED EQUATION PARAMETERS 
 
From the specification of the model, the parameters are calculated as the following: 
21 ˆˆ0ˆ iiilowest γγγ −−=  where i is the largest or second largest airline 
21
ˆˆ0ˆ βββ −−=lowest  where 1 refers to largest  and to second largest  airlines 
21 ˆˆ1ˆ ααα −−=lowest  
 
The variances of the parameters can be calculated by using the delta method as 
following: 
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and same way for the other parameters. 
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APPENDIX F 
AIRLINES’ NAMES 
 
Table C1. List of Airlines Used in the Dissertation     
Airline Name Group DOT Code 
American Airlines, Inc. Major AA 
Alaska Airlines, Inc. Major AS 
Continental Air Lines, Inc. Major CO 
Delta Air Lines, Inc. Major DL 
America West Airlines, Inc. Major HP 
American Eagle Airlines,inc Major MQ 
Northwest Airlines, Inc. Major NW 
American Trans Air, Inc. Major TZ 
United Air Lines, Inc. Major UA 
US Airways, Inc. Major US 
Southwest Airlines, Co. Major WN 
Discovery Airways, Inc. National DH 
Atlantic Southeast Airlines National EV 
Comair, Inc. National OH 
Executive Airlines National OW 
Expressjet Airlines, Inc. National RU 
Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp National ZW 
Chautauqua Airlines, Inc National RP 
Skywest Airlines, Inc. National OO 
Continental Micronesia Regional CS 
Air Midwest, Inc. Regional ZV 
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APPENDIX G 
HOMOGENEITY AND SYMMETRY RESTRICTIONS TESTS 
 
Table G1. Homogeneity and Symmetry Restrictions: Likelihood Ratio Test Results  
 Homogeneity and 
Symmetry 
Homogeneity Symmetry Homogeneity 
single equation 
test a  
 14.93  0 accept Markets with 
two airlines   (0.001)  1 reject 
  9.81   1.45  8.82 2 accept Markets with 
three airlines (0.020) (0.485) (0.003) 0 reject 
16.22  9.84  4.37 1 accept Markets with 
four airlines (0.012) (0.020) (0.220) 2 reject 
26.14 15.33  9.76 3 accept Markets with 
five-and-  
more airlines (0.003) (0.004) 
(0.135) 1 reject 
Probabilities are in parentheses 
A: shows number of equations the homogeneity restriction was accepted or rejected.  
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APPENDIX H 
CROSS AND OWN-FARE ELASTICITY: COMPARISON 
 
Table H1. Uncompensated Cross & Own-Fare Elasticities Using Capps Jr. et al. (2003) 
Formulas: Markets with Three Airlines 
Airline Largest  airline Second largest  airline Smallest  airline
Uncompensated fare elasticity: leisure travelers 
Largest  airline -0.871 -0.148 -0.079 
Second largest  airline -0.130 -0.801  0.104 
Smallest  airline -0.122  0.044 -0.728 
Uncompensated fare elasticity: business travelers 
Largest  airline -0.680 -0.222 -0.380 
Second largest  airline -0.164 -0.776  0.057 
Smallest  airline -0.237 -0.046 -0.316 
Uncompensated fare elasticity: all observations 
Largest  airline -0.896 -0.107 -0.068 
Second largest  airline -0.110 -0.818  0.067 
Smallest  airline -0.117  0.022 -0.704 
Source: Author calculations using equations 10 and 11 
 
Table H2. Differences in Calculated Uncompensated Cross & Own-Fare Elasticities 
Using Capps Jr. et al. (2003) and Common Formulas: Markets with Three Airlines 
Airline Largest  airline Second largest  airline Smallest  airline
Uncompensated fare elasticity: leisure travelers 
Largest  airline  0.007  0.002  0.106 
Second largest  airline -0.006 -0.006  0.000 
Smallest  airline -0.018 -0.001 -0.020 
Uncompensated fare elasticity: business travelers 
Largest  airline -0.011 -0.003  0.030 
Second largest  airline  0.006 -0.005  0.053 
Smallest  airline -0.010  0.003  0.054 
Uncompensated fare elasticity: all observations 
Largest  airline  0.006  0.000  0.104 
Second largest  airline -0.004 -0.005  0.002 
Smallest  airline -0.018  0.000 -0.021 
Source: Author calculations from Tables A16, B16, C2 and H1. 
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